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Abstract                                                                                                                                                       
Economic and Religious Significance of the Islamic and Conventional Pawnbroking in 
Malaysia: Behavioural and Perception Analysis                                                                           
Azila Abdul Razak 
Operating alongside with the formal financial sector, there has been less recognition 
about the important role played by informal finance through their complementary role in 
providing credit to the society. Among informal finance, pawnshop has grown in 
importance over the past few years especially during the tough economic climate. In 
Malaysia for instance, the pawnbroking business has served people in need of small 
instant cash since the 19
th
 century in various forms. Due to the excessive interest rate and 
other malpractices imposed by the conventional pawnshops, Malaysian government 
initiated the first Islamic pawnbroking in 1992 which was set up by the Terengganu 
Islamic Religious and Malay Customs Council namely as the Muassasah Gadaian Islam 
Terengganu, which has experienced an overwhelming success in terms of expanding in 
the informal economy. In 2010, there were 329 of institutions offering Islamic 
pawnbroking operating side by side with 259 licensed conventional pawnshops which 
shows a remarkable increase in the Islamic pawnbroking. 
 
Given this background, the research aim is to explore and analyse the socio-economic 
consequences of pawnshops crediting in Malaysia through the perceptions of the 
participants. In doing so, this study will examine the factors determining people‟s 
preferences for pawnshop and also exploring the perceptions and opinions of the 
customers and the participating pawnbrokers in Malaysia on various aspects and 
consequences of pawnbroking. Importantly, it will analyze specifically the impact of 
Islamic pawnbroking on the socio-economy of the Malaysian society. 
In an attempt to fulfill the aims of the research study, first, the questionnaires survey were 
administered to both customers and pawnbrokers of the conventional and Islamic 
pawnshops in order to distinguish the processes of lending, factors determining 
pawnshops‟ selection, and also the perceptions of Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers 
regarding the role of pawnshop institution in social development hence in economic 
development related issues. Second, a semi-structured interview were subsequently 
conducted with the leading individuals of the Islamic pawnbrokers in order to develop in-
depth ideas and understanding about the underlying principle of Islamic pawnbroking and 
other issues related. Furthermore, a SWOT analysis is employed to analyse the prospect 
of Islamic pawnbroking in future with possible recommendations that could be 
considered by the government, pawnbrokers, and the customers as well. 
 
The findings from the surveys analysis demonstrate that the customers of Islamic 
pawnshops attest the positive role of pawnshop in both economic and social aspects of 
their lives especially in the case of low-income groups as compared to the conventional 
pawnshops. On the other hand, the results from the pawnbrokers‟ analysis revealed that 
Islamic pawnbrokers demonstrated a promising prospect of the pawnshops‟ business as 
compared to the conventional pawnbrokers as the latter operates with profit maximization 
and neglect the social welfare of the customer. Importantly, while the findings of the 
study renders valuable information in terms of behavioural dimension and customer 
preferences in pawnbroking, the findings are also useful for the businesses and 
government in considering the future development related to ar-rahn shops.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Throughout the world, emerging economies use various types of informal financing 
such as moneylenders or pawnbrokers before more sophisticated formal banking 
systems ever develop. Operating alongside the formal financial sector, there has been 
less recognition of the important role of informal finance although they have played a 
complementary role in providing credit to the society for so many years. As stated by 
Ghate et al. (1992: 3), the informal financial sector tends to be hidden from view due 
to their loans that are relatively small and the sensitivity attached to credit on lenders 
and borrowers which make it a particularly difficult subject for empirical studies.  
Among informal finance, pawnshops have grown in importance over the past few 
years especially during the tough economic climate. In Malaysia, for instance, the 
pawnbroking business has served society in need of small, instant cash since the 15
th
 
century through the diplomatic relationship between the government of Malacca
1
 and 
China. This continued to flourish in the 19
th
 century when the Chinese immigrant 
came to work in the tin industries and other trading.  
It should be stated that, in terms of the working mechanism, pawnbrokers lend money 
based on collateral provided by the borrower and then charge an interest rate upon this 
loan, which is the main way for them to derive income. While pawnbroking is a 
commonly used method of financing in the low strata of the society, Adnan (2004) 
lists nine weaknesses of conventional pawnshops operating in Malaysia, which 
includes the excessive interest rates charged by pawnbrokers. The concern over high 
interest rates and the usurious and exploitative activities imposed by the pawnbrokers 
explains the negative perception of this business among society.   
                                                          
1
 Malacca is a small state on the Western of Peninsular Malaysia which experienced an amazing 
historical, cultural, and economical influence during the Malay Sultanate (1400 – 1511). Retrieved 5th 
June 2009 from: http://www.lecco.polimi.it/premiolecco/premiolecco2007/MalaccaHistory.pdf. 
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With the significant growth of Islamic banking and finance since the establishment of 
the Lembaga Tabung Haji, used to facilitate savings for pilgrimage to Makkah in 
1963 and the first Islamic bank in 1983, the Malaysian Islamic financial sector has 
become one of the most progressive and attractive in the world. In terms of 
pawnbroking, Malaysia has once again become a pioneer of Islamic pawnbroking 
with the establishment of the Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT), which 
was set up by the Terengganu Islamic Religious and Malay Customs Council 
(MAIDAM) in 1992 (Abdul Razak, 2008). The Prime Minister of Malaysia (Najib 
Tun Razak), in his speech at one of the YaPEIM programmes on 28
th
 June 2010, 
stated that the scheme needs to be widened because “firstly, it is in accordance with 
Islamic principles, secondly it is simple, thirdly the system is fair, furthermore it will 
avoid borrowers from going to the loan sharks and conventional pawnshops which 
charge high interest rates”.2 In 2010, there were 329 institutions offering Islamic 
pawnbroking operating side by side with 259 licensed conventional pawnshops, 
which showed a remarkable increase in Islamic pawnbroking, despite the fact that 
they had only been established in 1992 as compared to the conventional pawnshops 
that have been operating since the 19
th
 century. 
This research study arose out of a need to know more about the characteristics of 
pawnshops operating in Malaysia in an attempt to transform pawnbroking‟s shady 
image of a mechanism for making money from other people‟s misery, to that with a 
positive impact, in the sense that it will be able to enhance the socio-economic status 
and well-being of the Malaysians, especially the low-income and high risk groups, by 
providing short-term financing. This negative perception will be shed with the 
existence of Islamic pawnbroking, which is permissible according to shari‟ah 
principles which encourage positive attributes such as fairness, justice, transparency, 
and honesty to the borrowers as well as to the lenders. 
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The research aims to explore and analyse the socio-economic consequences of 
pawnshops crediting in Malaysia through the perceptions of the participants. In doing 
                                                          
2
 Retrieved 28
th
 June 2010 from: 
http://www.cibafi.org/NewsCenter/English/Details.aspx?Id=8859&Cat=0. 
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so, it will analyse specifically the impact of Islamic pawnbroking on the socio-
economy of Malaysian society. This study also examines the factors determining 
people‟s preferences for pawnshop. Importantly, this study also aims to explore the 
perceptions and opinions of the participating pawnbrokers in Malaysia.   
The following objectives will be fulfilled to reach the research aim: 
(i)  To explore the role of the informal financial markets that fill the gap created 
by mainstream financial institutions towards constraining credit to the 
financially „excluded‟ part of society; 
(ii)  To provide an overview of the history and characteristics of conventional 
and Islamic pawnshops operating in Malaysia that provide small credit to the 
Malaysian population; 
(iii) To provide an overview of the mechanism of Islamic pawnbroking which 
eliminates the element of interest, avoids unethical procedures, and aims for 
social justice, which are areas of weakness in conventional pawnshops; 
(iv) To identify the difference between conventional pawnshops and Islamic 
pawnshops in lending, redeeming, auctioning, complaining, and 
compensation and regulatory processes through questionnaires;  
(v)  To analyse the role of each pawnshop in enhancing the socio-economic 
status of society from the customers and pawnbrokers point of view through 
questionnaires; 
(vi) To analyse potential and future prospects of Islamic pawnbroking as an 
alternative to conventional pawnshops through interviews; and 
(vii) To suggest recommendations to the customers, pawnbrokers, and policy 
makers for the sustainability of Islamic pawnbroking. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions of this study are as follows: 
 4 
(i) What are the socio-demographic attributes of customers who get loans from 
pawnshop? 
(ii) What is the opinion of customers of conventional and Islamic pawnbroking 
in Malaysia regarding the role of pawnshops in solving financial exclusion?  
(iii) What is the opinion of the different groups in Malaysia regarding the role of 
pawnshops in solving socio-economic issues? 
(iv) What is the opinion of different groups in Malaysia regarding the role of 
pawnshops as an alternative to formal financial institutions? 
(v) Does faith contribute to the choice of pawnshop? 
(vi) Is financing for production purposes instead of consumption purposes 
supportive to the socio-economic development of customers? 
(vii) What is the opinion of customers in Malaysia towards the services provided 
by pawnshops? 
(viii) Can Islamic pawnbrokers sustain their business without charging any fee or 
for a small percentage of safekeeping fees?  
(ix) Is there any dilemma between social responsibility and profit maximisation 
in the Islamic pawnbrokers‟ point of view? 
(x) Is there any attempt from the selected Islamic pawnbroking institutions to 
standardise their policies and regulations? 
(xi) Is there any agreement between customers and pawnbrokers on the factors 
influencing pawnshop preferences?   
(xii) Do the processes held in the pawnshop tally with the regulations provided in 
the Pawnbrokers Act 1972?   
(xiii) What is the ultimate role of pawnshops from the perspective of the 
pawnbroker itself? 
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1.4 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Even though pawnshops were one of the most popular informal financing methods in 
early traditional Malay society, there have been limited studies of pawnbroking, 
regardless of the type of pawnshops that exist in Malaysia. Perhaps one of the reasons 
that pawnbroking has been understudied is that people do not really understand what 
pawning is. Literally, pawning involves a transaction using a piece of movable 
property as collateral to secure a short-term cash loan (Wolloson, 1964). Historically, 
pawnbrokers are criticised as being usurious and profiting by exploiting the poor, 
leading to an unsavoury image while ignoring the positive features of this credit 
provider, which can impact social and economic growth negatively. Perhaps, because 
they are frequented by people of low-income who seem to desperately need quick 
money, their image has been tarnished. 
The image of pawnshops, however, has gradually improved due to the establishment 
of Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia in 1992, which is free from riba and gharar, and 
enjoys transparent microcredit facilities. Although Islamic pawnbroking is relatively 
new in Malaysia, its existence has influenced the end users of short term credit 
market. Ever since the introduction of the scheme, the demand for it has increased 
continuously. For example, YaPEIM (Malaysian Islamic Economic Development 
Foundation) experienced an increase in the number of branches, customers, 
transactions, and financing in the last five years of operation. 
Table 1.1: Total Loan Disbursement for YaPEIM from 2005 to 2009 
Year Total of Branch Total of Customer Total of Transaction Total of Financing 
(RM) 
2005 19 5,908 43,050 29,724,957 
2006 26 7,199 49,406 41,947,707 
2007 32 11,082 62,939 58,661,734 
2008 54 28,019 112,484 133,217,176 
2009 64 39,394 182,081 254,310,418 
Source: YaPEIM (2009). 
This study, hence, is expected to fill the gaps in informal financing as well as Islamic 
micro credit literature through understanding the nature of both pawnshops and their 
significant role to both the social and economic aspects of society in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, this study also suggests several recommendations that would be useful 
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to Islamic pawnbrokers and policy makers in order to promote Islamic pawnbroking 
as an alternative to conventional pawnbroking in Malaysia. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research is conducted using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods. First, two questionnaires are distributed to both the customers and 
pawnbrokers of conventional and Islamic pawnshops in order to explore the 
characteristics of both pawnshops, factors determining the pawnshops‟ selection, and 
to examine the perceptions of Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers on the role of 
the pawnshop institution in social development and economic growth.  
Second, a semi-structured interview was subsequently conducted with the pioneers of 
Islamic pawnbrokers in order to develop in-depth ideas and to understand the 
underlying principles of Islamic pawnbroking, the prospect of this institution in the 
future and other related issues.  
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. The introduction chapter provides a background of 
the study, the research aim and objectives, research motivation, research methodology 
and a summary of each chapter. The remaining chapters of this thesis are organised as 
follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the relationship between economic growth and financial 
development. Several issues, such as the financial exclusion of low-income groups 
from the main financial institutions are a result of the lack of creditworthiness and 
also the role of the informal financial markets that can outreach the demand of these 
groups are also being discussed in this chapter.  
Chapter 3 introduces the history of pawnshops as an alternative credit provider to 
those in society that are excluded from mainstream financial institutions. Several 
issues related to pawnshops, such as their role as a credit provider to low-income 
groups, the regulations imposed in terms of interest rate charges, entries and 
competition, non rate regulatory and stolen goods, transaction costs, transportation 
costs, gold as pledge, pawnshops as an alternative to mainstream financial institutions, 
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and pawnshops as an alternative institution in economic downturns are also addressed 
in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 elaborates the concept of pawnbroking in the shari‟ah framework which 
eliminates the elements of riba and gharar in the transaction and promotes social 
justice. This chapter also reviews the experience of several countries, such as 
Thailand, Brunei, and Indonesia, which have established Islamic pawnbroking 
services after Malaysia.  
Chapter 5 renders an overview of the history of pawnshops in Malaysia and explores 
the weaknesses of traditional pawnshops which lead to the establishment of Islamic 
pawnbroking in Malaysia in 1992 by the Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu 
(MGIT). Although the Islamic pawnbroking scheme seems to be the best solution to 
conventional pawnshops, there are still some issues in Islamic pawnbroking that need 
to be highlighted, based on prior studies such as the issue of the shari‟ah perspectives, 
capital and funding, pricing systems, pledge assets, location and loyalty, microcredit 
provision, and the potential for capital accumulation. 
Chapter 6 is the research methodology chapter and focuses on research design, 
method, instrument, sampling strategies, and hypotheses in order to answer the 
research questions. It also presents the research limitations and difficulties. 
Chapter 7, being the first empirical chapter, provides a brief descriptive analysis on 
the characteristics of the responding customers of pawnshops and pawnbrokers in 
order to develop a better understanding of the characteristics of both parties in this 
research. 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of the inferential statistical analysis through 
crosstabulation and other statistical analysis and hypotheses testing methods that were 
developed in the Research Methodology Chapter in order to explore the attributes, 
behaviours, and opinions of Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers on the role of the 
pawnshop institution in enhancing the socio-economic growth of society and the 
overall economic growth of Malaysia, and the future prospect of Islamic pawnbroking 
as opposed to the conventional pawnbroking system. From the results of the analysis, 
it may be concluded that the customers of Islamic pawnshops perceive the positive 
roles of pawnshops in both the economic and social aspects of their lives, especially 
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to the low-income groups, as compared to conventional pawnshops. On the other 
hand, results from the pawnbrokers‟ analysis revealed that Islamic pawnbrokers 
demonstrate a promising prospect for the pawnbroking business as compared to the 
conventional pawnbrokers, especially during the economic downturn when banks 
were very stringent in giving loans to the customers. 
Chapter 9 provides an analysis of the opinions of the early Malaysian pioneers of 
Islamic pawnbroking regarding their motivation for establishing Islamic-based 
pawnshops, and other significant issues underlying the Islamic pawnbroking business 
in Malaysia. Overall, the results from this semi-structured interview are useful to 
prospective customers, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, in order for them to opt for 
Islamic pawnbroking, which certainly does not involve riba and gharar and also 
promotes social justice. In addition, the findings are also useful for businesses and 
government to take the initiative to set up more ar-rahn shops and establish standard 
regulations in order to promote Islamic-based pawnbroking as an alternative to 
conventional pawnbroking in Malaysia. 
Chapter 10 summarizes the content of this thesis along with the research findings that 
relate to the existing literatures. It also discusses the prospect of Islamic pawnbroking 
in the future by using SWOT analysis, along with recommendations, and highlights 
the study‟s limitations and future research. 
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Chapter 2 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Financial institutions play an important role in the economic growth of all countries. 
Although there are various views regarding the importance of financial institutions in 
the economic growth of a nation, the general view is that they are considered the 
backbone of the economy. This chapter, hence, will explore the relationship between 
economic growth and financial development, and the role of other alternative 
financial institutions, such as the informal financial market, which has filled the gap 
created by mainstream financial institutions towards constraining credit to the 
„excluded‟ society. 
2.2 CREDIT AND CREDIT MARKETS 
The arrangement of „credit‟ involves two parties: the lender that gives loans and the 
borrower that receives the loans. Lenders, which can be either an individual or an 
organization, will set up certain regulations and restrictions to ensure the borrowers 
pay back their loans. In such a conventional setting, interest has to be paid on a loan, 
which is the amount a borrower pays a lender for the use of the funds borrowed.
3
 In 
addition to such conventional workings of economy and finance, there are other 
culturally or religiously formed alternative ways of economic and financial conduct. 
One of such systemic understanding is Islamic economics and finance, in which, 
interest is forbidden. The only permissible credit in Islamic economics is through zero 
interest loans which are also known as al-qardhul hasan or loans with a certain 
service charge (Ahmed, 2007: 364).  
Credit markets can be categorised into the formal and informal credit market, which 
are further elaborated in the following sections with the links of those markets 
towards economic growth also being discussed. Finally, the chapter will focus on one 
                                                          
3
 Retrieved 25
th
 May 2007 from: http://www.fmd.co.za/FMD/Reference_library/reference.htm.  
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instrument in informal credit markets, an important institution of which pawnshops 
are seen to play a significant role, especially in serving credit finance to low-income 
groups in developing countries where dual economy systems prevail and financial 
exclusion is still an issue in rural areas. 
2.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Economic growth is the ultimate objective of most, if not all, economies and has been 
the main subject of a large body of economic studies. In an attempt to discover the 
determinants of economic growth, economists have studied various influences; among 
them is the role of the financial markets in economic growth.  
In economic theory, initially it was considered that financial markets had no relevant 
role in promoting economic growth. What was thought to matter as determinants of 
economic growth were only technological progress and population growth (Solow, 
1956). The role of financial intermediation in the process of economic development 
had been ignored in 19
th
 Century classical literature until Bagehot (1873) argued that 
the significant role of financial systems and the money market in setting off 
industrialisation in England by allowing capital to flow across England in search of 
the projects with the highest rate of return. 
It was not until the arrival of Schumpeter
4
 (1911) that financial intermediation was 
explicitly presented. He argued that banks play a major role in economic development 
because they choose which firms get to use society‟s savings. According to this view, 
the banking sector alters the path of economic progress by affecting the allocation of 
savings and not necessarily by altering the saving rate. Thus, Schumpeter‟s view of 
finance and development highlights the impact of banks on productivity growth and 
technological change. 
According to Keynesian and neo-classical theories, low interest rates would promote 
investment spending and economic growth in developed and developing countries 
                                                          
4
 Schumpeter (1911: 107) argued for finance and development nexus as follows: “Granting credit in 
this sense operates as an order on the economic system to accommodate itself to the purposes of the 
entrepreneur, as an order on the goods which he needs: it means entrusting him with productive forces. 
It is only thus that economic development could arise from the mere circular flow in perfect 
equilibrium”.  
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(Molho, 1986: 90). This theory was challenged by McKinnon (1973) who analyzed an 
economy with very limited possibilities of external finance for the vast majority of 
investors. McKinnon (1973) argued that, “because of the lumpiness of physical 
capital, savers may find it convenient to accumulate funds in monetary assets until 
they have enough resources to invest in higher-yielding physical assets. The 
availability of deposits with positive real rates of return may thus encourage both 
saving and capital accumulation.” (McKinnon, 1973 as cited in Molho, 1986: 90-91)  
On the other hand, Pagano, (1993: 615-619) outlined three different channels through 
which finance can impact economic  growth within an endogenous growth model – 
the „AK‟ model, where aggregate output is a linear function of the aggregate capital 
stock. The resulting models showed that financial development can affect economic 
growth by: (i) increasing the proportion of savings funnelled to investment; and (ii) 
improving the allocation of funds to those projects where the marginal product of 
capital is highest. However, improvements in the household credit market and risk-
sharing (insurance markets) will lead to a decrease in the saving rate, hence the 
growth rate.  
The role played by financial intermediation in the development of the real activities of 
economy and the causality between them is still debated in economic development. 
The new classical view is that financial and monetary factors do not have any effect 
on real variables such as GDP growth and considers money as neutral. Lucas (1988) 
does not think that the financial system has any significant role in economic 
development. Economic development literature, represented by the work of the 
pioneers of economic development such as Bauer, Clark, Hirschman, Lewis, Rostow, 
Singer, and Tinbergen, simply ignored the linkages between finance and 
development. None of these pioneers mentions or lists the financial system as a 
contributor to the process of economic development (Chandavarkar, 1992). 
Empirically, in recent years, the issue of causality between the financial system and 
economic development has been the subject of a growing body of economic research.
5
 
Most of these studies find a strong link between the financial system and economic 
                                                          
5
 Refer to Levine (2004). 
 
 12 
growth. As Goldsmith (1969: 400) suggests, “the financial superstructure of the 
economy accelerates economic growth, and improves economic performance to the 
extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place in the 
economic system where the funds will yield the highest social return”.  
The positive relationship between financial development and economic growth 
predicted by Schumpeter (1911), has received considerable, empirical support from 
recent cross-country studies such as King and Levine (1993), and Beck et al. (2000). 
Using data on 80 countries over the 1960-1989 period, King and Levine (1993: 734) 
found that the indicators of the level of financial development, such as the size of the 
formal financial intermediary sector relative to GDP, the importance of banks relative 
to the central bank, the percentage of credit allocated to private firms, and the ratio of 
credit issued to private firms to GDP, are strongly and robustly correlated with 
growth, the rate of physical capital accumulation, and improvements in the efficiency 
of capital allocation. In addition, Beck et al. (2000) examines whether the level of the 
banking sector development exerts a causal impact on real per capita GDP growth 
(capital per capita growth, productivity growth, and private saving rates) using a 
cross-country dataset of 63 countries over the period 1960-1995. They found that 
higher levels of banking sector development produced faster rates of economic 
growth and total factor productivity growth. These results are consistent with 
Schumpeter‟s (1911) view that the level of banking sector development importantly 
determines the rate of economic growth by affecting the pace of productivity growth 
and technological change. On the contrary, they did not find any robust relationship 
between the banking sector‟s development and private saving rates. However, 
Modeste (1993), who tested the McKinnon
6
 model from some Caribbean countries, 
supports the hypothesis that financial repression can slow down economic growth. 
While King and Levine (1993) analyze a large cross-section of countries that are 
affected equally by financial development, De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) suggest 
that the positive impact of financial development on growth changes according to 
regions, time periods, and levels of income. Unlike King and Levine (1993), De 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) only focus on the banking sector‟s development as a 
                                                          
6
 McKinnon (1973) profounded the „financial liberalization‟ thesis, arguing that government 
restrictions on the banking system restrain the quantity and quality of investment (Arestis, 2005: 2). 
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proxy for financial development. Thus, they found that this positive effect is 
particularly strong in middle-income and low-income countries, whilst there is a weak 
relationship observed in high-income countries.  
The above cross-section correlations are also consistent with alternative explanations 
of the relationship between financial development and economic growth by Robinson 
(1952), and Thangavelu and Ang (2004). Robinson (1952: 86) argues that “the 
causality was reversed; economies with good growth prospects develop institutions to 
provide the funds necessary to support those good prospects”. In other words, finance 
always follows economic growth and that the general tendency is that the supply of 
finance moves with the demand for it: “by and large, it seems to be the case that 
where enterprise leads, finance follows” (Robinson, 1952: 86). Using time-series 
evidence from 16 countries
7
, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) find that economic 
growth systematically causes financial development in quite a few countries such as 
Korea and Thailand, which experienced financial reforms, as well as other countries 
such as Greece, India, Portugal, and Turkey). Thangavelu and Ang (2004: 259), using 
Australia as a case study, also suggested that economic growth will lead to financial 
development. 
It should, however, be stated that the effects of credit market development are 
multidimensional and depend upon which sector of the credit market is being 
developed. Some economists believe that financial institutions are not essential to the 
growth process and respond passively to other factors promoting growth. Jappelli and 
Pagano (1994) find that saving and growth rates are negatively and significantly 
correlated with indicators of the development of household lending, such as the ratio 
of consumer credit to GDP, and the maximum loan-to-value ratio in the mortgage 
market, a finding that confirms that some forms of financial development are not 
conducive to faster economic growth. On the other hand, little empirical support is 
found regarding the positive correlation between the financial market, saving, and 
growth. Modigliani (1986) emphasized that the constraints of borrowing may force an 
                                                          
7
 The countries include Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Korea, 
Mauritius, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela with 
rich experiences in relation to both economic and financial development. 
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economy to save more. This obviously will decrease the effects of credit market on 
economic growth.  
It should, hence, be stated that the available body of knowledge emphasizes the 
relationship between credit markets, saving and growth. However, Rosenthal (2005) 
argues that credit markets can contribute to the reduction of inequality. Credit 
becomes especially important when reducing inequality in short-term consumption. 
They can provide for the redistribution of capital from the rich to the poor. Investment 
by the poor may then reduce inequality. This argument has been supported by Bolton 
and Rosenthal (2005: 3) who consider credit as a motor for entrepreneurship, 
providing the funds for the poor to escape from poverty. At the same time, the rich 
also will get a benefit from the investment if lending is expected to be profitable. 
The importance of financial markets in economic growth is still being debated by 
many economists. 
2.4 FORMAL vs INFORMAL MARKETS 
As the working of financial markets indicate, credit is taken to finance fixed capital 
(the purchase of fixed inputs such as factories, production processes, machines, or 
warehouses), working capital (ongoing production activity), and consumption credit 
(sudden downturn in the production or increase in consumption needs caused by 
illness, death, or festivities) (Ray, 1998). 
There are two sources of credit in the credit market: the formal and informal market. 
The coexistence of the formal and informal credit markets is a wide spread 
phenomenon in developing economies. Recently, there has been a gradual change in 
borrowing trends where the informal credit market has been extensively developed in 
developing countries in comparison to the formal market. 
Financial markets are defined as formal when they are controlled by government 
regulations or any related financial regulations (Kropp et al., 1989). For formal 
financial institutions, the government, or state, usually establishes a central bank as an 
instrument of central control. Schrader (1996: 8) lists the formal markets, therefore, as 
the central banks, commercial or business banks, development banks, savings banks, 
cooperative banks, merchant banks, building societies, and the insurance and social 
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security sector. Licensed investment companies, hire-purchase companies, public 
pawnshops
8
 (and sometimes private licensed ones), and so on may also be part of 
formal financial markets.  
According to Schrader (1996: 10), however, the formal financial institutions have 
strengths such as: (i) they provide modern financial services; (ii) they can finance 
long-term, large volume, and large-scale businesses; (iii) they collaborate with 
national and international partners and have access to refinancing and other 
supporting institutions; and (iv) they are integrated into the formal and public sector. 
They are also bound to the following weaknesses: (i) they can only reach medium and 
high income groups of customers, and inadvertently exclude low-income groups of 
customers and small business entrepreneurs from their services; and (ii) they ignore 
socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic conditions. 
With the advantages of unregulated money supply, easy accessibility, easy liquidity, 
low administrative and procedural costs, little or no collateral requirements, and 
flexibility in interest rate structures and repayment schedules, informal finance is 
ideally suited towards lower income groups (Daniel, 2000: 1).  
According to Ghate et al. (1992) and Adams (1992), informal finance can be 
classified as follows: 
(i) Intermittent lenders (friends or relatives)  
(ii) Untied loans (moneylenders, pawnbrokers, indigenous bankers and finance 
companies) 
(iii) Tied credit (landlords) 
(iv) Group finance (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows how the four categories are related to each other.  
 
 
                                                          
8
 Other researcher include pawnshop in the informal financial market. 
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Figure 2.1: Major Types of Informal Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ghate et al. (1992).  
In terms of characteristics, Waldron (1995) describes informal finance as: (i) using 
their own funds to provide loans; (ii) lending transactions as being on a face to face 
basis; (iii) flexible in terms of interest rates charge, rescheduling the maturity of the 
loan and collateral requirement; and (iv) the probability of getting loans  is high. In 
addition, informal credit markets respond quickly to short-term financing at a 
relatively low cost, and allow access to low-income groups (Bouman, 1989). Apart 
from that, the activities in informal and non-organised sectors are usually unregulated 
and are inadequately represented in the standard accounts of national income (Daniel, 
2000). 
In addition, Ray (1998: 540-543) also discusses some characteristics of the informal 
markets focusing on rural credit markets as follows: 
(i)  Informational constraints (which create repayment problems); 
Informal Finance 
Credit extended by entities 
(whether individual or 
institutional) to other entities 
 
Credit extended within entities, 
or group finance 
 
Intermittent lenders 
 
Regular lenders 
 
Untied credit (specialist lenders) 
 
Tied credit 
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(ii)  Segmentation (in which lenders seem to deal with demarcated zones of 
borrowers)
9
; 
(iii) Interlinkage (in which lenders and borrowers are simultaneously transacting 
with each other on at least one other market, such as land or output); 
(iv) Interest rate variation (in which the rates vary by geographical location, the 
source of funds, and the characteristics of the borrower)
10
; 
(v)  Credit rationing (a borrower may wish to borrow more at the going rate of 
interest in the transaction but is not permitted to); and 
(vi) Exclusitivity (a borrower typically deals with one lender at a time).11 
Waldron (1995) expressed his view that the role of the informal sector had filled the 
void created by the natural limitations of the formal sector. He argued that there are 
large segments of the East Asian economy where the formal sector simply does not 
reach. Furthermore, because informal credit is better distributed than formal credit, it 
is remarkably effective in reaching small farmers, entrepreneurs, small businesses, 
and in meeting the needs of individuals (Braverman and Gausch, 1986). These groups 
have been „financially excluded‟12 from the formal financial sectors, and, as a result, 
they opt to informal finance that is likely serve to all sections of the population 
without discrimination. 
                                                          
9
 Aleem‟s (1993) survey of fourteen moneylenders in the Chambar region of Pakistan showed that as 
many as ten moneylenders lent more than 75% of their funds to old clients – those with whom they had 
dealt in the past. 
 
10
 In Thailand, due to lack of access to the formal sector, the interest rates charge by informal sector 
were around 25% in the Central Plains, whereas 60% or higher in other regions (Siamwalla et al., 
1993). 
 
11
 It is reported that over 70% of informal sector borrowers in Thailand had borrowed from only one 
lender over the past three years (Siamwalla et al., 1993). 
12
 Financial exclusion refers to those procedures that restrict the poor and misfortunate social groups 
from obtaining loan from the financial system (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). A study carried out in the 
UK by the Financial Services Authority (2000: 9) argued that financial exclusion can be identified from 
a number of aspects such as; “(i) Access exclusion: the restriction of access through the process of risk 
assessment; (ii) Condition exclusion: where the conditions attached to financial products make them 
inappropriate for the needs of some people; (iii) Price exclusion: where some people can only gain 
access to financial products at prices they cannot afford; (iv) Marketing exclusion: whereby some 
people are effectively excluded by targeted marketing and sales; and (v) Self exclusion: people may 
decide that there is little point applying for a financial product because they believe they will be 
refused. Sometimes this is a result of having been refused personally in the past, sometimes because 
they know someone else who has been refused, or because of a belief that „they don‟t accept people 
who live round here‟”. 
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Operating side by side with the formal sectors, there has been less recognition of the 
important role of informal credit markets
13
, although they have played a 
complementary role in providing credit to society for so many years (Schrader, 1992; 
Ghate et al., 1992).
14
 However, in recent years, an increasing number of studies have 
begun to evaluate the role of informal credit markets to the socio-economy of the 
society.  
The following section will discuss several issues associated with informal markets. 
2.4.1 Issues in Informal Markets  
The main issue in the credit market is the principal-agent theory, which provides 
many insights to the problems in credit markets. There are numerous empirical studies 
which examine the credit market‟s imperfections, and which may cause friction in an 
economy‟s resource allocation. Specifically, it is recognised that credit market 
imperfections may result in credit rationing, and thus, may prevent entrepreneurs from 
borrowing as much as desired for capital investment.  
There are several literatures in economics and finance that establish a fundamental 
link between credit rationing and imperfect information such as Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), and El-Shazly (2005). Credit rationing occurs when 
lenders are imperfectly informed about their borrowers‟ creditworthiness. As 
Galetovic (1994) points out, the more important friction in the credit market is 
associated with incentives regarding conflicts of interest between lenders and 
borrowers. Borrowers will not truthfully reveal all their information (which includes 
characteristics, actions, and outcomes) to lenders which will lead to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. By reducing the incidence of credit rationing, it is 
possible to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, whereby the credit market‟s 
development will enhance economic growth and development (Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1993; Ma and Smith, 1996; Bose and Cothren, 1996).  
                                                          
13
 According to Daniel (2000: 1), the early recognition of informal credit markets was pioneered as 
long as 1948 by Wai (1980) in the moneylenders‟ context.  
 
14
 The informal credit market is also called as indigenous or unorganized credit market (Fry, 1995). 
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Due to imperfect information in the credit market (especially informal market), the 
determination of interest rates is most likely to be very high in informal markets. 
Informal markets usually charge a very high interest rate to borrowers due to their 
lack of information regarding the ability of the borrowers to repay their loans (Aleem, 
1993; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In addition, the credit histories of borrowers in 
informal markets are not as well documented as in formal markets. Ray (1998: 543-
544) explains that the informal lenders can charge very high rates of interest due to 
having an exclusive monopoly over their clients. In addition, he argues that the high 
interest rates are grasped from the lender‟s risk hypothesis which comes from two 
sources: (i) involuntary default: the borrower does not have enough money to repay 
when the the loan matures because of crop failure, unemployment, disease, death, etc., 
and (ii) strategic default: the borrower can repay the loan, but simply refuses to pay 
up. On the contrary, Sarap (1987) found that if the quality or marketability of 
collateral is high, the interest rate charge will be decreased. Another theory is that 
interest rates are high in informal markets because they are determined by custom and 
have always been high, which might be called the theory of the „customary rate of 
interest‟ (Wai, 1957: 107). For example, Newlyn and Rowan, discussing interest rates 
in British Colonial Africa, conclude that “in the type of economy we are considering, 
interest rates are likely to be determined mainly by law or convention and to respond 
very little to changes in the local demand and supply for loanable funds.” (taken from 
Wai, 1957: 107). Wai (1957: 108) also claims that the high rates of interest are 
influenced by demand (higher demand from low-income groups) and supply factors 
(shortage of capital).  
Apart from the issue of high interest rates charged by the informal markets, another 
issue that is being debated by many researchers is the purpose of borrowing from the 
markets. Many researchers claim that informal finance lends most of their money for 
consumption or for non-productive purposes to the borrowers. Mohieldin and Wright, 
(2000: 667) for instance, claim that most of the people use the loans given by formal 
finance for production purposes and loans from informal finance for consumption 
purposes. Pischke et al. (1983) argues that informal lending adds nothing to the 
borrowers; in fact, they put them in debt. Hence, “providing loans for consumption or 
non-productive purposes were not in the best interest of the capital scarce economies” 
(Daniel, 2000: 20). Ghate (1998), on the other hand, rejects these facts. He argues that 
 20 
the term „consumption‟ is always misinterpreted because in rural households, 
consumption goods such as fridges, ovens, other electrical appliances, vehicles, etc. 
can be considered as investments goods for agricultural production, whilst those 
goods are considered as consumption by the urban household. 
Above all the issues regarding the impact of the asymmetric information problem on 
the credit market, this asymmetric information phenomenon does not apply to one 
type of the informal credit market, which is pawnbroking, due to the nature of the 
business itself. Pawnbroking normally needs less information regarding the borrowers 
because they will need collateral as a pledge of the transaction. According to Adams 
(1992), unlike banks, moneylenders, and traders, pawnbrokers need almost no 
information about their borrowers unless they are wary about receiving stolen goods 
as collateral. In addition, Al-Zuhayli (2003) claims that pawning is one of the most 
powerful means of preventing default because of the collateral being held by the 
lenders. He added that “documentation and guaranty provide less certain insurance of 
the creditor‟s right compared to a pawned object that he holds in his possession, and 
which he may sell to collect what the debtor owes him with the permission of a judge 
or the object‟s owner” (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 81-82). In terms of purpose of lending, 
previous literatures (Ismail et al., 2007; Awang Kechil et al., 2004; Samsudin, 2002) 
have found that pawnbroking not only lends money for consumption purpose but also 
for production purposes in Malaysia.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
An overview of financial markets, which consists of the formal and informal markets 
given above, makes it clear that financial intermediation plays an important role to 
improve the socio-economy of the society. Previous studies proved that formal sectors 
are unlikely to extend credit facilities to all the strata in the economy due to many 
reasons; hence, there is a wide mismatch between demand and supply of credit. This 
gap is likely to be filled by the informal markets, thus they have a potential in making 
a valuable contribution to economic growth. There are several informal financial 
institutions established to fill the gap, such as pawnshops, microfinance, 
moneylenders, and others. In this research, we will focus on pawnshops as an 
informal financial institution and how they can improve the socio-economy of the 
society. 
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Chapter 3 
PAWNSHOPPING: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A survey of the related literature supports the notion that the financial system plays a 
vital role in supporting the growth of the economy (Beck et. Al., 2000; Levine, 1997; 
King and Levine, 1993; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; and Schumpeter, 1911). For 
this to work, the financial system must provide a complete range of products and 
services to meet the different needs of all strata in the economy by expanding the 
financial base of society and preventing financial exclusion. Therefore, informal 
credit institutions such as pawnshops are recognized as providing loans to those in 
society that are excluded from mainstream bank loans. Operating side-by-side with 
the mainstream financial sector, but largely ignored, the pawnshops as part of the 
informal sector are significant in providing credit finance, particularly to low-income 
groups and in areas where mainstream institutions are hampered by bureaucracy 
(Chan and Owyong, 2007).  
In the context of development, Caskey (1994) emphasizes the importance of 
pawnshops as „banks for the poor‟. He elaborates that pawnshops have a high 
outreach, are often financially viable, and have several advantages; compared to other 
informal market institutions, clients are not expected to fall into long-term 
indebtedness. Moreover, it reduces the risk of a pawnbroker to provide loans to poor 
people, and monitoring is not necessary. 
Although pawnshops have grown in importance and influence part of the population 
in various societies, there is still a lack of research regarding these important informal 
credit institutions. In other words, despite the flourishing business, the theoretical and 
empirical studies of pawnshops are very limited. The following studies are some of 
the earlier studies in the U. S. among the little available literature: Patterson (1899a 
and 1899b), as a comparative study, investigated American and European pawnshops, 
Levine (1913) provides an extensive description of the pawnbroking business, and 
Nugent (1939) estimates the total pawnshop credit (Caskey, 1991: 86). Since then, 
there has been no serious study of pawnbroking in the United States due to the 
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limitation of data and statistics on this forgotten institution and a lack of academic 
studies on pawnshop operation (Caskey, 1991). Until 1990, Caskey, who is known as 
“the founding father of research in this field” (Johnson and Johnson, 1998: 31), 
explored the role of the pawnbroking industry in providing credit to consumers 
excluded from mainstream credit markets in the United States. This was followed by 
Caskey (1991, 1994 and 2005), who looked at the importance of pawnbroking in the 
United States economy; Oeltjen (1996), who studied the history and regulations of 
pawnshops; Bienkowski and Davis (1997), who studied the characteristics of the 
pawnbroking industry and regulatory policies, particularly in Victoria states; Johnson 
and Johnson (1998) who described the profile of pawnshop customers; and Francis 
(2007) who explored the characteristics of pawnshops as retail and stolen goods 
trading.  
Meanwhile, in Britain, research on pawnbroking received less attention and mainly 
focused on the historical development of British pawnbroking through studies by 
Hows (1847), Hudson (1982) and Tebbutt (1983). 
In contrast, with pawnshops being common in much of Asia compared to the 
developed countries, more attention has been given to their role as a short term 
lending solution for consumption purposes and as microcredit for small and medium 
businesses.  
3.2 DEFINITION AND ASPECTS OF PAWNBROKING 
Pawnshops are informal financial institutions which are found all over the world and 
provide quick and easy access to money for their customers who are short of cash. 
Andrews (1994 as cited in Schrader, 1999: 5) noted that, 
 Most people who need to borrow relatively small sums of cash in a hurry don‟t 
want the fuss and formality of as bank loan. It‟s a simple equation, but if your 
credit card is heaving at its limit – or you simply don‟t have one – then the 
shops (….) can be an attractive proposition. 
Basically, pawnshop lending is characterized by small-sum loans, short maturities, 
and fully collateralized by personal property with an interest charge that is extremely 
high relative to other types of lending (Caskey, 1990).  
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According to Oeltjen (1996: 997), „pawn‟ originated from the French word „pan‟, 
which means the skirt of a gown. „Pan‟, on the other hand, is traced out from the Latin 
word „pannum‟, which describes clothing in general. This definition makes it clear 
that in that time, in 1828, more than one-half of the pawn items in New York City 
were articles of clothing. 
The two parties which are involved in pawnshop transactions are the pawnbroker 
(lender) and the pawner (borrower). A pawnbroker is defined as “one engaged in the 
business of lending money upon interest on the security of articles of personal 
property pawned or pledged” (Attenborough, 1913: 1). It is the very advantage of 
pawnbroking that the collateral or property pledged eliminates the lender‟s cost of 
assembling information on the creditworthiness of the borrower.
15
 Some researchers 
state collateral as a „pledge‟ or a „pawn‟. For instance, according to Oeltjen (1996: 
996), “a „pledge‟ and a „pawn‟ are virtually identical: a bailment of personal property 
as security for payment of a debt for which the holders of the property have an 
implied power of sale on default”. However, he also makes a distinction between 
pawns and pledges concepts. Business practice in general perceives that „pawns‟ are 
applied to tangible, personal property only, for example goods and land, while 
„pledges‟ may refer to either tangible or intangible personal property, including goods 
or commercial papers and securities. 
Who is the customer of pawnshops? According to Mottershead (1938: 150), the 
customers of pawnshop businesses can be described as “the wealthy spendthrift, who 
pawns his personal belongings rather than get a loan from his bank on commercial 
collateral; the demimonde, the gamblers, the owners of resorts and nightclubs, persons 
of dubious professions, who invest their excess cash in „ice‟ against the unfortunate 
days when they may need to raise money in a hurry; petty entrepreneurs, people doing 
business on a „shoestring‟, street peddlers turned shopkeeper, sandwich stand 
operators, haberdashers, sweatshop owners, and the like, whose bank credit is worth 
                                                          
 
15
 In the U. S., economists have generally criticized state usury laws as detrimental to low-income 
consumers. Financial institutions under binding interest rate ceilings tend to allocate credit to only the 
most creditworthy borrowers, who generally belong to middle-income or high-income group. This is 
not the case with pawnshops, because all customers provide collateral, eliminating the need to 
distinguish high-risk from low-risk borrowers (Caskey, 1991).  
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little but who have something of value to pledge; another group comprises the 
careless artisans who pawn their tools; newspapermen who hock their cameras, 
railroad men who pledge their watches; and the private citizen of small means who 
owns no particularly valuable jewelry, but who has a radio, a davenport, a frigidaire, 
or other furniture, upon which he can obtain some money in order to keep alive”. 
Maamor and Ismail (2006) consider pawnshops as a source of short term financing, 
generally used by lower income groups
16
 to alleviate their cash flow problems. It is 
also employed by petty traders as a means of obtaining working capital for their small 
business. Caskey
17
 (1994) classified a pawnshop
18
 as a „fringe bank‟ or „banks for the 
poor‟19 that provide credit services primarily to low and moderate income households, 
many of whom rarely interact with, or have access to mainstream financing and are 
excluded from the formal banking system. These may include people who have a low 
income but not those living under the poverty line like housewives, private sector 
workers, the unemployed and also small-time traders (Mohamed, 1986). Generally, 
they borrow money for daily spending purposes, schooling fees, medical bills, paying 
debts and also for providing capital for business. 
Surprisingly, recent findings have proved that pawnshops are not only patronized by 
lower-income groups but also by the middle and higher income groups with the 
exception of the very poor.
20
 For example, Oeltjen (1996) provides evidence that 
pawnshops in the United States experienced an increasing number of middle-class 
customers in 1990s, despite its popularity among lower-income group. According to 
him, the rise of these „new‟ customers getting loans from pawnshops is due to the 
                                                          
16
 Not only are many low-income excluded because of their income, but they are also much likely than 
the middle class to have unstable incomes and employment patterns (Andreason, 1975). 
 
17
 Johnson and Johnson (1998: 31) acknowledge Caskey as “the founding father of research in this 
field” that is pawnshops, due to his initiative to explore more in depth on pawnshop despite of 
inattention of previous researcher towards this issue. 
 
18
 In an article in ADB‟s quarterly newsletter (2003) on microfinance, Finance for the Poor, Fernando 
(from ADB‟s Lead Rural Finance Specialist) argues that pawnshops, in fact, an important source of 
microcredit in many developing countries, especially in Asia. 
  
19
 As noted by Bosanquet (1896: 213), “The pawnbroker especially is extolled by many who have no 
dealings with him as the „poor man‟s friend‟ and the system of credit at the general shop is very 
generally regarded as the one salvation of the wage-earner in bad times”. 
 
20
 A very poor customer can hardly belong to the target group because they have nothing to offer 
(Schrader, 1999; and Chechovskich and Schrader, 2000). 
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economic recession, bankruptcies, and foreclosures. In addition, the higher demand of 
pawnshop loans are due to the dramatic decrease of the people‟s standard of living 
caused by the instability of the economy, low wages, and pension payments, which 
are often below the official subsistence line and are paid irregularly (Schrader, 1999). 
These new customers found that pawnshops were much more convenient for „lenders 
of last resort‟ (Oeltjen, 1996; Caskey and Zikmund, 1990). In fact, the increasing in 
demand of pawnshop loans from the middle and higher income groups can also be 
found in the studies of Maamor et al. (2005), Maamor et al. (2006), and Johari et al. 
(2007).  
3.2.1 The Working Mechanism of Pawnbroking 
The pawnshop is a place where a customer, who is in dire need of money, pledges any 
valuable item as collateral with the pawnbroker in exchange for a mutually agreed 
amount of money. The pawnbroker, after valuing the item, uses his discretion to 
determine the maximum amount of money to be given in exchange. Typically, the 
practice is that the pawner
21
 gets 50-60% of the item‟s net market value (Soon and 
Choon, 2001; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; and Caskey and Zikmund, 1990). In the past, 
items such as watches, pens, bicycles, expensive clothes, sewing machines, 
jewelleries, and other ornaments were used for this purpose (Attenborough, 1913; 
Emery, 1970; and Hudson, 1982). Now, most pawnbrokers accept gold ornaments as 
collateral as they command higher payout compared to other items and can be 
disposed off in short notice (Meera, 2008; Chan and Owyong, 2007; Khan and Nisar, 
2004; Soon and Choon, 2001; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; Skully, 1992; and Bouman 
and Houtman, 1988). Table 3.1 shows the types of pledges that are common in some 
Asian countries.  
With regards to the operation of pawnbroking, if the borrower wants to redeem his 
pawned items, he must pay back the principle of the loan, together with interest rates 
and other fees such as storage and insurance fees, within the contractual period. On 
the other hand, if the borrower fails to pay the debt, or chooses not to renew the loan 
by paying interest only, then the pawnbroker has the right to take possession of the 
                                                          
21
 A pawner is another term for pawnshops‟ customer which is described by the Malaysia Pawnbrokers 
Act 1972 as “a person delivering an article for pawn to a pawnbroker”. 
 
 26 
pawned items and terminate the contract. The items can be sold or auctioned and the 
entire surplus belongs to the pawnbroker. However, if it is required by law, the 
pawnbroker may retain the amount that the borrowers‟ owe and return the surplus 
gained to the borrower. 
Table 3.1: Types of Pawnshops Pledges in Some Countries 
Source: Skully (1992). 
Soon and Choon (2001: 1) note that:   
 Pawnbrokers made most of their profits from the interest differentials between 
the interests charged on the loans and the cost of capital of providing the 
loans. They were allowed to auction off unredeemed pledges through 
approved auction houses to recover their losses.
22
 Pawnbrokers were also 
allowed to purchase unredeemed pledges that had been pawned with 
themselves at the auction.  
Another special niche of pawnbroking is that it differs from most banks‟ lending in 
terms of a higher volume of small size loans within a short contractual period of time. 
Presumably, the transaction costs would be quite high given the loan processing, 
security, valuating, and storage of the collateral and the high risk of losses compared 
to the percentage of the small amount lent. Nevertheless, these incurred costs are 
partly offset as it is unnecessary for the pawnbroker to identify the credit ratings of 
the borrower or to monitor the loans. 
                                                          
22
 This is one of the reasons why pawnbrokers in general had no problem in dealing with bad debts 
(Soon and Choon, 2001). 
Country Pledges 
China Jewellery, classic Chinese calligraphy, electric appliances, 
antiques, bicycle, watches, and expensive clothing items. 
Hong Kong Gold jewelry (particularly rings and chains), watches, other 
jewelry, some consumer goods if located in housing estates. 
Indonesia Bicycles, TVs, kitchenware and other household goods, batik, 
gold, other jewellery, and other valuables. 
Japan Jewelry, gold, some watches, electrical goods, cameras, 
expensive kimono, and other clothing. 
Malaysia Gold and other jewellery items. 
Philippines Gold and other jewellery. 
Singapore Gold and other jewellery items. 
Thailand Gold, other jewellery, watches, TVs, VCRs, radios, and other 
electronic goods. 
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In other words, pawnbrokers can mitigate the credit ration problem. If the borrower 
does not repay the loan at the end of the contractual period, the pawnbroker can obtain 
the principle of the loan with less risks and additional expenses, hence, the credit 
risk
23
 and the related recovery costs can be avoided.  
3.2.2 A Grey Area in Pawnbroking 
There is also the perception that pawnbroking credit is not a real credit but a sale 
under value with the right to repurchase such as the sale-buy back arrangement 
(Skully, 1992: 2). Even Nugent (1934: 3) agrees with the statement that “pawnbroking 
cannot be considered as debt without qualification. The pawnbroking transaction 
approximates a sale of property on a contract which permits repurchase at an 
increased price (measured in terms of interest) within a certain time. There is no 
promise to pay involved in the pawn, or pledge loan; the pawnbroker has a right only 
against the article pledge. Technically, there is no debt involved in pawnbroking 
loans”. 
According to Skully (1994: 360), 
One should consider the person borrowing money from a pawnshop, as 
effectively selling the item in question to the pawnbroker, in return for the 
cash amount of the loan, plus a call option to repurchase the item at a set price 
at a future date. 
This is supported by Oeltjen (1996: 1025) by stating that, in contrast with the pawn 
loan, the buy-sell agreement enables the pawnbroker to buy an item from the seller 
(pawner) through the contract agreement that provides the seller the right to 
repurchase the item within a particular period of time. For example, a minimum of 
sixty days in Florida, U. S. The repurchase price will be higher than the initial „sales‟ 
price where a mark-up of 25% is commonly applied.  
                                                          
23
 Mainstream financial institutions screen customers for credit risk for both types of loans either 
secured (large-value loans such as home mortgages and automobile loans) and an unsecured (small-
value loans such as items purchased with credit cards) lending. The rational of screening procedure for 
unsecured lending is important since the financial institution has no collateral if the borrower defaults. 
Whilst for secured loan, screening is important because the collateral may be worth less than the loan 
and because significant costs often arise when transferring collateral in case of default. Method to 
determine credit risk is by using „credit scoring‟ which content the applicant‟s years on job, education, 
occupation, checking and savings account status, credit card ownership, total outstanding debt 
excluding mortgage debt and credit repayment history (Caskey, 1990). 
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As a conclusion, the definitions discussed above clearly state that the buy-sell 
agreements are pawn business activities subject to the pawnbroker‟s regulations.24 
Yet, pawnbroking literature often overlooks this issue as pawning is generally treated 
explicitly as a lending activity.   
Another type of loan under the guise of pawnbroking is the title loan. Unlike the buy-
sell agreements, title loans have been prohibited in some states in the United States 
(Oeltjen, 1996). According to Oeltjen (1996: 1003), the title loan is defined as “a loan 
of money secured by bailment of a certificate of title to a motor vehicle”.  
An example of title loan transaction would be as follow: 
 As title pawns have developed – exchange for a loan, the borrower signs over 
his title and hands over a set of keys. The borrower then pays a monthly fee of 
as much as 22% (The Florida statutory maximum) until the loan amount is 
repaid. Say you need $500. You would pay a fee of $110 a month until you 
repaid the loan. If you kept the loan six months, the fees alone would total 
$660. None of that money would be earmarked to pay off the underlying loan; 
you would still owe the initial $500. If you can‟t make your payments, the 
lender eventually can repossess your car. (Oeltjen, 1996: 1003) 
In Florida, for instance, where title loans have been authorized, they are forced not to 
use the term „pawn‟, „pawnbroker‟, or any pawn logos in their entities‟ names, 
advertisement, or presentation (Oeltjen, 1996). 
To conclude, pawnshops constitute a special niche market in the financing sector, i.e., 
for individuals who need short term financing on an immediate, loan-on-demand basis 
while providing collateral in exchange. 
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 Oeltjen (1996: 1025-1026) noted that, “Under the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, if a pawn is a 
loan, it is a secured transaction; the pawnbroker would have a security interest. If there were no special 
rules for pawnbroker transactions that trumped the Code provisions, under chapter 679, the parties 
could agree for the secured party to forgo any deficiency there may be between the amount of the loan 
with accrued service charges and the sales proceeds of the pawn. The parties however, could not 
ignore, or otherwise waive, the notice of sale required by chapter 679 and the requirement that the 
debtor must be paid any surplus generated by the sale of the pawn. However, if a pawn is a buy-sell, it 
is a purchase transaction. It is the pawnbroker‟s position as a purchaser that is the basis for the 
pawnbroker‟s rights. If the pawner does not buy back the pawn, the pawnbroker is free to sell it. 
Whether the pawnbroker realized from the sale more or less than the pawner received from the 
pawnbroker is of no relevance because the transaction was characterized as a sale with an option to 
repurchase, which option has expired”. 
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3.3 THE HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAWNBROKING 
The relevant historical material demonstrates that pawnbroking is a type of collateral 
based lending which has been in practice for quite a long time. For example, as a 
religious text, the Qur‟an (Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 283) from many centuries ago 
states that, “If you are on a journey and cannot find a scribe, then use the receipt of 
pawned objects”, which indicates the practice of pawnbroking even in those times. 
The Bible‟s Old Testament (Exodus, chapter 22, verse 26) also mentions when 
lending to a fellow Hebrew about taking “his clothing as a pledge of his repayment”. 
As such, examples show that, while it is not known when pawnbroking developed 
into a specialist business, it is certainly quite old.  
It should also be stated, however, that this kind of establishment stretches further back 
in time in Asia than in Europe. According to Whelan (1979), the earliest formal 
pawnshops may have developed in China, dating from the last quarter of the fifth 
century A. D. As for Britain, Hudson (1982: 22) mentioned that there is no evidence 
for pawnbroking in Roman Britain, but the existence of anything similar to it after the 
collapse of the Roman civilization in Britain was established and flourished in the 
later Middle Ages, “primarily to meet the needs of powerful and ambitious rulers, 
who required money to finance wars and the building of castles, palaces and churches, 
and to maintain a standard of living which they considered appropriate to their rank, 
power and social position”.  
3.3.1 The Pawnshop Experience in China 
The Buddhist origin of pawnbroking in China
25
 has also been noted by several 
Chinese and Japanese scholars. According to Yang (1950: 175): 
The celebrated Sung poet Lu Yu (1125-1210) in his Lao-hsűeh-an pi-chi 
mentions pawnshops known as ch‟ang-shêng k‟u,lit. “long-life treasuries,” in 
Buddhist monasteries of his time and traces the practice back to the end of the 
fifth century when a certain CHẾN Pin pawned a bolt of hemp cloth in the 
treasury of a monastery. Later, having redeemed it, he found in it five taels of 
gold, which he promptly returned.  
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 In Chinese history, there are four money-raising institutions which either originated in or had close 
connections with Buddhist temples and monasteries i.e., the pawnshop, the mutual financing 
association, the auction sale, and the sale of lottery tickets (Yang, 1950). 
 
 30 
As Buddhism is perceived to have arrived from India to China via central Asia, many 
scholars such as Whelan (1979: 2) believe that the pawnbroking business institution is 
“a consequence of the interaction between Buddhism, newly arrived on the scene, and 
the rather advanced Chinese money economy”. 
During the period in question, the Chinese pawnshop was a commercial enterprise 
restricted to Buddhist monasteries, where it was to remain as such for several hundred 
years. Similar to the early Italian pawnshops, the Buddhist monastery institution was 
built to serve the poor, not as a profit-making organization. Indeed, probing through 
historical documentations, Chinese scholars could not find the term „interest‟ in any 
business transaction within this time period. Loans were always repaid in time or later 
with wheat or rice. Likewise, it is found that pawn contracts were interest-free loans 
in the Chinese government manual during the T‟ang Dynasty (618-907 A. D.) 
(Skully, 2005). 
Apart from having purely religious functions, the Buddhist temples during the T‟ang 
Dynasty also undertook a series of secular activities in economic, commercial, and 
charitable spheres (Ch‟en, 1973: 154), as most of the land was owned by the Buddhist 
temples. In fact, they were among the great land-owners of the empire. Such land was 
acquired by outright genuine donations from the imperial household and the great 
families of the realm and also by purchase. 
The temples were also the recipients of contributions from the devoted followers of 
the religion.
26
 Often, such contributions far exceeded the needs of the monastic 
community living in the temples and gradually accumulated to form a sizeable 
surplus. Also, the income in the form of produce from the land owned by the temple 
or monastery was often more than sufficient to feed and clothe the monks, and, again, 
there was a surplus. The monastic law did not permit the sale of such surplus goods 
for the private benefit of the monks, but if the income derived from the sale was used 
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 The tremendous amount of donated wealth in the monastery was used for the repair of temples and 
monasteries all over the country in the early T‟ang period, until the treasury was confiscated by 
imperial order in 713 A. D. (Yang, 1950: 177). Emperor Jui-tsung (710-712 A. D.) prohibited further 
donations of land to monasteries due to several complaints made by the Confucian memorialists and 
another official, Hsin T‟i-fou regarding the Buddhist monasteries controlled 70% to 80% of the wealth 
of the empire (Ch‟en, 1973: 128-129). 
 
 31 
for the furtherance of the religion, then the sale was allowed. One of the Vinaya
27
 that 
took a more conciliatory attitude towards this issue is the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādin 
School. Ch‟en (1973: 158) noted that, 
In the Chinese version of this Vinaya, there is a passage telling about some 
merchants who were on the point of departing for some distant land to trade. 
Before they left, they deposited some goods, which they had donated to the 
sańgha, with the monks, and instructed them to loan these goods out for 
interest, and thus earn a profit. The monks replied that they were not 
authorized to do so by the Buddha, but went ahead and reported the matter to 
the Blessed One. Upon hearing of the proposal, the Buddha gave permission to 
accept the goods, and authorized the ching-jen or pure people within the 
monastery grounds to carry out the commercial transactions for gain, such 
gain to be used for the benefit of the dhamma and sańgha. 
In order to dispose of the surplus, the Buddhist organization established a peculiar 
institution known as the Inexhaustible Treasury which proceeded to use the surplus as 
its capital to carry on commercial transactions.  
Rather than depending on Buddha to guarantee the loan repayments
28
, the monks 
discovered that they could reduce their risks by imposing the compliance of pledged 
items, like third party guarantors from prospective borrowers to support the loan 
application. 
An example of such a contract can be found detailed in the Tun-huang
29
 manuscript 
(as cited in Ch‟en, 1973: 165) as follows: 
Yu year, first day, third month. Commoner Ts‟ao Mou-sheng of the lower 
village, owing to lack of seedlings, borrowed one shih and eight tou of beans 
from Monk Haich‟ing (of the Ling-t‟u Monastery). The beans must be 
returned before the thirtieth day of the eight month. If he disregards this 
contract and does not pay at that time, then he shall have to pay double the 
amount. His diverse belongings shall be seized to pay for the value of the 
beans. If he should disappear, then the guarantors shall repay the loan for him. 
If there should be an amnesty during the interval, it shall not affect the 
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 The Vinaya (a word in Pāli as well as in Sanskrit, with literal meaning 'leading out', 'education', 
'discipline') is the regulatory framework for the Buddhist monastic community (Wikipedia). 
 
28
 During the early T‟ang Dynasty, loans were made from the Inexhaustible Treasury even without 
written documents. Most of the borrowers will pay back the loans for “fear of divine retribution” 
(Yang, 1950: 177). 
 
29
 The Tun-huang manuscript is the oldest (earliest) version of the sutra (The Platform Sutra of the 
Sixth Patriarch) that is still extant and is therefore considered to be the most accurate (Yampolsky, 
1967). 
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stipulations stated here. This contract is drawn up because of the fear that there 
would be an absence of trust. Both parties mutually consider it to be fair and 
clear, and attach their fingerprints to record it. 
Borrower, Ts‟ao Mou-sheng, age 50. 
Witness, Monk Tz‟u-teng. 
These pledged items could be movable, such as clothes or animals, or immovable 
articles, such as lands and property buildings. For the movable items, a debt default 
indicated that the pledges items were forfeited, while for the immovable articles, the 
borrowers still retained ownership of the property until the debt was repaid. However, 
the creditor is entitled to any benefits accumulated from the property. 
Following their Italian counterparts, these interest-free loans and debts gradually 
ceased to exist as a practice. Loans were made to people, grains to peasants, and 
goods to traders and merchants, with a sizeable interest being charged in all instances. 
The treasuries soon broadened their activities to include pawnbroking and banking 
operations (Ch‟en, 1973: 154). According to Whelan (1979: 1), during the T‟ang 
Dynasty (618-907 A. D.) independent pawnbrokers soon flourished outside the 
monastery. As Yang (1952: 6) observed during the reign of the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644) “one or more pawnshops would be found in every city and town and in many 
villages and reached up to 25,000 pawnshops by the early 1800s”. 
The literature informs that the Ch‟ing Dynasty (1644-1912) witnessed a phenomenal 
rise in the number of pawnshops. By the early nineteenth century, there were almost 
25,000 of them, and pawnbroking yielded a higher rate of return on investment 
(Whelan, 1979). The Ch‟ing Dynasty also saw this industry in decline. When the 
People‟s Bank of China opened the Citizens‟ Petty Loan Offices in the early 1950s in 
order to furnish workers and peasants with low interest loans, and when the 
transformation of private enterprises occurred in 1956, the last of the pawnbrokers, 
holding out in urban areas such as Shanghai, were forced to close their doors, and 
pawnshops ceased to exist on the mainland (Whelan, 1979: 1). Officially in 1956, the 
People‟s Republic banned pawn businesses, denouncing them as a symbol of an 
exploitative economy. 
The need for pawnshops re-emerged after China entered the opening up and reform 
period in the late 1970s. After decades of prohibition, a private economy was 
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permitted on the mainland, igniting a boom in private enterprises. By 1990, 
companies were being formed in Beijing at the rate of 2,000 a month. Meanwhile, 
state-owned commercial banks were still hamstrung by old regulations capping loans 
for private businesses at RMB50,000. China‟s swelling legion of private enterprises 
hungered for capital, stimulating the resurgence of pawnbroking services. Yet in 
1987, the Huamao Pawnshop in Sichuan Province opened for business, the first 
pawnshop on China‟s mainland since 1956 (Yahong, 2008). In the 1990s the majority 
of pledged items were gold, silver, and electrical home appliances. Nowadays, there 
are various types of pledge items accepted by the pawnshops such as vehicles, 
automobiles, houses, bonds, and securities. The interest charges depend on the types 
of the items pledged. For regular items, the loan period is one month with a 2% 
interest rate for items which are less valuable, house properties (3.2%), and vehicles 
(4.7%) (Ming, 2006). 
According to Ming (2006), there are 2,052 pawnshops with a registered capital of 
RMB17 billion in 2006. In 2007, the Ministry of Commerce reported that China had 
2,342 pawnshops whose gross assets increased to RMB86.2 billion. Their total 
business value reached RMB44.1 billion in the first six months of 2007, a 31% 
increase from the same period in 2006 (Yahong, 2008). These statistics proved that 
the pawnbroking industry in China was still relevant in terms of providing short and 
quick finance to their society in need. 
3.3.2 The Pawnshop Experience in European Countries  
Like China, the first Italian mont-de-pieté
30
, which was established by a priest at 
Perugia in 1440, also had a religious affiliation which was charitable in character, and 
became the model for early state pawnshops in Europe, especially in Germany, 
France, and Belgium (Hudson, 1982: 28).  
 
 
                                                          
30
 Caskey (1994) translated mont-de-pieté as „banks that take pity‟. Mont-de-pieté provides small loans 
and redefined „interest‟ as a contribution to defray the costs of operations i.e. the salaries of the 
officials of the monti (Johnson and Johnson, 1998). On the other hand, Donald (1894) defines mont-de-
pieté as a charitable institutions intended to deliberate the poor from the hands of the usurers, and to 
accommodate them with loans at moderate rates of interest, or without interest at all. 
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According to Schrader (1999: 5-6), 
The first pawnshops in Italy had a religious affiliation with social character, 
but they were distinct from present pawnshops in their way of operating. They 
mainly loaned means of production such as tools, ploughing animals of the 
monastery, etc. to needy people. To reduce the risk they sometimes required a 
pawn or a guaranty by a third party.  
Donald (1894: 178), who wrote during a period of developing public discourses on 
ethics and charity, as the “statesman-monk and social democrat, Savonarola” initiated 
these social institutions in response to combat usury, they soon mushroomed in Italy 
and spread to France (1577), the Netherlands (16
th
 century), Spain (1705) and other 
European countries.  
As the Church lost influence after the reformation period, more and more of these 
pawnshops were operated by the municipal governments. The municipal pawnshops
31
 
sought to charge low interest rates on loans and return any surplus (the difference 
between the amount earned from the sale of the collateral and the amount the 
customers would have to pay to redeem the collateral) on forfeited pledges to the 
customer. Despite being municipal institutions with strictly regulated interest rates 
and also provided low-cost small collateralized loans to artisans and the poor, these 
pawnshops worked profitably (Caskey, 1994).  
It should also be noted that private pawnshops also existed in Europe alongside the 
services offered by religious institutions. Although they charged higher interest rates 
than municipal pawnshops, they were patronized by some borrowers, because they 
provided larger loans on collateral, more discreet, and more conveniently located 
(Caskey, 1994). 
In England, pawnbroking was carried out by the Jewish merchants in the eleventh 
century. The history of the Jews in England began when they were encouraged to 
settle there by William the Conqueror. They remained for more than two hundred 
years until 1290 when Edward I issued a proclamation ordering all Jews to leave the 
country. Such a drastic step was taken because of the Pope‟s strong condemnation of 
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 According to Donald (1894: 186), the municipal pawnshops serve as the poor man‟s bank, and 
sometimes as the rich man‟s safe deposit. 
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usury at the Council of Lyon that had stirred up public hatred against the Jews 
because of the incredibly extortionate interest rates charged by them (Hudson, 1982: 
24-25). By the end of the thirteenth century, their places were filled by foreign 
merchants, chiefly by the Lombards
32
, Italian financiers, and the Cahorsins, who 
derived their name from the French town of Cahors in Languedoc, which is was a 
famous centre of Italian financiers and money changers in the Middle Ages (Hudson, 
1982).  
In the early years, no attempt was made to regulate the trade until the reign of George 
III which resulted in the very high interest rates charged by the market, despite the 
laws against usury (Donald, 1894: 181). This situation continued until the 1980s, 
where the first statutory regulation for British pawnshops were apparently imposed in 
1603 (Hows, 1847: 36; and Levine, 1911: 35). In 1759, pawnbroking was made an 
exception to the general maximum interest law and in 1784, a further Act established 
a maximum interest rate for all loans larger than ten pounds, and in 1785, the British 
government established national licensing requirements (Donald, 1894; Hudson, 
1982; Tebbutt, 1983). The more comprehensive Act of 1800 contained a number of 
specific provisions which helped to clarify the legal situation and gave both the 
pawnbrokers and their customers a more easily understandable basis for their 
transactions. Several alterations and amendments have taken place in these Acts of 
Parliament and the British government established the new Pawnbrokers Act of 1872 
where it stated clearly the exact level of interest rates that could be charged for 
different amounts of loans and their duration. 
With the Pawnbrokers‟ Act of 1872, the establishment of the National Pawnbrokers‟ 
Association, and the development of The Pawnbrokers‟ Gazette, the number of 
pawnshops in Britain grew throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
reaching a peak in 1913 and 1914 (Hudson, 1982). However in 1950, the number of 
pawnshops decreased and the amount was about the same as the number in 1846 
when the population was considerably less than half the present level (Minkes 1953). 
Minkes (1953) points that changes in the economic climate and popular habits have 
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 In Russia, pawnshops is called dom lombard which means lombard house. It is related to the 
historical fact that moneylenders from Lombardia (Italy) went to France to start moneylending 
(Chekhovskich and Schrader, 2000). In Belgium, pawnshops are called as lombard or „cahorsins‟ 
(Johnson and Jonhson, 1998). 
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brought a radical alteration in the sources of small credit used by the poor. In 
addition, Minkes (1953), Hudson (1982), Tebbutt (1983) and Johnson and Johnson 
(1998) attribute this contraction in British pawnbroking to the growth of new 
consumer credit sources, rising personal incomes, increased public welfare measures, 
and the growing social stigma
33
 attached to the use of pawnshops and entry into the 
profession.  
The Pawnbrokers Act of 1872 remained imposed until it was incorporated into one of 
the sections of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 (Hudson, 1982). Since then, the 
pawnbroking business has flourished, attracting many customers who need short-
term loans and becoming part of financing system besides the mainstream financial 
system.  
Still, the interest rates charged by the pawnbrokers are very high, ranging typically 
from a 7% to 9% flat rate per month, depending on local competition and the location 
of the outlet (H & T Group plc, 2006). Nowadays, most pawnbrokers, the Harvey 
and Thompson Group in the United Kingdom for example, not only provide 
pawnbroking services but other services as well, such as gold purchasing, pay day 
advances, KwikLoan, cheque cashing, jewellery retail and prepaid debit card (H & T 
Group plc, 2010). With 8% interest rates charged per month for pawnbroking, the H 
& T Group experienced an increased in the total amount of pledges from £25.2 
million in 2006 to £39.5 million in 2010.
34
 
Historically, British pawnbroking is acknowledged as the first to use the three balls as 
a symbol for the profession. The most compelling explanation of the symbol is that it 
originated in the mid-eighteenth century in Britain, when, 
……the three balls, either golden or blue, became generally adopted by 
pawnbrokers as a sign of their trade. Before then, pawnbroking establishments 
were distinguished by a variety of signs, although the „Three Blue Balls‟ or 
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 Oeltjen (1996: 995) describes the „pawnbroker stigma‟ as “shady, unkempt, overweight character 
working out of filthy, run-down, back street hock shop with barred windows – a person who is 
involved in morally questionable practices, such as providing continuing support to “druggies” and 
other “low lifes” in exchange for pawns of stolen goods. Frequently associated with such concepts as 
„fenced property‟, „sleaziness‟, „shylocking‟ and „usury‟”.  
 
34
 Refer H & T Group plc Annual Report and Accounts 2010. 
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„Three Blue Bowls‟ were much the most frequent. Blue was, in fact, a more 
fitting colour than gold, since the sign almost certainly comes from the three 
blue discs which appear on the lower part of the coat of arms of the Medicis, 
from whose territory the Lombard goldsmiths [the first great moneylenders in 
Britain] originally came. (Hudson, 1982: 35) 
Levine (1911: 32-33), drawing on Hardaker (1892: 8), provides a similar account, 
adding that, 
…..the signs suspended over the doors of the Lombards were originally three 
flat yellow effigies of byzants, or gold coins, laid heraldically upon a field 
sable. But [pawnbrokers found it] …. More convenient to convert the flat discs 
into spherical gilt balls, as glittering in the light they could be seen from all 
sides and so attract customers to the houses above which they were 
suspended.
35
 
3.3.3 The Pawnshop Experience in the United States of America 
As for the United States, the history of pawnshops in American history began when 
Isabella of Castile, the Emperor of Spain, pawned her jewels to finance Christopher 
Columbus‟ first voyage to America (Levine, 1911). According to legend, after 
rejecting Columbus‟s initial proposal of financing his explorations, Isabella of Castile 
nobly pledged her jewels to raise money for the venture. Hardaker (1892: 15) notes 
that one of the 19
th 
century
 
scholars facetiously commented, “If Americans had duly 
reflected on this accident … they certainly, with the stars and stripes had quartered the 
three balls in their national flag”. Whether true or not, the event clearly indicates that 
the pawnbroking business activity in the U. S. has existed since the colonial period, 
where Foulke (as cited in Caskey, 1994: 16) discovered that in New York City, the 
establishment of the first pawnshop was recorded in 1657, while in Philadelphia in 
1782.  
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 There is also a fanciful account that relates the three ball emblem to a legend involving St. Nicholas, 
the Bishop of Pantheria (Hardaker, 1892: 6-8; De Roover, 1946). According to the legend, there was a 
poor starving nobleman in the town with three daughters. He was so poor that there would be no means 
of obtaining foods for his daughters other than to sacrifice them to an „infamous‟ life. The maidens 
wept constantly from hunger and fear for their prospects. St. Nicholas, upon learning of this, contrived 
to provide for the man and his family. Accordingly, he wrapped three handfuls of gold in 
handkerchiefs, one for each daughter, and threw them in an open window of the poor man‟s house so 
the man would not know their origin. It is said that some early pawnbrokers, who saw themselves as 
helping those in financial distress, adopted the three gold balls to represent the three purses of gold in 
this legend. 
 
Another interpretation of the three ball symbol is provided by a traditional joke among pawnshop 
customers, which maintains that it means the odds are two to one that customers will never see their 
collateral again (Caskey, 1994). 
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Unlike Britain, the pawnbroking
36
 industry in the United States grew rapidly until 
1997. Over time, the industry shifted from a concentration in older major urban areas, 
primarily in the Northeast, to Southern and Central Mountain states. During the 
1980s, the increased demand for pawnshop services could largely be attributed to the 
rising number of Americans who were unable to access mainstream financial 
institutions due to poverty
37
, the decrease in average real wages for production labour, 
and the consequences of bank deregulation (Caskey, 1991).  
In addition, the following reasons could be mentioned: (i) banks discourage small 
checking and savings accounts by assessing service charges and other fees to offset 
their higher costs of funds due to the 1980 statute that removed the ceilings on rates 
that banks could pay on their savings accounts, enabling them to compete more 
efficiently with money market funds and, (ii) the consumers‟ discomfort or even fear 
of banks (Caskey, 1990). 
Eventually, the number of pawnshops declined between 2000 and 2002. Caskey 
(2005) observed that the major reason as to why pawnbroking lost its momentum in 
many states in the U. S. was the rise of payday lending
38
. Survey data indicated that 
majority of the pawnshop customers have bank accounts now and might be eligible to 
make a payday lending. They also felt more convenient using this type of credit 
because the customer‟s „collateral‟ was based on cheques and not on personal 
belongings.  
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 Caskey (2005) refers the check-cashing outlets, pawnshops, and payday lending as “fringe banks”. 
 
37
 The relevant measure of poverty to financial markets is not household income; it is the households‟ 
ability to maintain financial savings (income level as well as its structure, stability of income, special 
needs and lifestyles choices) (Johnson and Johnson, 1998). 
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 In payday loan, a customer writes a personal check made out to the lender, which the lender agrees to 
hold for about two weeks before depositing. In exchange, the payday lender advances to the customer a 
cash payment that is somewhat less than the amount of the check. The difference, which is the “finance 
charge”, combined with the maturity of the loan determines the annualized interest rate (Caskey, 2005). 
Johnson and Johnson (1998: 26) added that only the post-dated check (payday loan) and small loan 
companies financing would be possible competitor to pawnshop. 
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3.3.4 The Pawnshops Experience in Southeast Asian Countries 
In contrast to the decline of pawnshops in the United States and Great Britain, 
pawnshops increased in importance in developing countries. Today, pawnshops are 
well represented throughout Southeast Asia, having become an important credit 
institution for short loans, consumption-oriented loans, small-scale business loans, 
and emergency loans in developing countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Singapore and Indonesia. The following sections relate to development in 
these countries: 
3.3.4.1 Pawnbroking in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, pawnbroking was introduced in the 15
th
 century through the diplomatic 
relationship between the government of Malacca and China. During the reign of the 
smaller independent states, local rulers accepted higher supplies of funds from many 
sources, and Chinese businessmen were one of them. For instance, a farmer would 
rent some land and pay the rent from the profits made from selling crops. The same 
analogy can be applied to these businessmen; where they may rent a particular piece 
of land and retain any income earned. 
This concept is known as „farming‟, which covers a variety of businesses including 
gambling, opium, and liquor sales as well as pawnshops (Skully, 1992). In most cases, 
the Chinese not only rented the „farm‟, but they became the farmers as well. The start 
of „farming‟ is practically unknown, but it was undoubtedly well-established during 
the time of the Malay-rulers, long before European colonialism in Malaysia. This 
practice was also exercised in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines. In the days of 
European colonialism, European pawnbrokers also adopted a similar approach. 
However, many local people were unsatisfied with the „farming‟ pawnbroking 
because it only gave profit to gambling, opium, etc., and did not facilitate productive 
activities. To date, the conventional pawnbroking business in the region is still 
controlled by the Chinese.  
In Malaysia, the conventional pawnbroking business has been governed by the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972 which laid down the basic guidelines for both pawnbrokers 
and pawners. The interest rate charged by the pawnshops is 2% per month. In 2011, 
there were 259 licensed, conventional pawnshops operating throughout Malaysia. It is 
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also important to state that there are Islamic pawnshops operating side by side with 
the conventional pawnshops in Malaysia. 
A number of studies have been conducted on pawnshops in Malaysia. Ismail and 
Ahmad (1997: 1349), for instance, examine the role of pawnshop lending in Malaysia. 
They find that pawnshops in Malaysia have become one of the most recognizable 
lending institutions and will continue to do so in the future due to many factors. For 
example, these factors are: (i) cheaper transportation costs; (ii) interest rate 
regulations; (iii) accessibility to the formal financial market; (iv) the effects of 
financial liberalization; (v) the duration of the loan; (vi) the confidentiality of the 
loan; and (vii) the banking hours.   
The discussion of pawnshops in Malaysia, however, will be presented in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
3.3.4.2 Pawnbroking in Philippines 
Lamberte (1988) also found that pawnshops were more popular than ever in the 
Philippines. With their rapid expansion, pawnshops have definitely taken a 
developmental role in the financial development of the Philippines. According to 
Padilla (1985); 
These farmers and small entrepreneurs frequently run out of seed money or 
working capital fund for their trade. With no acceptable collateral for bank 
loans, they will seek financial relief from usurious lenders. Now, they get their 
funds from pawnshop in the city, which accept various types of collaterals, 
such as jewellery and other items of value. When they need money for 
weddings, funerals, education, pilgrimage, or business, they go to the nearest 
pawnshop for funds. 
Pawnbroking in the Philippines has experienced various patterns of development 
throughout the years. Before 1972, the business of pawnshops in Philippines was 
independent and not covered by the Usury Law enacted in 1916. But in 1972, the 
Central Bank took control of the entire financial and credit system, including 
pawnshops (they were authorized to lend but not allowed to accept deposits). This 
implementation created some inefficiency, where profits of pawnshops were squeezed 
because the Usury Law was applied to them. Under this new regulation (Presidential 
Decree No. 114, dated 29
th
 January 1973), pawnshops in the Philippines were allowed 
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to impose a maximum service charge of five pesos, or not exceed 1% of the principal 
loan.
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 When the Central Bank imposed a higher interest rate ceiling in 1980, it was a 
favourable moment for pawnshops, and hence, contributed to improvements in the 
profitability of pawnshops. In 1984, due to the high inflation rate (more than 50%), 
pawnshops went through a difficult period, but they quickly recovered.  
According to Lamberte (1988: 14), during the financial crisis (1984 – 1986), 
pawnshops improved their profitability considerably. Strong demand for the services 
of pawnshops by households who suffered a loss in real income and by small firms 
that encountered financial difficulties, may have contributed to the rise in interest 
rates charged by pawnshops in 1986. But in 1987, the effective interest rates charged 
by pawnshops had already gone down. Due to stiffer competition, they broadened 
their scope of items from jewellery to electrical goods such as electric fans and radios. 
The stiff competition brought down the effective lending rates charged and the 
profitability of pawnshops as well. Presently, all pawnshops no longer impose service 
charges and liquidated damage fees for overdue loans in order to attract more 
customers. While most pawnshops still charge 5% per month for their loans, others 
have started giving discounts, especially to highly-favoured clients.  
3.3.4.3 Pawnbroking in Singapore 
The pawnbroking business in Singapore started in 1875 and was regulated under the 
Pawnbrokers Ordinance implemented in 1898 (Ismail, 2002). The core business was 
to offer loans to customers who presented valuables as collateral. According to Soon 
and Choon (2001), items such as electrical appliances, antiques and paintings, 
branded items such as mobile phones, camera, etc., are generally unacceptable in the 
Singapore pawnshops due to complications in determining their authenticity or market 
value, but items such as gold and jewellery, including gold bracelets, necklaces, 
watches and diamonds were accepted, since these items have a sufficiently large 
secondary market (Chan and Owyong, 2007). Normally, the business is owned by 
Dabu people, a Chinese Hakka ethnic group. 
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Pawnshops in Singapore are located throughout the island, particularly in densely 
populated residential areas and work places. There are no pawnshops in some private 
and landed residential areas (occupied by wealthier people at lower population 
density), rural areas, nature reserves, farm land, and areas designated for factories, 
power/water treatment plants, up-market shopping and financial services, military 
bases, heavy industries and others (Mohd Noor, 2004) . 
The literature shows that pawnbroking in Singapore enjoyed stable growth despite 
political turbulence (1960‟s), the oil crises (1970‟s) and the economic recessions 
(mid-1980‟s and 1997-1998). According to Mohd Noor (2004), the financing amount 
of pawnshops in Singapore in 2003 was S$1.2 billion with pawned items valued at 
S$2.7 million in average. Each conventional pawnshop conducted transactions worth 
S$14 million. 
Regarding the regulations, pawnshops in Singapore were controlled under the 
Registrar of Pawnbrokers in the Ministry of Law (under the Pawnbrokers Act 1955). 
Interest rates were fixed at 1.5% per month, which was lower than the interest rates 
imposed in Malaysia. They were not allowed to make more profits than the rates 
stated in the Act and must allow pawners to redeem (with interest) pledges exceeding 
S$50 even after the loans had matured, as long as the pawned items had not been 
auctioned off. Pawners could demand that the surplus (if any) of the net sale proceeds 
of the loans, interests, and other charges, be returned to them within four months after 
the auction. Pawnbrokers, however, might use the surplus to offset any other 
outstanding loans, interests, and charges arising from the sale of other unredeemed 
pledges belonging to the same pawners. Unlike the pawnbroking industry in 
developed countries, pawnshops in Singapore still retain a very conservative 
management style and pawnbrokers generally feel that their survival will not be 
threatened in the immediate future (Soon and Choon, 2001). 
3.3.4.4 Pawnbroking in Indonesia 
Perusahaan Umum Pegadaian is an enterprise owned by the Indonesian Republic 
Government, which is the only enterprise allowed to operate the pawnshop service in 
Indonesia. The enterprise was established in 1901 by the Dutch East Indies Governor 
according to the laws (staatsblad) No. 112, 1901 (Djuhar, 2004: 24). By the time of 
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Indonesian independence in 1945, ownership and control of pawnshops was signed 
over from the Colonial to the Indonesian government. In 1990, the government 
monopolised the pawning business activity and converted it into a profit-oriented state 
enterprise (Perum Pegadaian). Since then, it has been managed professionally, and has 
been established as a service oriented organisation that caters the low-income 
households, to hold their savings in movable assets, and acts as an essential source of 
liquidity. The Ministry of Finance is accountable for regulating and managing this 
institution. 
Perum Pegadaian experienced tremendous development throughout the years. 
According to Fernando (2003), between 1980 and 2003, it was found that the number 
of Perum Pegadaian branches increased from 450 to 722. In 2001, the total amount of 
loans given to customers was $22.2 million with 15.7 million borrowers. Acceptable 
collateral in Indonesia is in the form of gold and jewellery, electrical appliances, 
household items, vehicles, and even invaluable fabrics or clothes. Five credit schemes 
are developed for borrowers to choose from, ranging from a minimum of Rp5,000 to 
Rp20 million and above. The interest rates vary between 1.25% to 1.75% per 15 days 
with 120 days maturity. Also, renewable loans using the same collateral is deemed to 
be a normal practice in Indonesia.  
3.4 ISSUES IN PAWNBROKING AND PAWNSHOPPING 
As the discussion so far indicates, the pawnbroking business addresses some of the 
following issues: (i) pawnshops as a credit provider to low-income groups; (ii) the 
regulation of pawnshops which consist of the interest rates charged, entries, and 
competition, non rate regulatory and stolen goods; (iii) the transaction costs; (iv) the 
transportation costs; (v) gold as pledge; (vi) pawnshops as an alternative to 
mainstream financial institutions, and (vii) pawnshops as an alternative institution in 
economic downturn. These issues are further elaborated thoroughly by pointing out 
some of the cases in the countries mentioned previously. 
3.4.1 Pawnshop as a Credit Provider to the Low-Income Group 
In the discourse on development issues, pawnshops are discussed as an important 
credit sources for the low-income groups by many contributors in the field 
(Bosanquet, 1896; Yang, 1950, 1952; Whelan, 1979; Mohamed, 1986; Bouman and 
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Houtman, 1988; Caskey and Zikmund, 1990; Caskey, 1991, 1994 and 2003; Andrews, 
1994; Skully, 1994, 2005; Oeltjen, 1996; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; Johnson and 
Johnson, 1998; Schrader, 1996, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Soon and Choon, 2001; Lim, 
2001; Ming, 2006; Maamor and Ismail, 2006; Maamor et al., 2006; Francis, 2007; 
Chan and Owyong, 2007; and Johari and Sanusi, 2007). Literature, therefore, refers to 
pawnshops as fringe banks, which translates as „banks for the poor‟ (Caskey, 1994).  
Several literatures have proved that pawnshops are not only being patronised by low-
income groups but also by the middle and higher income groups as well (Mottershead, 
1938; Woloson, 1964; Schrader, 2000; Maamor et al., 2005; Maamor et al., 2006; and 
Johari et al., 2007). In addition, Caskey (1991: 87) characterizes the pawnshops‟ 
customers as having a comparatively low level of income and education, and also 
having poor financial management. Woloson (1964: 4) claims that pawnshop loans 
have helped them make ends meet from one payday to the next, due to the 
insufficiency of their income in covering their expenses. 
In addition, recent literature provides evidence for various country cases that 
pawnshop loans have not only been used for consumption purposes but also for 
productive purposes such as a start-up capital for small and medium businesses 
(Abdul Razak, 2008; Bhatt and Sinnakkannu, 2008; Chan and Owyong, 2007; 
Maamor and Ismail, 2007 and 2006; Maamor et al., 2006; Sanusi and Johari, 2006; 
Ming, 2006; Maamor et al., 2005; Mohammed et al. 2005; Mohd Nor, 2004; Soon 
and Choon, 2001; Mohamed, 1986; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; Skully, 2005 and 1992; 
Bouman and Houtman, 1988). 
3.4.2 Regulation of Pawnshop 
The issues involving the regulations of pawnshops can be divided into four important 
areas as below: 
3.4.2.1 Interest rates 
Despite moral and religious objections to high interest rates, pawnbrokers generally 
impose a very high interest rate to customers (Visser and MacIntosh, 1998). For 
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example, in Malaysia, a monthly charge of 2%
40
 or more than 24% per annum for 
getting a small advance loan from pawnshops can be considered exorbitantly high, 
more so for the lower and middle-income groups who are the main customers of such 
credit markets. Apparently, the history of pawnshops in China being banned by the 
government in 1956 does not seem to deter the pawnshops from charging higher 
interest rates to customers, 2% for regular items, 3.2% for housing properties, and 
4.7% for vehicles. This can be more harmful to United States citizens where the 
charge is much higher, that is around 20% a month and with interest rates set 
differently by the individual states (NPA, 2008).  
According to Skully (1992: 1), pawnbrokers charge a very high interest charge due to 
the fact that there is no credit check of the borrower or monitoring of the loan which 
normally happens in formal financing. In addition, pawnbrokers normally use their 
own funds to offer credit, which leads to high opportunity costs for them (Lamberte, 
1988: 20). It should also be noted that, as suggested by Daniel (2000: 42), the interest 
rate will be low if the quality or marketability of the collateral is high. According to 
this view, high default is secured by pledged collateral. 
Interestingly, many researchers have proven that, although the interest rate imposed 
by the pawnshops is very high, they are still patronised by customers, especially those 
excluded from mainstream financial institutions, due to the desperate states they are in 
(Bouman and Houtman, 1988; and Caskey, 1991). Oeltjen (1996: 1032) finds that 
most of the customers of pawnshop disregard the interest rates charged or any other 
fees incurred related to the loan made. Their main concern relates to the amount of the 
loan given by pawnbrokers with disregard to the interest rate charged. This behavior 
stems from the urgency of raising a particular amount of cash to accommodate certain 
needs and expenditures and stretch the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Nevertheless, since usury matters have been involved in the case of pawn lending, 
efforts have been made to limit the charges for the loan, especially for the benefit of 
lower-income groups. To achieve social goals through price controls is not easy and 
might even be impossible (Tenney, 2004). In fact, Caskey (1990) and Johnson and 
Johnson (1998) in their study argue that the efforts of regulators to lessen interest 
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rates for the benefit of borrowers, however, has an unintended opposite impact. They 
claim that reducing the allowed interest rates on pawnshop loans forces surviving 
pawnshops to reduce the loan-to-value ratio of pawnshop loans. Moreover, by driving 
some pawnshops out of the market, the reduced ceiling rates would encourage the 
remaining pawnshops to move to more affluent markets (urban areas) in order to raise 
the average size of loan. Adversely, the lower-income group especially from the rural 
areas will remain in disadvantageous position for not getting the pawnshop services. 
Thus, in the case of pawnbroking, regulators face a somewhat different trade-off than 
those faced in mainstream markets. 
3.4.2.2 Regulation on pawnshop entry, competition and local monopoly 
The high interest rates charged by pawnshops have made many of their operations 
very profitable (Lamberte, 1988). Due to the highly profitable gains made by the 
pawnbroking business, new pawnshops get encouraged to enter the market. With this 
stiff competition in the pawnshop business, the customer base per pawnshop reduces 
since many of them will turn to the most suitable pawnshops. As a result, the profit 
gained will fall as every pawnshop must cover its fixed costs from less money earned.  
Despite decreasing profit gains by pawnshops, customers on the other hand, will 
obtain benefits through the competition. Customers will have a wider range of 
pawnshops to get the best bargain from the collateral they provide. Moreover, the stiff 
competition also brings down the effective lending rates charged (Lamberte, 1988). 
Besides, on the pawnbrokers‟ part, its low interest rate charged, particularly in the city 
area, could be compensated with more customers, and will thus be able to cover its 
overhead costs (Ismail and Ahmad, 1997).   
Positively, even though the profit of each pawnshop in the industry falls due to the 
high competition, the quality, the process of their service and their shady image is 
improving. For example, the emergence of pawnshop chains from the mid 1980s 
through the early 1990s has challenged the family-owned pawnshop of the U. S. to a 
more modernised form of pawnshop in terms of technology and computerised 
operation, regulations displayed at pin boards, high quality service, and quick and 
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easy procedures (Johnson and Johnson, 1998).
41
 With these improvements, their 
premises and services are more similar to banks or insurance companies; hence, they 
may create new demand and drive the sector to grow.  
In contrast, conventional pawnbroking sectors in Southeast Asia such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines are still characterized by conservative 
management styles, though this does not appear to negatively affect the profitability 
and survival of individual pawnbrokers because of the years of stable growth and 
healthy profit margins attained in the past (Soon and Choon, 2001). 
What if only one large pawnshop serves the whole community? As Oeltjen (1996: 
1032) points out, the pawnshop operating in such a manner will be considered a „local 
monopoly‟. He claims that the reasons as to why there may exist only one pawnshop 
is that: (i) the existing community is very small and cannot allow more than one 
pawnshop; (ii) regulatory limitations on pawnshop density; and (iii) wise pawnbroker 
who realize that, in order to maintain their long-run prosperity, high entry-barriers 
must be well-constructed.  
For this type of pawnshop, if the location is quite far, it will not be attractive for 
potential pawners because many of the customers may not possess suitable means of 
transportation; the pawned items could be immense and heavy; the possibility of a 
small amount of loan given; and relatively high cost of transportation. It is in these 
types of circumstances that loan sharks thrive (Oeltjen, 1996: 1033). 
3.4.2.3 Licensing 
In Malaysia, pawnbrokers are required by law to obtain licenses in order to operate 
legally. However, this regulation does not prevent other unlicensed pawnbrokers to 
provide equivalent financial services. In fact, these illegal pawnbrokers may prove 
just as significant, if not more significant, than their licensed counterparts.  
In Indonesia, for example, it is reported that 58% of the Indonesian pawnshop 
industry is made up by these illegal operators, despite the fact that the legal pawnshop 
business is monopolised by government, (SEACEN, 1986: 257).  
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With regards to Malaysia, there are many illegal pawnshops that operate side by side 
the licensed pawnshops as the enforcement of the Pawnshop Act 1972 is rather 
ineffective (Ismail and Sanusi, 2005). Findings by other studies, such as Bouman and 
Bastiaanssen (1989), Bouman and Houtman (1988), Harriss (1983), Sivakumar (1978) 
and Wells (1980) indicate that there is a strong presence of illegal pawnshops 
operating throughout Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, even though these 
unlicensed pawnbrokers operate illegally and charge higher interest rates than their 
legal counterparts, customers seem to prefer to deal with them. Many reasons 
contribute to why they flourish. Among other reasons are more privacy, less 
formalities, efficient services, higher lending values, convenient operating times, and 
locations (Skully, 1994).  
3.4.2.4 Regulation in stolen goods 
Previous literature states that pawnshop business also facilitates traffic in stolen goods 
(Levine, 1913; Cromwell, 1991; Caskey, 1991; and Francis, 2007). According to 
Caskey (1991), all pawnbrokers adamantly insist that they do not knowingly accept 
stolen goods as collateral.
42
 It is not in their interest as police may seize the pawned 
items and the pawnbroker may end up losing the borrowers‟ collateral and the money 
lent to the customers.  
In 1988, in the United States, the police seized only 0.1% of pawned goods for being 
stolen property (Francis, 2007). This is because in many states in the United States, 
the manager must send a copy of the pawn-ticket or a description of the item pawned 
and its serial number to the local police department to check against its records of 
stolen goods. Often, the pawnbroker is required to hold the pawned item for a 
minimum number of days so that the police have time to discover it. Some statutes 
provide that the pawnshops must obtain the thumbprints of pawners. In addition, most 
pawnshops have video surveillance cameras that will provide pictures of the 
individual pawning the stolen items (Francis, 2007). 
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In China, all the urban pawnshops are closely monitored and supervised by police 
authorities with the objective of preventing pawnshops from being a medium for the 
disposal of illicit goods (chinadaily.com.cn, 2006). 
Although the strict enforcement succeeded in the U. S., it is less applicable in 
Southeast Asia because regulators are only interested in regulating the institutions but 
not the activities of the pawnshops (Ismail and Sanusi, 2005). 
3.4.3 Transaction Cost 
According to Fernando (2003) and Bouman and Houtman (1988), pawnbroking 
transaction costs are low due to minimal overhead and administration costs, record 
keeping is simple, no need to assemble information on the loan applicant‟s 
creditworthiness, and the procedure is quick and simple. The loan provided by 
pawnshops can also be labelled as „no further strings attached‟, because its operation 
involves collateral in case of a loan default. This means that, if the borrower fails to 
pay the loan with interest within the contractual period, the pawnbroker may take 
possession of the collateral assets. Thus, the transaction ends and there is no such 
thing as ever-increasing debt in pawning (Fernando, 2003). 
Schrader (1999), however, rejects this statement. Reversely, he argues that the 
transaction cost of pawnshop credit is quite high due to the storage and safekeeping of 
these goods. Nevertheless, he agrees that the transaction costs of pawnshop can be 
reduced to some extent by only accepting items with a small size and high value such 
as jewellery, gold and silver items, and precious stones.  
On the borrowers‟ part, Lamberte (1988) claims that they face very minimal 
transaction costs due to easily obtained loans, and because getting loans from 
pawnshops only involves providing collateral. 
3.4.4 Transportation Cost 
Obviously, with an average loan of around $50, customers of pawnshops in the U. S. 
will generally patronize the closest shop in order to reduce transportation costs 
(Caskey, 1991). With the increased usage of transportation systems, pawnshops are 
now not only well represented in the urban areas but rural areas as well (Caskey, 
 50 
1990). Johnson and Johnson (1998) describe that, in the early years, the pawnshop 
business was located within cities in the United States, but, because of the change in 
the nature of items pawned and the greater availability of transportation, pawnshops 
were more likely to be along highways in strip malls with ample parking. As a result of 
the infrastructure development, the transportation cost could be reduced. 
3.4.5 Gold as Pledge 
Gold is synonymous to women in terms of accessories as well as a means of safe 
keeping. As mentioned by Bouman and Houtman (1988: 73), “a woman without 
ornaments is like a woman without background, without a family to protect her”. For 
Asian women, gold is used as dowry or as wedding gifts, and they are particularly 
prone to collecting valuables that are passed down the family line as something very 
personal that others cannot easily claim.  
Gold is very commonly used as collateral over other items due to a number of 
reasons. According to Abdul Razak (2008: 5-6), “first, undoubtedly gold can be sold 
and liquidated without much difficulty, and if there is such a need arise, the auction 
can be performed should the borrower become unable to redeem the pledged gold. 
Second, the process of determining the gold‟s purity and authenticity is 
uncomplicated; therefore there is less risk in mispricing the collateral. Third, gold 
chains and rings typically require only a small flat envelop for storage and so can be 
kept securely in the bank‟s safety box at little, if any, additional cost”.  
Gold is not only in demand for its own sake, but it also has an intrinsic value and 
functions as a hedge against inflation (Bouman and Houtman, 1989: 73). According to 
Bouman dan Houtman (1988: 87), in India, the price of gold has never lost more than 
20% of its peak market value from 1946 to 1984. Hence, for pawnbrokers, accepting 
gold as collateral is more secure and profitable compared to other items that would 
depreciate against time. 
3.4.6 Pawnshop as an Alternative to the Mainstream Financial Institution 
According to Caskey (1991) and Johnson and Johnson (1998), during the 1980s, due 
to higher rates of poverty in the U.S, many Americans turned to pawnshop services 
from mainstream financial institutions. They also believed that these following factors 
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greatly enhanced the use of pawnshop services: (i) a higher number of households 
who were unable to have bank accounts; (ii) a rise in household credit risk rating; (iii) 
a decline in the number of unsecured consumer lending by banks and small loan 
companies; (iv) an increase in gold prices; (v) more interest from investors in fringe 
banking such as those exercised by pawnbrokers; and (vi) growing preference by 
customers to use this easy and convenient service (Francis, 2007). In addition, the 
pawnshops‟ customers are free from further, possibly embarrassing obligations 
(Bouman and Bastiaanssen, 1989: 12) 
Nevertheless in most developing countries, researchers agree that the role of 
pawnshops is to serve the poor (including the low-income groups) who are facing 
insufficient cash, emergency needs, and exclusion from mainstream financial 
institutions (Yong, 2008; Bouman and Houtman, 1988; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; 
Lamberte, 1988; Skully, 1994 and 2005). Evidently, there has been a change in the 
types of customers patronising pawnshops; they are not only patronised by the lower-
income and the middle-income groups but also by the higher-income groups 
(Mottershead, 1938; Schrader, 2000; Maamor et al., 2005 and 2006; and Johari et al., 
2007). 
3.4.7 Pawnshop as an Alternative in Economic Downturn 
Caskey (1991) claims that pawnbrokers will restrict credit in economic downturn 
because, in the recession, the same collateral may be worth less than it would be in 
normal times. Moreover, pawnbrokers may become illiquid and reduce the average 
loan to collateral ratio if the downturn leads to a decline in pawnshop sales or loan 
redemption. 
Conversely, with the economic slowdown and a significant tightening of conventional 
credit, many customers of mainstream credit institutions, understandably, switch to 
other sources of credit such as pawnshops. Furthermore, due to the escalated credit 
crunch phenomena, many banks and credit card companies have became more 
selective in choosing potential loan borrowers; hence, pawnbrokers fill the gap.       
Despite providing many means in shaking off its reputation as a „bad times‟ industry, 
pawnbrokers evidently benefit from the economic crises. In the early days, the 
customers of pawnshops were patronaged by low income groups, petty traders, and 
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poor people. Due to the credit crunch in 2008, pawnshops operating in the United 
Kingdom experienced a boom in their business (Brennan, 2008). Surprisingly, the 
National Pawnbrokers Association (NPA) reported that the customers of pawnshops 
in the United Kingdom come from middle income and higher groups such as brokers, 
pawning their Rolex watches to pay the wages of their workers, bankers pawning their 
gold rings to pay their mortgage repayments, and property tycoons, as well as wealthy 
wives, pawning their gold jewellery and art valued up to £30,000 (Gleeson, 2008).  
Similarly, pawnbrokers such as Cash America in the U. S. are expected to see their 
customers increase tremendously because more consumers are being cut off from 
mainstream financial institutions as banks take fewer risks in a slowing economy 
(Edward, 2008). 
As with the United Kingdom and the United States, the business of pawnbroking in 
China has also experienced booms during the economic downturn (Yahong, 2008). In 
addition, the increase in businesses utilizing pawnbroking services can partly be 
attributed to prevailing, domestic economic conditions. According to Yahong (2008), 
the Chinese economy began to face the risk of overheating and suffering serious 
inflation after a persistent 11% growth throughout the first three quarters of 2007. The 
risks prompted the government to take precautions, which was to shift to a tight 
monetary policy in 2008. The effects were immediately felt by China‟s smaller 
companies, which were inevitably always at the bottom of the banks‟ corporate 
borrowers lists. This provided a perfect opportunity for pawnshops to expand their 
business. In 2007, a study on local pawnshops by the Beijing Pawn Trade Association 
revealed that 90% of pawnshop customers were individuals and 10% of them were 
medium-sized and small businesses (Yahong, 2008). Surprisingly, in 2006, 90% of 
pawn loans were channelled to manufacturing and business purposes (Ming, 2006). 
As a conclusion, pawnshops will not only alleviate poverty but it can also contribute 
to economic growth per se. 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
While pawnbroking is frequently associated with such negative elements as 
moneylenders, it is a somewhat benign form of lending in comparison. Pawnshops are 
one of the many financial institutions supplying consumer credit; yet do not compete 
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directly with other financial institutions for customers. Rather, they lend to those 
excluded from mainstream financial markets. For instance, in the U. K., the positive 
publicity and the work of the National Pawnbrokers Association (NPA) in raising its 
profile makes pawnbroking a resource available to all. Even local terminology is also 
much friendlier. It is the „banks for the little man‟ in the United States, „small man‟s 
bank‟ in Malaysia, known as „uncle‟ in the U. K. and „my aunt‟ in the U. S. 
(Mottershead, 1938). Certainly, formal markets are the most important financial 
institutions but economists will have a very incomplete understanding of alternative 
credit sources that are available for those excluded from mainstream financial 
institutions such as pawnbroking. 
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Chapter 4 
PAWNBROKING IN SHARI’AH FRAMEWORK AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN ISLAMIC FINANCE 
4.1 PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Islamic finance is not a new phenomenon as the basic principles and practices were 
expounded by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) over fourteen hundred years ago 
(Baldwin and Wilson, 1988; Khan, 2008). Up to the 13
th
 century, the progress made 
in the Islamic financial instruments helped Muslim societies to progress. However, 
after the Muslim world became stagnant due to many reasons such as the Mongol 
invasion and political instabilities, the West on the other hand has undergone a period 
of renaissance that resulted in significant scientific achievements (Hamid, 2006: 27). 
During the later period and in particular during the colonialisation period, Islamic 
finance was abandoned and was displaced by Western financial systems; hence, the 
institutionalization of Islamic finance could not be achieved (Wilson, 2002; Vogel and 
Hayes, 1998; Wilson, 1995; Baldwin and Wilson, 1988). 
It was only in 1940s that the works on Islamic economics and finance were initiated 
and developed by Muslim scholars in an attempt to provide an alternative system to 
capitalist and socialist systems (Hamid, 2006: 27). One of the early institutions of 
Islamic finance that was implemented in modern times was the Pilgrims Fund 
Corporation (Lembaga Tabung Haji) in Malaysia, which was established in 
November 1962, and commenced its operation on 30
th
 September 1963. Its operation 
focused more on managing the pilgrimage matters by investing the money of the 
participants into the scheme through a shari‟ah compliant manner. In Egypt, however, 
the modern Islamic bank was equivalent to the savings bank that was based on the 
profit sharing, introduced in 1963 in the Egyptian town of Mit Ghamr.  
It should be noted that the early years of Islamic banking system witnessed a striking 
resemblance to conventional banking products. Nevertheless, due to 
institutionalisation, competitiveness, and a search for authentic Islamic solutions, the 
industry has recently started to develop its own products closely compliant with 
shari‟ah principles, standards, and guidelines such as Islamic insurance (takaful), 
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Islamic pawnbroking (ar-rahn), Islamic bonds (sukuk) etc. Among the products 
offered by the Islamic finance institutions, in particular in Southeast Asia, Islamic 
pawnbroking has a potential to serve a wide range of customers from lower income to 
upper level income groups. 
This chapter, hence, discusses and analyses the concepts of pawnbroking in the 
shari‟ah framework. However, in order to contextualise the discussion, the three 
important norms of Islamic financial ethics, which are the prohibition of riba and 
gharar, and also the concept of social justice, will be examined first. 
4.2 THE SALIENT FEATURES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
There are two distinct aspects that differentiate the modes of finance between the 
Islamic and conventional finance which include riba and gharar.  
4.2.1 Riba  
The central proposition in Islamic financial ethics and law is that every single 
financial transaction and business contracts conducted must be independent from any 
traces of riba, which is strictly prohibited in Islam (Abdul Samad, 2007). According 
to Ayub (2007: 47), riba is defined as earnings from loans, such as personal or 
commercial loans, and debts where the borrowers pay more than the principle amount 
of loans.  
The Holy Qur‟an and Sunnah have clearly stated the prohibition of riba repeatedly, 
for example:  
 That which ye lay out for increase through the property of (other) people will 
 have no increase with Allah: but that which ye lay out for charity seeking the 
 Countenance of Allah (will increase): it is these who will get a recompense 
 multiplied. (30: 39) 
 O ye who believe! Devour not usury doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; 
 that ye may (really) prosper. (3: 130) 
Those who devour riba will not stand except as he stands who has been driven 
to madness by the touch of Satan….Allah has permitted trade and forbidden 
riba…Allah will deprive riba of all blessing. (2: 275-6) 
 56 
O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and give up what remains of your demand for 
riba, if you are indeed believers. If you do not, take notice of war from Allah. 
(2: 278-79) 
During his final sermon at his last hajj or pilgrimage, the Prophet (pbuh) emphasized 
the prohibition of riba as Allah (swt) forbade the act of taking and accepting riba. He 
stated that “every form of riba is cancelled; capital indeed is yours which you shall 
have; wrong not and you shall not be wronged. I start with the amount of riba which 
people owe to my uncle Abbas and declare it all cancelled” (Ayub, 2007: 46). 
Subsequently, on behalf of his uncle Abbas, the Prophet (pbuh) wrote off the total 
amount of interest charge from his borrowers‟ loan (Ayub, 2007: 46).  
The Arabic word riba can be interpreted as „increase‟, excess, or „usury‟, and while 
many discussions have aroused in determining its literal meaning, it is generally 
accepted that it means „interest‟ (Khan, 2008: 10). Even though most Muslim scholars 
deem that riba, or interest is prohibited, some scholars nevertheless have an opposite 
view, as “Siddiqui (1995) states that a controversy has arisen that interest paid by 
banks on deposits or charged on advances is not tantamount to riba and is hence 
permissible” (Khan, 2008: 10; Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1992: 2). In addition, scholars 
such as Sheikh Tantawi and Sheikh Wasil believe that the conventional banking 
interest is merely a profit-shared of growth-inducing capital investments; hence, is not 
the riba prohibited by Allah (swt) (El-Gamal, 2001: 2; Soliman, 2004: 277). 
Other small minority scholars‟ claim that interest may be lawfully permitted if the 
objective of the interest charged is to shape the people‟s behaviour by acting as a late 
payment penalty, or it should not be permitted in cases where the borrowers are being 
oppressed by the lenders who charge at exorbitant interest rates, which is equal to 
usury rather than interest (Dhumale and Sapcanin, 1999: 2). 
Despite this, the scholarly consensus reached amongst Islamic jurists, fuqaha‟, and 
specialists is that all types of interests are forbidden under the rules of Shari‟ah and 
all parties that have taken part in the contract, including the writers and the witness, 
are party to the sin. Riba or interest is strongly prohibited in Islam due to, first, the 
unlawful gains from the financial contracts, as the lender does not share the risk, and 
second, interest boosts the inclination of wealth to be highly concentrated in the hands 
of a few (Khan, 2008: 10). Interest charged is considered an unjust mechanism of 
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financing in Islam because “if the borrower‟s venture is unsuccessful through no fault 
of his or her own, it is unfair for the lender to consider a fixed rate of return or 
demand repayment; while if the borrower earns a very high rate of profit on the 
venture, it is unfair that the lender should receive only a small proportion of the profit 
even though he/she may well have provided the majority of the finance for the 
venture” (Khan, 2008: 10)43. In other words, since Islam considers risk and also the 
profit/loss sharing, interest does not fulfil such conditions, and therefore results in an 
unfair outcome. 
The decree of riba prohibition, thus, indicates that the purposes of money lending 
activity must be for either a charitable purpose (al-qardhul hasan), or for generating 
lawful investments which are based on profit and risk sharing concepts (mudharabah, 
musharakah, etc.). Indeed, the undertaking of legitimate economic activities and 
productive efforts that conform to shari‟ah laws is considered to be a pious merit or 
even a religious duty in Islam, as it allows Muslims to earn and consume halal 
products. 
Riba, hence, is clearly prohibited in order to establish a fair economic system that 
ensures the prevalence of justice and the removal of any forms of exploitation 
practiced in trade and loan activities. In other words, Islam aims at social optimality 
and efficiency as well as financial and economic optimality and efficiency. 
4.2.2 Gharar  
The second underlying prohibition in Islamic finance ethicality is gharar. It includes 
the elements of uncertainty/ambiguity, risk or hazard about the end result of the 
contract and its nature, the quality value and conditions specified in the contract, the 
rights and obligations of the parties involved, the ownership or custody of the item 
and its time of delivery (Ayub, 2007: 58; Al-Saati, 2003).  
                                                          
43
 An axample of a just financing as a viable financial instrument in Islamic finance is musharakah 
financing. As a financial contract, musharakah financing means the relationship established under a 
contract by the mutual consent of the parties for sharing of profits and losses, arising from a joint 
enterprise or venture. The ratio of profit for each partner must be determined in proportion to the actual 
profit accrued to the business, and not in proportion to the capital invested by him. In the case of a loss, 
each partner shall suffer the loss exactly according to the ratio of investment (Usmani, 1999).  
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Reliable sources from several of the Prophet‟s companions have provided narrations 
concerning the proscription of gharar in trading by the Prophet (pbuh). Abu Hurayra, 
for example, narrated that, “The Messenger of Allah prohibited husah44 sale and 
gharar sale” (Sahih Al-Bukhari: 2783); and Ibn Hanbal narrated the Prophet (pbuh) 
saying, “Do not sell fish while they are yet in the sea for this is gharar” (Cattelan, 
2009: 394). 
Al-Saati (2003) challenges the notion that all gharar transactions are sinful and thus 
are forbidden. He claims that some Muslim jurists allow some flexibility in certain 
gharar transactions on the ground of maslahah and is essential for that transaction in 
order to lessen the causes of disagreement to a tolerable level. Al-Saati (2003: 10-14) 
classified gharar in four categories as follows:  
(i) The prohibited gharar: The prohibited gharar is considered as exorbitant 
gharar such as gambling (maysir)
45
. This is the type of gharar which refers 
intentionally to gharar taking and involves unproductive money and goods 
transfer between parties, with no added value from the transaction.  
(ii) The permissible gharar: Gharar can be permissible when the school of 
jurisprudence cannot come to an agreement on whether the gharar in the 
contract is prohibited, thus the contract is invalid. The gharar would be 
permissible even if only one Muslim jurist gives permit to it.  
(ii) The acceptable gharar: The acceptable gharar is a situation, which involves 
exogenous uncertainties such as changes in weather or climate, consumer 
preferences, etc., and endogenous uncertainties such as the commodity‟s 
quality that the buyers‟ have bought or the terms of the trade that will take 
place.  
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 Husah sale is “a type of sale practiced by the Arabs prior to Islam where the sale was determined by 
the casting of pebbles. Classical commentators mention three forms of the husah sale: (1) the seller 
would say to the would-be purchaser, “When I throw the pebbles in my hand, then deal is closed and 
binding on you, (2) the seller would say to the potential purchaser, “I shall sell you the commodity that 
your pebbles hit, or (3) in a land, the seller would say, “I shall sell you the plot of land” ” (Islamic 
Finance Project, Harvard Law School). 
 
45
 According to Ayub (2007: 61), maysir refers to “easily available wealth or acquisition of wealth by 
chance, whether or not it deprives the other‟s right”. 
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(iii) The mandatory uncertainty: The mandatory gharar is a prerequisite to the 
validity of the contract which is practiced in mudharabah, musharakah, or 
ijarah contracts. According to Al-Saati (2003: 14), this gharar is based on 
the Islamic lawful axiom that is, “Damage and benefit go together,” whereby 
“in the musharakah contract all parties are partners in case of profit and 
liable in case of loss and no minimum profit can be assured to one party, or 
one party is entitled to a share in profit only while the other party is made 
liable for the entire loss along with his share in profit as these situations 
could contradict the above maxims”. 
Concisely, not all gharar trading are proscribed by Muslim jurists. Thus, Islamic 
jurists allow some flexibility in certain gharar transactions on the ground of maslahah 
or public interest and consent-stipulated conditions in order to lessen the causes of 
disagreement among the contracting parties and reduce the gharar involved to a 
tolerable level.    
As a conclusion, the prohibitions of transactions involving riba and gharar are to 
ensure that the interests and benefits of all parties involved in the market transaction 
are fully protected in order to achieve social justice. 
4.2.3 The Concept of Social Justice 
Apart from being concerned with riba and gharar, Islamic finance is also committed 
towards social justice. Social justice can be defined as “a basic value in the life of a 
community to respect human dignity and provide for the best possible quality of life 
for all human beings” (An-Na‟im et al., 2006: 19).  
Several passages in the Holy Qur‟an mention the important of social justice and well-
being in Islam especially in helping the poor or the needy. For example: 
Worship none but Allah (Alone) and be dutiful and good to parents, and to 
kindred, and to orphans and Al-Masakin
46
 (the poor), and speak good to 
people, and perform As-Salat, and give Zakat. (2: 83) 
And give to the kinsman his due and to the poor and to the wayfarer. (17: 26)  
                                                          
46
 As narrated by Abu Hurairah, the Prophet (pbuh) said, Al-Masakin (the poor) is that “who has not 
enough money to satisfy his needs and whose condition is not known to others, that others may give 
him something in charity, and who does not beg of people”. (Shahih Al-Bukhari, 2/1479). 
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Do good to parents, kinsfolk, orphans, the poor, the neighbour who is near of 
kin, the neighbour who is stranger, the companion by your side, the wayfarer 
you meet, and those slaves whom your right hands possess. (4: 36) 
Based on this definition and these verses, it is essential for Islamic finance institutions 
to offer ethical alternatives to conventional financing that can enhance social justice 
and the well-being of society, especially for those from low-income groups and also 
those who are excluded from mainstream financial institutions.  
4.3 PAWNBROKING IN SHARI’AH FRAMEWORK 
While Islamic finance has enjoyed considerable growth and success in recent years, 
Islamic financial alternatives, which are free from riba and gharar, have only now 
begun to make inroads. One of the new Islamic financial alternatives which is in 
compliance with shari‟ah precepts and is significant for consumers, especially the 
lower-income groups, is ar-rahn or Islamic pawnbroking, and Malaysia has become 
the pioneer of this product.  
The ar-rahn scheme is anticipated to be the most appropriate mechanism to overcome 
the excessive interest rates imposed by conventional pawnshops, which relate to riba 
and other malpractices such as undervaluing the collateral price, and no information 
regarding the weight, length, or type of collateral stated in the pawn-ticket which 
relates to gharar.  
Apart from being the best alternative to conventional pawnshops, the ar-rahn scheme 
is expected to improve the well-being of society as it provides financial opportunities 
and short-term financing to lower-income groups and small businesses which are 
usually excluded from the mainstream financial system due to limited capital.  
The following sections elaborate the concept of pawnbroking in the shari‟ah 
framework. As discussed in the following section, shari‟ah scholars in Malaysia have 
come to an agreement that the underlying concept of the Islamic pawnbroking 
contract is based on the al-qardhul hasan, al-wadiah yad dhamanah, al-ujrah and ar-
rahn.   
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4.3.1 Concept of Ar-Rahn 
The Arabic term of rahn may refer either to „constancy‟, or to „holding‟ and 
„bindingness‟. In this regard, the verse “Every soul will be held (rahinah) in pledge 
for its deeds” (Qur‟an, 74: 38) associates the binding element of the term. In addition, 
the Prophet (pbuh) quotes that “the soul of the believer is marhuna or pledged for the 
debt until it is paid off” (as cited in Khan and Nisar, 2004: 20). In financial terms, 
however, one uses the term rahn to refer to the object that was pawned to ensure a 
debt repayment should the debtor unable to repay their loan. The pledge contract is 
drawn to provide such security by binding the collateral to the creditor in the events of 
the debtor‟s failure of payment. 
According to Al-Zuhayli (2003: 79), the definition of pawning or mortgage contracts 
involves possessing an item in lieu of a legal right that may be satisfied from that 
item. There is also a similarity in terms of the definition of pawning among the four 
madhabs (School of Sunni Jurisprudence). The Shafiis define the pawning contract as 
thus: “Taking a non-fungible property as insurance against a fungible debt, whereby 
the debt may be extracted from the held property if it is not repaid” (Al-Zuhayli, 
2003: 79). In addition, the Hanbalis define pawned object as “a property used as 
insurance for a debt, so that the debt may be extracted from the property if it is not 
possible to recollect from the debtor” (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 80). Similarly, the Hanafis 
define pawning as retaining valuable items by giving loans with the probability of 
taking possession of the items (Mohamed Naim, 2005). In addition, Mohamed Naim 
(2005) notes that the Zaidiyyah
47
 defines pawning as a contract on specific assets and 
the ownership of the assets can be transferred to the pawnbroker if the debt is not paid 
off.  
The most precise definition of pawning is given by the Malikis. As noted by Al-
Zuhayli (2003: 80), the Malikis define the pawning contract as:  
It is the act of taking a valued property from its owner, as a means of insuring 
a loan that has matured or is about to mature. Thus, they allow this contract to 
include taking non-fungible properties such as real estate, animals, or 
                                                          
47
 The Zaidiyyah refers to a sect within Shia that separated from the main branch [Twelvers (al-Ithnay 
„Ashariyyah)] over the fifth imam. It is named after the Imam Zayd Ibn „Ali, the grandson of Husayn 
Ibn „Ali, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad (pbuh).  
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commodities, as well as usufruct, as pawned objects. In the latter case, pawned 
usufruct must be tied to a specific time period or task, and must be deducted 
from the debt. As for the debt itself, they stipulated that it must be matured, 
e.g. the price in a concluded sale, the repayment of a matured debt, or the 
value of ruined objects; or it must be about to become matured, e.g. taking an 
object from an artisan or borrower to ensure against losing one‟s capital or lent 
object. In the latter cases, the pawned object is used as insurance against the 
value of the objects for which the artisan or borrower is liable. 
4.3.1.1 Islamic rationale for ar-rahn 
There are proofs of legality of the pawning contract in the Qur‟an and the Sunnah, 
which are discussed below: 
4.3.1.1.1 The Qur’an 
Evidence from the Qur‟an (2: 283) is provided by the verse, “If you are on a journey 
and cannot find a scribe, then use the receipt of pawned objects” (as an act of 
insurance, instead of the scribe documentation). Based on this verse, only Mujahid 
and the Zahiris restrict pawning to the state of travelling, while most jurists agreed 
that taking pawned objects is permissible both at home and while travelling, based on 
the Prophet‟s Sunnah which allowed it unconditionally (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 81). In this 
regard, the Qur‟anic verse mentioned the state of travelling to alert people that there 
is an easy means of documenting and insuring a debt if there is no scribe at hand. 
4.3.1.1.2 The Sunnah 
The Sunnah, being the second legal and knowledge source in Islam, is provided by the 
Hadith narrated by Al-Bukhari on the authority of Aisha (mAbpwh) that “The Prophet 
(pbuh) bought some food from a Jew, and he pawned his iron shield with him”.  
In another Hadith, Anas (mAbpwh) said: “The Prophet (pbuh) pawned a shield with a 
Jew in Madinah, and he took from him some barley for his family”. 
It is also established in a Hadith narrated by Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet (pbuh) 
often said: “pawned riding animals may be mounted in exchange for their expenses, 
and the milk of pawned dairy animals in exchange for their expenses; and the one 
who rides or drinks is thus responsible for the animal‟s expenses” (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 
81). 
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Based on the textual provisions from the Qur‟an and Sunnah, it can be concluded that 
the rational of ar-rahn (collateral) in a pawning transaction is to ensure the repayment 
of debt; hence the objective of ar-rahn is to offer the creditor the option to sell the 
collateral in the event of non-payment (DeLorenzo, 2004: 121).    
4.3.1.2 Principles, requisites and components 
According to Mohamed Naim (2004), the pawning contract has four components: 
(i) Sighah implying „offer and acceptance of both parties‟; 
(ii) Ar-rahin, meaning „who pawns an object of his‟ and Al-murtahin „who 
receives the pawned object‟; 
(iii) Al-marhun, „the pawned object as insurance of the debt‟; and  
(iv) Al-marhun bih, „the debt in lieu of which the object is pawned‟. 
In this regard, the Hanafis stipulate that the offer and acceptance from the debtor and 
creditor, respectively, as the cornerstone of the pawning contract, is analogous to most 
other contracts (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 82). However, the Hanafis rule that the contract is 
not finalized or binding until the pawned object is delivered either by transportation to 
the creditor, or by giving him access to it. The offer and acceptance must be clear, 
concise, and free from any gharar (Ibrahim et al., 2006). Thus, the debtor may make 
an offer such as: “I pawn this object with you in lieu of the debt I owe you”, and the 
creditor may indicate his acceptance by saying: “I accept”. In this regard, the term 
“pawn” need not be uttered in the offer. For instance, a buyer may give an object to 
the seller saying: “keep this until I pay you the price”, in which case the pawning 
contract is concluded, since what matters in contracts is their economic content (Al-
Zuhayli, 2003: 82). 
Similarly, the non-Hanafis also stipulated four essential principles or requisites for the 
pawning contract: „contract language‟, „contracting parties‟, „pawned object‟, and 
„underlying debt‟ (Al-Zuhayli, 2003: 82). They added that the contracting party is 
considered as a requisite, since it is impossible to imagine a contract without 
contracting parties.  
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4.3.2 Concept of Al-Qardhul Hasan (Benevolent loan)  
One of the underlying principles of Islamic pawnbroking is al-qardhul hasan which 
comes from two Arabic words; (i) qardh (to cut)
48
 and (ii) hasan (kindness). 
According to Ayub (2007: 492), al-qardhul hasan can be defined as “a loan with the 
stipulation to return the principal sum in the future without any increase. In Islamic 
law, all loans have to be virtuous, as seeking any benefit from loaning amounts to 
riba”. In addition, the borrower is only required to repay the principal amount 
borrowed, but he/she has the absolute discretion to pay an additional amount to the 
lender as a token of appreciation, which is called hibah (Mohd. Ariffin and Adnan, 
2010: 2). Thus, this type of financing is highly recommended to be practiced by 
financial institutions because it helps those people in need; hence enhances the social 
justice and well-being of society. There are several verses in the Holy Qur‟an that 
clearly state the term „al-qardhul hasan‟ (see: Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 245; Surah 
At-Taghabun, verse 17; Surah Al-Maidah, verse 12; Surah Al-Hadid, verses 11 and 
18; and Surah Muzammil, verse 20).  
Accordingly, the concept of al-qardhul hasan is applied in the Islamic pawnbroking 
mechanism. Basically, the pawnbroker will offer a al-qardhul hasan loan to the 
borrower who wants to pawn his belonging. At the maturity of the contractual period, 
the borrower is expected to repay the principal amount borrowed in order to redeem 
the pawned item.  
4.3.3 Concept of Al-Wadiah Yad Dhammanah (Keeping valuable asset safe with 
guarantee) and Al-Ujrah (safekeeping fee) 
Under the concept of al-wadiah yad dhammanah, the Islamic pawnbroker will accept 
custody of the valuable asset and they will have to promise to keep the valuable asset 
in a safe place and return it to the borrower at the end of contractual period (Bhatt and 
Sinnakkannu, 2008). The pawnbroker has to take full responsibility to the collateral 
such as providing security and insurance (takaful) to ensure its safe return once the 
borrower redeems his/her belongings. If the collateral item is damaged or lost not due 
to the lender‟s negligence, the lender is not required to replace the item. Otherwise, 
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 According to Mohd Ariffin and Adnan (2010), the word „qardh‟ means that the lender‟s property 
will be cut off by giving loan to the borrower.  
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the lender is responsible to replace the damaged or stolen collateral to the owner if 
they fail to keep to the agreement due to self negligence (Bhatt and Sinnakkannu, 
2008). 
As a related concept, Islamic pawnbroking will charge a service fee which is known 
as al-ujrah. According to Bhatt and Sinnakkannu (2008), the pawnbroker is allowed 
to charge a reasonable fee for the services rendered in keeping the borrowers‟ pledged 
items secured and in good form. Furthermore, in the al-ujrah concept, the acceptance 
of offer by the specified person (borrower) is necessary (Ayub, 2007).  
As a whole, the mechanism of Islamic pawnbroking can be illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Based on Figure 4.1, when the pawnbroker lends out money, it uses the contract of al-
qardhul hasan, implying a benevolent loan or interest free loan. To avoid loan 
defaults, it employs the contract of ar-rahn. In order for the collateral to be kept 
safely and guaranteed by the lender, al-wadiah yad dhammanah is employed. To earn 
profits, the lender will charge the borrower a custodial fee contracted under the 
principle of al-ujrah. 
Figure 4.1: The Ar-rahn Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rosly (2005: 130).  
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4.4 THE PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC PAWNBROKING IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 
After presenting the shari‟ah dimensions of Islamic pawnbroking, this section 
provides an overview of the experiences of running ar-rahn operations in Southeast 
Asia. 
4.4.1 Thailand 
One of the institutions that conduct muammalat practices in Thailand is the Pattani 
Islamic Cooperative Limited (Koperasi Islam Pattani Berhad), which was established 
on the 28
th
 October 1987 under the act of the Cooperative Act of 1968 and later 
amended to the Cooperative Act of 1999. It conducts almost all shari‟ah compliant 
products such as al-wadiah, al-mudharabah, al-musharakah, al-bai-bithaman ajil, al-
salam, al-wakalah and ar-rahn.  
Since the establishment of the Pattani Islamic Cooperative Limited, there has been a 
positive response for the ar-rahn scheme among Muslims, especially in Pattani. The 
first ar-rahn scheme operated by this cooperative was launched on the 27
th
 June 1999 
through its first counter in Pattani City in the Muang Province of Pattani Region. The 
concept of management and operation of this scheme was adapted from the ar-rahn 
scheme implemented by the Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (PKB) in Malaysia (Ismail 
Dewani, 2002). The scheme was implemented in order to prevent Muslims from using 
conventional pawnshops which operate under a usury basis.  
Similar to Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia, the Pattani Islamic Cooperative Limited 
charges safekeeping fees, instead of interest, which is commonly imposed by 
conventional pawnshops. The rate of the safekeeping fee charged by the cooperative 
is shown in table 4.1. The loan amount is 75% of the collateral value and the period of 
the loan is six months, which can be extended to three months and finally for one 
month. 
The conventional pawnshops in Thailand are controlled under the Pawnshop Act 
which was established in the Buddhist year of 2480 (1937) and has been amended for 
several times in the Buddhist year of 2517 (1974), 2525 (1983) and 2534 (1991) 
(Tohmeena, 2004). Unlike conventional pawnshops, the ar-rahn scheme conducted 
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by the Pattani Islamic Cooperative Limited is controlled under the Cooperative Act 
due to the non-existent regulations for the ar-rahn scheme in Thailand. 
Table 4.1: Safekeeping Fees Charge by the Pattani Islamic Cooperative Limited 
Value of item pledge 
(Bath) 
Fees rate for every 100.00bath 
per month (Bath) 
1.00 – 5,000.00 0.83 
5,001.00 – 15,000.00 0.86 
15,001.00 – 30,000.00 0.89 
30,001.00 – 45,000.00 0.92 
45,001.00 – 60,000.00 0.95 
Above 60,001.00  1.00 
Source: Regional Ar-Rahnu Secretariat (2002/2004). 
As shown in table 4.2, the ar-rahn scheme implemented by the Pattani Islamic 
Cooperative Limited shows a very progressive performance from 1999 till the mid-
year of 2005.  
Table 4.2: Performance of Ar-Rahn Scheme in Thailand from 1999 – 2005 
Year Total Loans (Bath) Total Customers 
1994 – 2004 211,083,790.00 14,745 
2005 (Jan – June) 42,832,450.00 2,468 
Total 253,916,240.00 17,213 
Total value of item pledge 348,554,980.00  
Source: Regional Ar-Rahnu Secretariat (2004) 
4.4.2 Brunei 
According to Matahir (2002), the practice of pawning under the shari‟ah principle in 
Brunei began since the writing of the Hukum Kanun Brunei during the rule of Sultan 
Hasan (1605 – 1619) and was implemented during the rule of Sultan Jalilulakbar 
(1619 – 1649). However, the shari‟ah compliant pawnbroking stopped their 
operations during British colonization and pawnbroking was obliged by the Common 
Law. 
Nowadays, with the establishment of Bank Islam Brunei Berhad (BIBB), shari‟ah 
finance products have become popular again among Muslims. In order to cater for the 
financial needs of the lower income groups, BIBB has decided to expand its shari‟ah 
products such as the ar-rahn scheme. The establishment of the ar-rahn scheme in 
1996 was most probably after the BIBB made an observation of a huge number of 
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Muslims who visited one goldsmith
49
 shop in the capital city of Brunei to get cash 
(Matahir, 2002). With that scenario, BIBB was prompted to introduce the ar-rahn 
scheme which would help the people get quick cash which was permissible by 
shari‟ah principles.  
According to Matahir (2002), the BIBB only accepts gold and precious stones as 
collateral. The loan amount is based on 50% of the gold prevailing market. Customers 
are allowed to get a maximum financing of up to B$5,000.00 per day, and the 
maximum total limit for whole financing is B$25,000.00. In addition, safekeeping 
fees will be charged based on the value of gold, which is B$0.70 per B$100.00 value 
of gold. 
4.4.3 Indonesia 
Perum Pegadaian (PP) is an enterprise which has provided pawnbroking services 
since 1901 in Indonesia. Since the early ages, Muslims who represent up to 85% of 
the whole Indonesian population have always been interested in dealing with 
economic transactions based on shari‟ah.  
The implementation of the ar-rahn scheme was planned by the PP back in 1999. 
Firstly, the PP set up an internal team which cooperated with the consultants who 
were familiar with the ar-rahn‟s terms and regulations. Next, the PP sent some of 
their staff to Malaysia to gain more knowledge about the practice of the ar-rahn 
scheme in Malaysia. Finally, with the cooperation of Bank Muammalat Indonesia, PP 
launched its first ar-rahn scheme which was called Shari‟ah Pawning (Pegadaian 
Shari‟ah) on 14th January 2003.  
With the establishment of the ar-rahn scheme in 2003 and its implementation by the 
PP, it is clear that this scheme is experiencing stable growth. The performance of 
Shari‟ah Pawning is illustrated in table 4.3. 
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 Most of the goldsmith shop operated in the Southeast Asia not only selling gold but also buying gold 
from the customers, similarly like the pawnshop business. 
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Table 4.3: The Shari’ah Pawning Performance in 2003 – up to April 2005 
No. Regional 
Offices 
Customers Loans (Rp.) 
2003 2004 Up to 
April 
2005 
2003 2004 Up to 
April 
2005 
1. Medan 4,646 74,762 25,971 7,481,401 112,623,856 30,350,154 
2. Padang 0 4,052 2,025 0 5,189,688 3,102,417 
3. Jakarta 712 7,334 4,444 5,236,375 12,608,953 8,387,154 
4. Bandung 0 2,614 3,127 0 2,587,086 2,734,298 
5. Makassar 356 6,765 6,289 3,511,540 12,792,108 8,098,964 
6. Semarang 188 7,269 7,108 525,840 7,740,687 6,774,611 
7. Yogyakarta 272 7,181 4,627 538,750 5,314,780 2,934,432 
8. Surakarta 124 4,234 1,225 73,354 3,403,989 1,532,717 
9. Surabaya 111 3,818 3,430 2,523,620 8,280,512 4,987,317 
10. Balikpapan 0 449 571 0 1,039,412 1,477,648 
11. Manado 0 6,011 6,526 0 8,099,937 6,711,087 
Total  6,489 124,489 65,343 19,890,880 179,681,008 77,090,799 
Source: Shari‟ah Pawning in Indonesia (2005). 
As can be seen in table 4.3, the loans rose dramatically from Rp19,890,880 billion in 
2003 to Rp179,681,008 billion in 2004. Simultaneously, the customers have vastly 
increased from 6,489 people in 2003 to 124,489 people in 2004. Such fast 
development indicates a potential for business development in the future.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
While conventional pawnbroking has been established since the 15
th
 century in 
Malaysia, their operations are based on the elements of riba and gharar, which are 
against Islamic principles. Due to oppression and other malpractices by conventional 
pawnbrokers, the Malaysian government has made an effort to establish a just 
financial system such as the ar-rahn scheme which represents a viable solution to 
replace conventional pawnshops through Islamic principles. Shari‟ah scholars in 
Malaysia have come to an agreement that the underlying concept of the Islamic 
pawnbroking contract is based on the al-qardhul hasan, al-wadiah yad dhamanah, al-
ujrah, and ar-rahn. 
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Chapter 5 
MALAYSIAN PRACTICE OF AR-RAHN: TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENT50 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of helping the needy, especially the poor, has long been emphasized 
in much of the Islamic faith. Therefore, lending to the needy is considered as one of 
the main focuses of Islamic finance. In this context, the Islamic pawnshop (ar-rahn 
scheme) is one of the most appropriate mechanisms as it provides financial relief for 
lower-income groups and small businesses which usually have limited capital or have 
been excluded from the mainstream financial system. In support of this, prior studies 
have shown the importance of Islamic pawnshops to Muslim societies (Maamor et al., 
2006; Bhatt and Sinnakkannu, 2008; Johari et al., 2007; Mohamed, 1986). 
Before the implementation of the Islamic pawnshop system, conventional pawnshops 
used to charge high interest rates on the loans given, which had an adverse impact on 
the social welfare of the people involved in such transactions. The conventional 
pawnshops were more motivated on making profit from needy individuals, which was 
only restricted by the laws in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. Conventional pawnshops 
had indeed oppressed and put a burden on the lower-income group. 
The purpose of the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 was to guarantee a healthy pawnshop 
industry, as well as safeguarding the interests of the consumers. However, it failed to 
control the problems of the oppression of the lower income groups and the 
pawnbrokers‟ malpractices. In fact, it seemed to encourage the practice of usury with 
high interest rates of 2% per month. The high interest rates made it difficult for the 
consumers to reclaim their goods or jewellery. As for those who needed the loan as 
business capital, they found that their capital rapidly diminished, as a result. The 
conventional pawnshop system, hence, is more likely to put a burden on lower-
                                                          
50
 Some parts in Chapter 5 has been presented at the Conference on Malaysian Study Islam, organised 
by the Malaysian Students Department for the United Kingdom and Eire, and University of Wales, 
Lampeter, on 28
th
 – 29th June 2008, United Kingdom, and also published in the 
http://www.assaif.org/content/download/1490/10030/file/Islamic%20Pawnbroking.pdf website.  
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income groups and small businessmen, which is considered as against shari‟ah 
practices. 
The concern over higher interest rates, and the usurious and exploitative activities 
imposed by conventional pawnshops, hence, makes customers choose to deal with 
Islamic pawnshops. Table 5.1 shows the allocation of conventional pawnshops and 
Islamic pawnshops throughout Malaysia. In 2010, there were 329 institutions offering 
Islamic pawnbroking services operating side by side with 259 licensed conventional 
pawnshops, which showed a remarkable increase in Islamic pawnbroking provided 
they were only established in 1992, as compared to the conventional pawnshops that 
had been operating since the 19
th
 century. The growing numbers of pawnshops in 
Malaysia suggest that there is still a significant demand for their services and this 
would explain why formal financial institutions such as Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia, AgroBank, and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad are beginning to provide 
Islamic pawnbroking products to customers.  
This chapter, thus, reviews the historical background of conventional pawnshops, the 
modus operandi of conventional pawnshop, their weaknesses as practised in Malaysia, 
and also the development and issues related to the Islamic pawnshops in Malaysia.  
5.2 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PAWNBROKING IN 
 MALAYSIA 
The history of pawnbroking in Malaysia can be divided into four main stages, as 
discussed in the following sections: 
5.2.1 Early Traditional Malay Society 
During the reign of smaller independent states in the 15
th
 century, local rulers 
accepted higher supplies of funds from many sources, and Chinese businessmen were 
one of them. According to Wan Abdullah (1999), there are three different ways in 
which the Malay society obtains credit by giving up their property as a security of a 
debt.  
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Table 5.1: The Number of Pawnshops in Malaysia According to States in 2010 
STATES Conventional 
Pawnshops 
Islamic 
Pawnbroking 
MGIT/ 
MGI 
PKB Bank 
Rakyat 
Co- 
operatives 
YaPEIM AGRO 
Bank 
BIMB Total 
Johor 34 30   14 1 9 6  64 
Kuala Lumpur/ 
Putrajaya 
14 22   13 2 2 5  36 
Kedah 29 27   9 1 8 9  56 
Kelantan 11 50  22 8 1 9 8 2 61 
Melaka 12 7   4 0 0 3  19 
Negeri Sembilan 18 16   6 1 4 5  34 
Pulau Pinang 27 17   7 0 5 5  44 
Pahang 14 26   10 2 7 7  40 
Perak 40 31   11 2 6 12  71 
Perlis 4 6   2 2 0 2  10 
Sabah 7 14   10 1 0 3  21 
Sarawak 3 15   10 0 0 5  18 
Selangor 39 40   23 5 4 8  79 
Terengganu 7 28 10  6 1 5 6  35 
Total 259 329 10 22 133 19 59 84 2 588 
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Department of Co-operative Development, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat, Bank of Agricultural Development 
and the Malaysian Islamic Economy Development Foundation (YaPEIM), MGIT and PKB (2010). 
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Firstly, land pawning. With this method, the borrower gives permission to the lender 
to usufruct his land in order to get money. Usufructing the land is assumed to be 
interest to the loan. Previously, the contract of pawning is made verbally. However, 
recently, a written contract is made by two parties, which is witnessed by the 
borrower‟s Chief of the Domicile (Penghulu Mukim). A copy of the contract will be 
given to each party involved. There is no particular date of repayment for the debt and 
it all depends on the borrower‟s ability to repay. In cases where the lender wants his 
money back, he will go to the borrower and claim it. If the borrower has no money to 
repay, the pledged land will be evaluated according to its market price. The balance of 
the land‟s price, if any, will be returned to the borrower, and ownership of the land 
will be transferred to the lender. 
The second method of pawning is called goods pawning. For this pawning, the 
borrower will pledge their valuable assets such as gold rings, necklaces, earrings, 
watches, etc. to their relatives or friends to get cash. This type of pawning is similar to 
recent pawnshops, except a verbal agreement is preferred rather than a written 
contract in which the creditor will give their permission to the debtor to use their 
property. Similar to land pawning, there is no limit of time for repayment.  
The third method of pawning that evolved in early Malay society was to sell a 
promise. Under this transaction, a person who is in need of money will sell his 
proprietary right in the land to a purchaser to whom the land will be transferred. The 
transfer is subject to the condition that, if the seller is able to repay within a specified 
time, or at any time thereafter to repay the sum advanced by the purchaser, the land 
will be transferred back to the seller. If the seller intends to retain possession of the 
land, he may do so upon paying rental to the purchaser. Otherwise, produce from the 
land or any income derived from the harvest or the crops will be given to the 
purchaser in possession. No documentation or registration takes place at all, making 
the whole process bureaucracy-free. 
5.2.2 British Colonialism and the Chinese Immigrations 
The British came into Malaysia in 1786 when they succeeded in their trial to govern 
Penang from the Sultan of Kedah. Thereafter, they introduced their system of 
governance, administration, and law. Because of the shortage of manpower to support 
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them in trading and mining activities, the British encouraged Chinese immigrants 
from China to immigrate to Malaysia. Later, the Chinese were involved in tin 
industries and other trading. The Chinese introduced pawnshops as an institution in 
which to reinvest their capital, which they had obtained from mining and other 
economic activities. Although the pawnbroking institution in Malaysia originated 
from China, the law governing is based on English law due to the British colonization 
period. The introduction of English Law in Malaysia through the three Charters of 
Justice of 1807, 1826 and 1855, subsequently gave rise to some form of law and order 
(Aun, 1986). It should be noted that before the independence of Malaysia, there 
existed nine separate legislations with regard to pawnbroking (Wan Abdullah, 1999). 
5.2.3 Post-Malaysian Independence and the Era of Islamic Resurgence 
Not many changes took place in the legislation of pawnbroking until 1972 when the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972 was passed to repeal all nine existing legislations and bring the 
pawnbrokers under one act. This act was amended in 1982 and 2003. 
Recent developments in the world and in Malaysia in particular, have witnessed a rise 
in the Muslim‟s consciousness and awareness to practice Islam in all aspects of life 
since the 1970s. One of the consequences of such developments has been the 
emergence of Islamic banking and finance. The establishment of the first Islamic bank 
in Malaysia in 1983 motivated scholars and the government to implement the shari‟ah 
principle in other financial institutions such as insurance, unit trust, and pawnshops.  
Finally, the Terengganu Islamic Religious and Malay Customs Council (MAIDAM), 
through the Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT), established the first 
Islamic pawnbroking in the state of Terengganu in January 1992, followed by PKB 
(March 1992), Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia (27
th
 October 1993), YaPEIM 
cooperatives (2000), EON Bank (August 2002), AgroBank (September 2002) and 
other cooperatives.  
The objectives of introducing Islamic pawnbroking are as follows: (i) to create an 
alternative financing channel to conventional pawnbroking which is more transparent 
and ethical; (ii) to eliminate the interest element imposed by conventional pawnshops; 
(iii) to eliminate gharar in the assessment of the pawned item‟s value, auctioning 
without sending notice to the customer, etc.; and (iv) to promote social justice and the 
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well-being of the borrowers (Aziz, 2001). In other words, Islamic pawnbroking not 
only aims to provide an alternative financing which is permissible in Islamic 
principles but also to overcome financial exclusion among the lower economic strata 
in Malaysia in order to improve the socio-economy of the society.   
5.3 DEVELOPMENTS OF CONVENTIONAL PAWNSHOP IN 
MALAYSIA 
As mentioned above, pawning activities in Malaysia can be traced back to early 
traditional Malay society in the 15
th
 century which began to flourish after the arrival 
of Chinese immigrants in the Larut region of Malaysia in the 19
th
 century. The 
discovery of tin in Larut saw Chinese immigrants flocking to that region, which had 
struck its wealth from the tin mines. Many of them began to reinvest some of their 
accumulated savings through moneylending to the heads of the Kangchu
51
 settlements 
who were given sole rights to running the pawnbroking business. In addition, they 
also had the right to collect tax from farmers and a range of businesses such as 
gambling, opium, and liquor sales as well as pawnshops (Skully, 1994). The 
pawnbrokers were all of Chinese origin of the Hakka clan.   
The first formal regulation for pawnbroking institutions in Malaysia was the 
Pawnbrokers Ordinance of 1871 (Wan Abdullah, 1999). This ordinance was enforced 
for some time until it was abrogated by the Pawnbrokers Ordinance of 1898. At that 
time, several states introduced their own enactments. This was due to the fact that 
Malaysia‟s component states had not always existed as a single federation but rather 
as separate states. According to Wan Abdullah (1999: 75), the nine enactments and 
ordinances that were implemented by each state before the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
were: „the Pawnbrokers Ordinance Straits Settlements Cap. 216‟, „Pawnbrokers 
Enactment of Federal Malay States Cap. 85‟, „Pawnbrokers Enactment of Johore No. 
36 of 1917‟, „Pawnbrokers Enactment of Kedah No. 71‟, „Pawnbrokers Enactment of 
Terengganu No. 42 of 1356/1937‟, „Pawnbrokers Enactment of Perlis No. 5 of 
1335/1916‟, „Pawnbroking Farm Enactment of Kelantan No. 8 of 1910‟, 
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 Kangchu is a system that gives permission to Chinese agricultural workers to form settlements along 
certain Malayan rivers for the purpose of planting pepper and gambier. Each of the Chinese workers 
will be given a „river letter‟ to enable them to stay in particular place (Mohamed, 1986). 
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„Pawnbrokers Ordinance of Sabah Cap. 94‟, and „Pawnbrokers Ordinance of Sarawak 
Ordinance Cap. 115‟. Finally, the government introduced the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
in order to standardize the regulation of pawnbroking in Malaysia, which is still in 
existence today with certain amendments in 2003.  
5.3.1 Modus Operandi of Conventional Pawnshop  
5.3.1.1 The lending process 
The loan process of pawnbroking transactions can be described in the following 
stages. First of all, the customer must be 18 years of age and can show a valid 
identification card. Not like the banking system, the pawnbroker will not make any 
credit scoring and will not ask for the purpose of the loan. 
Secondly, when a customer walks in a pawnshop with their potentially pawned item, 
they will be entertained by a clerk or an officer that is an expert as a valuer. The task 
of the valuer is to determine the value of the pawn (used as a collateral) to make the 
loan. Based on this, the valuer decides on the size of the loan. Commonly, in the case 
of conventional pawnshops in Malaysia, customers can negotiate the amount of the 
loan with pawnbrokers in relation to the perceived value of the collateral. 
Detailed account of the pledge assets, the ratio of borrowed amount and maturity are 
provided in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Types of Pledged Assets, Amount, and Maturity in Pawnshop 
Types of pawnshop Pledge Assets Maximum borrowed 
amount (RM) 
Maturity 
(Months) 
Conventional 
Jewellery, watch, 
handphone and 
electronic 
instruments 
50 percent of the value 
of pledged 
assets/negotiation 
6 
Source: Ismail and Ahmad (1997: 1345) 
After following these processes, the customer will receive the loan immediately in 
cash. The pawnbroker will give a pawn-ticket to the person as a proof of transaction 
and record the particulars of the transaction in the pawnbroker‟s book. The pawn-
ticket states the customer‟s name and address, a description of the collateral, the 
amount lent, the maturity date, and the amount that must be paid to redeem the assets. 
In conventional pawnshops, the customer must repay the loan with an interest rate of 
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2% of the loan per month, as stated in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, Section 17(1). The 
entire transaction seldom takes more than a couple of minutes. 
5.3.1.2 The redeeming process 
In most transactions, pawnbrokers make loans with maturities up to six months. Every 
pawnbroker within this period from the pawning transaction date must deliver the 
pledge to any person who presents the pawn-ticket issued by him or her.  
However, if a customer is not able to repay the loan with interest within a 
predetermined period, the loan can be extended within which the pledge may be 
redeemed for a further period of not less than three months
52
 by paying the interest 
that has built up over time through the compound interest rate mechanism. A note of 
such extensions shall be made in the pawnbroker‟s book and an endorsement will be 
made on the pawn-ticket.  
If the pledge cannot be redeemed within the six month period or the extension period 
agreed by both parties, there will be two possible outcomes: (i) if pawned for a sum 
not exceeding two hundred ringgit, the pawn item shall become the property of 
pawnbroker, and (ii) if pawned for a sum exceeding two hundred ringgit, the 
pawnbroker can dispose of the pledge by auction.
53
 
5.3.1.3 The auctioning process 
It should be noted that according to the prevailing mechanism, the auction of the 
unredeemed pledge must be conducted by a licensed auctioneer. The pawnbroker can 
bid for, and purchase at a sale by auction and they shall be deemed the absolute owner 
of the pledge purchased. If the pawned item is sold with a surplus in the auction, the 
customer is entitled to that surplus within the period of four months. On the other 
hand, if no claim for the surplus is made, the pawnbroker shall pay the surplus to the 
Accountant General within fourteen days after the expiration of the period of four 
months. The Accountant General shall pay the amount paid to the Consolidated Trust 
Account.  
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 Refer Section 19, Pawnbrokers Act 1972. 
 
53
 Refer Section 23(1) (a) dan (b), Pawnbrokers Act 1972. 
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5.3.2 The Weakness of Conventional Pawnshop 
It can be acknowledge that conventional pawnshops provide a solution for the short-
term financial needs of individuals and entrepreneurs from the lower strata of the 
society. However, the practice over the years indicates certain weaknesses inherent in 
the system, which can be seen in the process and the consequences of the system. 
In supporting this, Adnan (2004) has listed nine weaknesses faced by the conventional 
pawnshop. Firstly, the biggest number of complaints received from customers is 
related to the decreasing value of pawned goods. Many report that their gold jewellery 
had decreased in weight or length after the pawning period. According to the 
Federation of Consumers Association (FOMCA), this happened because under the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972, it is not compulsory for the pawnbrokers to write down the 
weight, length, or type of gold of the jewellery to be pawned. In such cases, despite 
the fact that the customers who had complained suspected that the pawnbrokers had 
tampered with the jewellery, it could be difficult for the customer to prove this matter 
due to the failure in the recording system, which was not systematic or transparent. 
The second weakness is that pawnbrokers are likely to offer a higher interest rate 
compared to the rate stated in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. This often happens to 
illiterate customers or impoverished people and villagers from rural areas, who may 
not necessarily have financial knowledge and skills to deal with the details of such 
contracts. 
Thirdly, pawnbrokers are likely to give a low collateral value during the valuation 
process. This usually happens because the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 does not state a 
certain value or criteria to determine the value of the collateral. Unscrupulous 
pawnbrokers will refuse to give out loans of more than RM200 for jewellery valued at 
RM400. As stated in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, pawnbrokers are allowed to take 
possession of any collateral valued less than RM200 if the customer fails to redeem it 
in the specified period.  
The fourth weakness is that unscrupulous pawnbrokers will often issue an illegible 
pawn-ticket. This happens when the pawnbroker offers a much higher interest rate or 
does not complete the information needed as stated in Pawnbrokers Act 1972. The 
pawnbroker tries to cover his misconduct by using a large rubber stamp so that the 
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receipt cannot be read. The pawnbroker also uses language or technical jargons, 
which may not usually be understood by the customers due to financial illiteracy. The 
pawn-ticket is also usually made of poor quality paper and can be easily torn, which 
then facilitates wrong-doing in the system. 
As for the fifth weakness, it has been reported that some unscrupulous pawnbrokers 
have asked for 50 cents for each replacement of pawn-tickets and extensions of the 
pawning period. According to Section 21, Pawnbrokers Act 1972, customers are 
allowed to get a free replacement for any torn, destroyed, or lost pawn-tickets. 
However, some pawnbrokers neglect to follow this guideline when customers ask for 
an extension for the pawning period by exploiting their financial illiteracy and short-
comings in their understanding of bureaucratic forms.  
The sixth weakness is that some immoral pawnbrokers will auction pawned goods 
worth more than RM200 without the customer‟s knowledge. Even worse, the 
pawnbroker does not auction the goods off and takes possession of the goods instead. 
This is against Section 23(1) (b) of the Pawnbrokers Act, in which any collateral 
worth more than RM200 should be auctioned off by a licensed auctioneer.  
As for the seventh weakness, it has been reported that pawnbrokers do not return the 
surplus after the goods have been auctioned off. This irresponsible act will no doubt 
be a burden to the customers who need the money. As such, the customers should 
enquire the pawnbroker about any surplus that has been taken by the pawnbroker after 
the auction of the goods. 
The eighth weakness of the conventional pawnshop system is that many customers do 
not know when their collateral will be auctioned off. The notices about the auction are 
only publicized in Chinese and English language papers. Usually, these notices will 
be overshadowed by other more interesting notices. This is a disadvantage to the 
pawnshop customers who are usually Malays from the villages or Indians from the 
estates who do not have access to the language. Only a handful of them read the 
English or Chinese papers, and some of them are illiterate. This will cause them to 
lose the opportunity to redeem their goods. 
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Finally, some pawnbrokers will also ask for advance payment from the pawnshop 
customers although this is against the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. This will add further 
burden to the customer‟s misfortune. 
5.4 ISLAMIC PAWNSHOP AS A SHARI’AH COMPLIANT SOLUTION 
TO PAWNSHOPPING  
According to Baharuddin (2002: 30-32), the initiative to form Islamic pawnbroking 
was discussed in the National Council of Islamic Matters (Majlis Kebangsaan 
Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam Malaysia) meeting in April 1993. The meeting suggested 
that the State Islamic Council (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri) or Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad should implement Islamic pawnbroking. However, the two parties did not 
show any interest except for the Terengganu Islamic Religious and Malay Customs 
Council (MAIDAM) and Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (PKB). 
MAIDAM had taken the first step in January 1992 to launch the Muassasah Gadaian 
Islam Terengganu (MGIT). This institution was the first to start Islamic pawnbroking 
which was based on the concepts of ar-rahn and al-qardhul hasan. This was followed 
by PKB which started the Ar-Rahn shop in Kota Bharu on 12
th
 March 1992 and 
introduced the concept of a safekeeping fee for Islamic pawnshops. 
The Islamic Economic Development Foundation Malaysia (YaPEIM) also had 
planned to implement an Islamic pawnshop but faced problems as it was against the 
1972 Pawnbrokers Act. Due to the needs of the Muslim community for a pawnshop 
institution but to implement an act would take a long time, the Central Bank of 
Malaysia (BNM) requested Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia to implement the ar-
rahn and suggested co-operation with the YaPEIM. This suggestion was made based 
on the factors below: 
(i) Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia is a cooperative which is exempted from 
the 1972 Pawnbrokers Act; 
(ii) Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia owns many branches which are situated in 
each state capital; and 
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(iii) Commitment to the Islamic faith is in line with Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia‟s objective that is to become a full Islamic bank. 
This suggestion was taken seriously by Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia who was 
interested in exploring the tools of Islamic financial services as well as using the 
present platform as a starting point for the ar-rahn institution. Indirectly, it would also 
help Bank Rakyat reduce the high operating costs had they set it up individually. 
As such, on 21
st
 August 1993, the Finance Minister at that time announced that the ar-
rahn scheme would be implemented by Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia with the 
cooperation of YaPEIM. A memorandum of understanding had been signed between 
Bank Rakyat and YaPEIM and this signaled a partnership with an equal profit-sharing 
agreement. 
Later, on 27 October 1993 the first phase of the ar-rahn scheme was launched at six 
branches of Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad. In 2010, there were 133 
branches of Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad offering this scheme 
throughout Malaysia. YaPEIM had also taken the initiative to launch 59 counters of 
the ar-rahn scheme through YaPEIM co-operatives (See table 5.1). The next financial 
institution to enter the Islamic pawnbroking is EON Bank (August 2002) and Bank 
Pertanian Malaysia (AgroBank) in September 2002 followed by other cooperatives.  
5.4.1 The Shari’ah Determination on the Implementation of Ar-rahn scheme in 
 Malaysia
54
  
From 10
th
 – 12th April 2007, the Malaysia‟s Department of Islamic Development 
(JAKIM) held the 77
th
 Muzakarah (meeting) of the Fatwa Committee of the National 
Council for Islamic Religious Affairs to discuss shari‟ah determination on the ar-
rahn scheme in Malaysia to those interested in establishing the scheme.  
In the meeting, they came to an agreement by providing the following conditions:  
(i) The working capital for Islamic pawnbroking (ar-rahn) must be gained from 
Islamic banks or lawful (halal) sources and free from usury (riba), gambling 
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 Refer to http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my. 
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(maysir), uncertainties (gharar), and other activities that do not meet the 
shari‟ah requirements; 
(ii) The pawnbroker should subscribe to Islamic insurance coverage (takaful) 
and is not allowed to get involved with conventional insurance; 
(iii) If the collateral is lost, stolen, damaged or alike, the pawnbroker has to pay 
compensation for the remaining value of the collateral at the time of 
valuation; and 
(iv) The pawnbroker should appoint internal Shari‟ah legal advisor to supervise 
the operation and activities of ar-rahn. 
On the next meeting, JAKIM organized the 78
th
 Muzakarah of the Fatwa Committee 
of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs on the 12
th
 June 2007 to 
determine the safekeeping fees charge in Islamic pawnshops. The committee has 
come to a conclusion that the safekeeping fees will be charged as table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: The Determination of Value of Item Pledge and the Safekeeping Fee  
Value of Item Pledge Safekeeping Fee (RM/ monthly) 
RM100.00 – RM1,000.00 The first 3 months = 0.60 
The  next 3 months = 0.70 
 
RM1,001.00 – RM5,000.00 The first 3 months = 0.65 
The  next 3 months = 0.80 
 
RM5,001.00 – RM10,000.00 The first 3 months = 0.80 
The  next 3 months = 0.95 
 
Source: JAKIM (2010). 
In addition, the committee also agreed that if the specified period expires, and the 
collateral is not redeemed, agreement from both parties must be obtained in order to 
determine the extension period and the charge. 
5.4.2 Modus Operandi of Islamic Pawnshop  
Generally, the modus operandi for conventional and Islamic pawnshop transactions 
was quite similar. Despite the similarities, the contract (aqad) in the Islamic 
pawnshop is different from the conventional pawnshop. The loan granted is based on 
four concepts as discussed in the previous chapter: al-qardhul hasan (interest free 
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loan), al-wadiah yad dhammanah
55
 (keeping valuable asset safe with guarantee), al-
ujrah (storage fees), and ar-rahn (collateral). It should be noted that Islamic 
pawnbrokers set the safekeeping fee based on the value of collateral and not on the 
amount of loan. 
In addition, the only item accepted as collateral in the Islamic pawnbroking is gold. 
As stated in Chapter 3, gold has several advantages as collateral over other items 
(Skully, 2005). During the pawning process, the valuation is based on the purity of the 
gold item. The gold will be valued at the prevailing market price. The best method of 
assessing gold jewellery in Islamic pawnshop is by using acid test. The method 
involves rubbing the piece of the pawned jewellery on a black stone. The quality of 
gold will depend on the friction; the rougher the feel of the gold, the better the quality. 
The method of rubbing will be done at the edge of the gold as these parts are the 
easiest to determine if the gold is not genuine. In addition, a special density meter is 
used to value the gold.  
In terms of legislation, the Islamic pawnbroking is not regulated under the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972 except the MGIT and PKB. Most of the Islamic pawnbroking 
institutions are cooperatives which are subject to the Co-operatives Societies Act 
(1993) and their own Ar-Rahn Manual Guidelines. For example, the ar-rahn scheme 
in Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad is subject to three different acts, which 
are the Bank Kerjasama Rakyat (M) Berhad Act 1978, the Co-operative Societies Act 
(1993) and the Development Finance Institutions Act 2002. In addition, Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad has introduced separately the Ar-Rahn Manual 
Guidelines.
56
 Other relevant acts are the Occupational Safety and Health Act for staffs 
that are exposed to acid for the gold test and the Weight and Measurement Act, in 
which the gold weighing device has to be licensed every year (Sehan, 2004).  
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 The jurists have different views on the responsibility of the item pledge. Most of the Shafiis, 
Hanbalis and Zahiriyyah claim that the lender (the pawnbroker) is not responsible for any damages that 
occur to the collateral because they are a trustee (yad amanah), unless due to the carelessness of the 
lender himself. In contrast, the Hanafis, Zaidiyyah and Ibadhiyyah argue that the lender is fully 
responsible for the damages (yad dhammanah) that occur to the collateral, unless the defects have 
occurred before the contract is made. This view is in line with the provision in the Pawnbrokers Act 
1972 in Malaysia (Muhammad Naim, 2007). 
 
56
 Refer Bank Kerjasama Rakyat (M) Berhad (2000, 2002 dan 2003). Manual Pinjaman Pajakgadai 
Islam. Not published. 
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Principally, Islamic pawnbrokers would prefer the customers to redeem their 
collateral within six months. However, if there is no repayment in the end of 
contractual period, there is an extension period of three months after which the client 
is informed that the item will be sold by auction within a further two months period. 
Based on the Ar-Rahn Manual Guidelines of Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia 
Berhad, any surplus from the sale of the gold over the amount owed to the 
pawnbroker, including accumulated safekeeping fees and any costs related to the sale 
has to be returned to the customer. In case the customer cannot be located, the surplus 
will be forwarded to the Baitulmal from which the customer is entitled to make future 
claims.  
5.5 SURVEYING ISLAMIC PAWNBROKING INSTITUTIONS IN 
 MALAYSIA 
Pawnbroking based on shari‟ah principles was pioneered by MAIDAM through 
Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT) in Terengganu state in January 1992. 
This initiative was followed three months later by Kelantan State Economic 
Development Corporation (KSEDC) through its subsidiary, Permodalan Kelantan 
Berhad (PKB) which launched the Ar-Rahn shop in March 1992. Both of these 
institutions similarly provided Islamic pawnbroking services only to local customers 
in each state, Terengganu and Kelantan respectively. 
Later, the Malaysian government, through the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM), took 
the initiative to promote all formal financial institutions to implement the shari‟ah 
compliant pawnbroking in order to prevent Muslims from borrowing from 
conventional pawnshops which are based on riba and gharar (Skully, 2005). With 
assistance from the Central Bank, the Malaysian Islamic Economic Development 
Foundation (YaPEIM) signed a memorandum of understanding with Bank Kerjasama 
Rakyat Malaysia to commence the ar-rahn scheme on 27
th
 October 1993. Initially, 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia operated in six branches, and they expanded this 
scheme to all branches (133) in 2010. Although YaPEIM launched its first ar-rahn 
scheme on November 2000, it has expanded to 59 YaPEIM cooperatives in 2010.    
The next institution which offered this product to the public were EON Bank and 
Bank Pertanian Malaysia (AgroBank) which commenced on August 2002 and 
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September 2002 respectively. In 2010, AgroBank expanded its services to 84 
branches throughout Malaysia. 
After having difficulties in getting a license to operate the ar-rahn scheme from the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, MAIDAM launched Muassasah Gadaian 
Islam (MGI) through its own cooperatives and other joint-ventures cooperatives in 
2003, followed by other cooperatives. The commencement date of each Islamic 
pawnbroking in Malaysia is shown in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Islamic Pawnbroking in Malaysia 
Institutions  Commencement Date 
Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu January, 1992 
Permodalan Kelantan Berhad March, 1992 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia 27 October, 1993 
EON Bank August, 2002 
Bank Pertanian Malaysia (AgroBank) September, 2002 
Muassasah Gadaian Islam (Terengganu) 2003 
Kedai Al-Rahnu Kelantan 2003 
Pahang Consumer Co-operative 2003 
Source: Skully (2005: 3). 
The following section discusses the background, operation, and working mechanism 
of selected Islamic pawnbroking operating in Malaysia such as MGIT, PKB, Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, and AgroBank. 
5.5.1 Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT) 
Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT) was given a licence by the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government as the first Islamic pawnbroking operating in January 
1992 under MAIDAM supervision. The sole objective was to fulfil the needs and 
welfare of the less fortunate. 
The loans offered in the MGIT ar-rahn scheme are free from interest as it is based on 
al-qardhul hasan. However, customers are encouraged to contribute a small sum to 
the Muassasah treasury account. This is known in Islamic finance as „hibah‟ or gift. 
The collateral for loans may be in the form of gold or diamond jewellery. The loans 
given should not be more than 75% of the jewellery‟s value. In addition, the customer 
is only eligible for loans of up to RM1,500.00 for each item. If the customer fails to 
pay in three months, they can apply for a three month extension. If they fail to pay 
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after the extension period, the collateral will be auctioned off by MGIT to pay off the 
loan. If there is any surplus after the loan has been settled, it will be returned to the 
customer. This service is available for those 18 years old and above and it gives 
priority to the residents of Terengganu only. The customers need to show valid proof 
of ownership of the goods.  
It should be mentioned that the business of the MGIT has flourished since its first 
formation, as it started with 12,732 customers in 1992, which increased to 26,632 
customers in 2005. The value of pawned items has increased from RM9.85 million in 
1992 to RM28.9 million in 2005 (Johari et al., 2007). 
5.5.2 Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (PKB) 
In March 1992, the Kelantan State Economic Development Corporation (KSEDC), 
through its subsidiary, Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (PKB), set up the Ar-Rahn shop 
as the second Islamic pawnshop in Malaysia in order to fulfil shari‟ah needs. It is part 
of the Kelantan government‟s effort to help those in need by giving out interest-free 
loans with a small amount of safekeeping fee charges based on collateral value as 
shown in table 5.5. Currently, there are about 22 outlets of Ar-Rahn shops operating 
in Kelantan (See table 5.1).   
Table 5.5: The Safekeeping Fees Charge in PKB’s Pawnshop 
Value of pledged asset Safekeeping fee 
(for every RM100.00 of gold  
value per month) 
RM1-RM400 RM0.60 
RM401-RM2,000 RM0.85 
RM2,001-RM5,000 RM0.95 
Source: Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (2010) 
The collateral accepted is only in the form of gold jewellery. The loan given is 60% of 
the value of jewellery and not more than RM5,000.00. The pawning period is six 
months. Those who are unable to pay back may extend the pawning period, subject to 
approval of both parties, and the customers need to pay the safekeeping fees of the 
previous six months. If customers are still unable to pay back after the extension 
period, the ar-rahn pawnshop will send an auction notice before the auction is held by 
licensed auctioneers. The customers are eligible to get any balance of the auction 
price after subtracting costs and any debts. 
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5.5.3 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad 
The Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad ar-rahn scheme was introduced on the 
27
th
 October 1993, which was first introduced in six branches. In 2010, there were 
133 branches operating throughout Malaysia. Interestingly, the bank had also opened 
the first stand-alone Ar-rahn shop in Kota Bharu, Kelantan in June 2000. These 
schemes leaned more towards social-orientation with the borrowers rather than being 
profit-oriented, and thus, the borrowers will benefit from it. Table 5.6 shows the rates 
of safekeeping fees charge by the ar-rahn counters.  
Table 5.6: The Fees for Ar-rahn Scheme in Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia 
Type of 
Scheme 
Financing amount Safekeeping fee for every RM100.00 
of gold value per month 
Ar-rahn RM1,000.00 and below RM0.65 
RM1,001.00 – RM10,000,00 RM0.75 
Az-zahab RM10,001.00 – RM50,000.00 RM0.75 
Source: Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad (2011) 
The scheme is open to Malaysian residents aged 18 and above and not more than 65 
years old. Only gold jewellery, including gold bars, is accepted as collateral. Loans 
for the pawned goods will not be more than 70% of the goods value. Each pawned 
item must not exceed RM10,000.00 per day or a cumulative amount not exceeding 
RM50,000.00 for each customer. While for the az-zahab scheme, the maximum loan 
is RM50,000.00 with a RM0.75 safekeeping fee for every RM100.00 of gold value. 
The pawning period is only six months, which may be extended for another three 
months. If the customer fails to redeem their belongings, the bank will send a notice 
to auction off the goods. The bank will subtract the loan amount, fees for safekeeping, 
and other costs involved in the auction process from the sells. Then the surplus will be 
given to the customer. 
A week before the six month period, the bank will send the first reminder. After six 
months, a second reminder will be issued. After the third reminder, if the customer is 
unable to redeem their goods, the pawnbroker will dispose the goods by auction to the 
licensed auctioneer. Supposing the value of the item pawned is worth RM1,428.00, 
the bank will only release a maximum loan of RM1,000.00 within repayment period 
of six month. If the fee for safekeeping is 75 sen for every RM100.00, then the fees 
will be RM10.71 per month or RM64.26 for six months. For comparison, it should be 
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noted that with the same amount of loan, customer of conventional pawnshops will 
have to pay almost double which cost RM20.00 per month. Going back to the 
example, if the goods are auctioned at RM1,428.00, the bank will subtract 
RM1,000.00 for the loan, RM96.39 for safekeeping fees (9 months), and 
administration fees for the auction RM50.00, then the balance of RM281.61 will be 
returned to the customer.  
The Managing Director of Bank Rakyat, Datuk Kamaruzaman Che Mat points that 
through its fully owned subsidiary, Rakyat Management Services Sdn. Bhd, would 
open 15 branches of the Islamic based pawn franchise outlets, which is called Ar-
Rahnu X-Change, in the next three years (Bernama, 2008).  
The prototype branch of Ar-Rahnu X-Change in Sentul which has been in operations 
since 2007 has shown good performance with an average loan payout of 
RM900,000.00 a month. In the future, Bank Rakyat plans to expand the Ar-Rahn 
outlets to various locations such as Medan Tuanku, Kuala Lumpur (managed by 
Koperasi Pendidikan Islam Malaysia Bhd), Pokok Sena, Kedah (managed by 
Koperasi Kementerian Kesihatan Negeri Kedah Bhd), and Sri Gombak (managed by 
Koperasi Serbaguna Iman Malaysia Bhd). 
Table 5.7: Total of Financing, Collateral Value and Customers for Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia from January to June 2010 
Month (2010) Total of Financing 
(RM) 
Total of Collateral 
Value (RM) 
Total of Customer 
(thousand) 
January 96,228,000.00 148,043,000.00 32,895 
February 77,523,000.00 119,226,000.00 26,102 
March 94,542,000.00 145,449,000.00 33,311 
April 85,677,000.00 131,810,000.00 30,285 
May 112,741,000.00 173,447,000.00 34,155 
June 120,025,000.00 184,653,000.00 38,626 
Source: Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Annual Report (2010). 
The Islamic pawnbroking scheme operated by Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia is 
also experiencing a positive growth in terms of total financing, collateral value, and 
customers in 2010. As shown in table 5.7, the total customers increased from 30,285 
in April 2010 to 38,626 customers in June 2010. The total financing has also 
increased from approximately RM86 million in April 2010 to RM120 million in June 
2010.  
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5.5.4 Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad (AgroBank) 
Initially, AgroBank launched its ar-rahn scheme in 12 out of 132 branches in 
September 2002. In 2010, AgroBank expanded the scheme to 84 branches throughout 
Malaysia. The bank introduced the scheme to meet the short-term financial needs of 
the rural people, who were mainly farmers and fishermen, to improve their business 
and modernize their methods. This scheme is open to Malaysian residents of 18 years 
and above. All types of gold such as necklaces, earrings, rings, wrist and leg bracelets, 
brooches, gold coins, and gold bars are accepted as collateral. A loan of not more than 
70% of the market value of pawned item will be issued. The maximum loan is 
RM150,000.00 subject to the RM50,000.00 daily limit, and the pawning period is six 
months and can be extended to three months with a final extension of another two 
months.
57
 The margin of financing and the storage fee charge in AgroBank is 
illustrated in table 5.8.  
Table 5.8: The Fees for Ar-rahn Scheme in AgroBank 
Margin of financing Monthly Storage Fee 
per RM100 of jewellery value 
50% RM0.50 
60% RM0.60 
70% RM0.75 
Source: AgroBank (2011) 
 
5.6 ISSUES IN MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC PAWNBROKING  
There exists scarce information on Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia. However, there 
are several studies aiming to critically reflect on Islamic pawnbroking. Prior studies 
have documented on the importance of having pawnshops in Malaysian society. Such 
studies include: Johari et al. (2007), Skully (2005), Bhatt and Sinnakkannu (2008), 
Ismail and Ahmad (1997), and Mohamed (1986). The following discussion highlights 
some of the issues explored by these studies: 
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 Refer Bank Pertanian Malaysia. Ar-rahnu Scheme. Available at: 
http://www.bpm.com.my/article.cfm?id=560 Access Date: 2
nd
 February, 2008. 
 
 90 
5.6.1 Shari’ah Perspectives 
As with most Islamic financial products, the question is how to ensure the transaction 
itself will be shari‟ah compliant. Ismail and Sanusi (2005) examined Islamic 
pawnbroking and the importance of shari‟ah rules in the implementation of Islamic 
pawnbroking. They argue that Islamic principles such as al-qardhul hasan, ar-rahn, 
al-wadiah yad dhammanah, and al-ujrah
58
 must be given careful consideration in 
establishing Islamic pawnbroking. Similarly, Mohammed et al. (2005) render a 
similar explanation as Ismail and Sanusi (2005), who argue that these financial 
instruments make Islamic pawnshop clearly different from conventional pawnshops. 
The element of riba and gharar can totally be eliminated in the system through the 
use of these products. Skully (2005) explains that there are no disguised interest 
charges or application fees involved in Islamic pawnbroking system. Indeed, the four 
concepts above have been incorporated in the operation of all Islamic pawnbroking 
institutions in Malaysia, including Indonesia, Brunei, and Pattani. 
5.6.2 Capital and Funding 
The implementation of Islamic pawnshops has provided a means to overcome the 
problems of social failure and mismanagement by the conventional pawnshops. While 
it may be considered that the Islamic pawnbroking system does not appear to have 
problems in terms of operations, a study from Baharuddin (2002) has shown that the 
main problem with Islamic pawnshops is the lack of funds. The high demand for 
pawnshop services has caused the pawnshop operators to face a lack of capital.  
Among the institutions that experience problems concerning a lack of funding is 
MGIT. MGIT is the only Islamic pawnbroking that does not charge any safekeeping 
fee to the borrower due to their aims is solely to help the people in need. The same 
problem also occurred at the Ar-Rahn shop under PKB in Kelantan. 
5.6.3 Pricing System 
Prior studies by Mohammed et al. (2005) and Ismail and Ahmad (1997) have 
examined the importance of pricing associated with the pawnshop lending. In more 
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 Refer Chapter 4 for the description of these instruments. 
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specific terms, they argued that the safekeeping fee imposed by Islamic pawnbroking 
is relatively cheaper than the conventional pawnshops (2%). This means that the cost 
of getting instant cash in Islamic pawnshop is cheaper, thus, little burden is carried by 
the customers. On the basis of these findings, it is important to have the ar-rahn shop, 
which offers competitive rate, reflect the average pricing system in the market. 
With regard to this issue, table 5.9 shows a comparison between conventional 
pawnbroking, Islamic pawnbroking, and bank personal loan in terms of fee charge 
and total amount of loan that the customer needs to pay when the loan period is due, 
i.e. one year tenure. Customers will usually benefit more if they borrow from the bank 
as compared to the conventional and Islamic pawnshop. But, normally, those who 
borrow money from banks have an established income and can produce pay-slips as 
compared to customers who borrow money from the pawnshop. 
Table 5.9: The Comparison of Fee Charge and Total Amount of Loan between 
Conventional Pawnbroking, Islamic Pawnbroking, and Personal Loan from 
Bank  
Conventional 
Pawnbroking 
Islamic Pawnbroking Personal Financing              
(Bai’ Al-Inah) 
Total of loan = RM 10,000 
 
 
 
Interest rate = 2% per 
month 
 
Financing tenure = 1 year 
 
Calculation: 
Total of interest rate = 
2/100*10,000*12 month  
= RM2,400 
 
Monthly installment (plus 
total of loan) = 
(RM10,000 + 
RM2,400)/12 = 
RM1,033.33 
 
Value of item = RM14,285 
60 % from collateral value 
= RM 10,000 
 
Fee charge = RM0.75 (for 
every RM100.00) 
 
Financing tenure = 1 year 
 
Calculation: 
Total fee charge = 
14,285/100*0.75*12 
month = RM1,285.65 
 
Monthly installment (plus 
total of loan) = 
(RM10,000 + 
RM1,285.65)/12 = 
RM940.47 
 
Total of loan = RM10,000 
 
 
 
Profit rate for a year = 
3.25% 
 
Financing tenure = 1 year 
 
Calculation: 
Total of profit rate = 
3.25/100*10,000 = 
RM325 
 
Monthly installment (plus 
total of loan) = 
(RM10,000 + RM325)/12  
= RM860.42 
 
Conclusion Total of fee charge a year, RM1,285.65 is equal to 
12.86% profit rate. If we compare the personal financing 
with Islamic pawnbroking, the fee rate is more 
expensive by 9.61%. On the other hand, if we compare 
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the interest rate charge by conventional pawnbroking 
with the Islamic pawnbroking fee rate, the fee rate will 
be more cheaper by 11.14%. 
 
As discussed previously, safekeeping fees for collateral is allowed according to 
shari‟ah. This is because customers should pay all maintenance costs for collateral. 
However, Muhammad Naim (2007) argues that fixing specific fees based on collateral 
value could bring back riba into the system, especially if the real cost of maintaining 
it is same for each of collateral, which is prohibited in Islam. He suggests that Islamic 
pawnbrokers may charge a fee for safekeeping, but this should not be based on the 
collateral value. It should be based on the real cost occurred in keeping the item. 
5.6.4 Pledge Asset 
Previous studies by Sanusi and Johari (2006), Mohammed et al. (2005) and Ismail 
and Ahmad, (1997) have shown that Islamic pawnshops accept collateral that has a 
market value, such as gold and jewellery only. According to Ismail and Ahmad 
(1997), these items will maintain their value over a reasonable period of time and are 
easy to store.   
Comparatively, in conventional pawnshops, the items to be accepted are beyond gold 
and jewellery, including branded watches and diamonds. Ismail (2002) has raised the 
issue on whether Islamic pawnshops can accept a wider spectrum of items such as 
land, property and bond certificate in terms of item pledge. He argues that the price of 
gold can fluctuate and was also concerned about the pricing of gold and whether it 
was based on weekly market price or daily market price. According to Johari et al. 
(2008), MGIT uses the weekly market price as an indicator for determining the price 
of gold. In contrast, most banks will use the daily market price as an indicator. 
Like the Muslim Funds of North India that practice Islamic pawnbroking, acceptable 
collateral includes papers of security, property documents, bonds, cheques, shares, 
vehicles paper, ornaments, and other valuables etc. (Khan and Nisar, 2004). With this 
policy, the customer can have a wide range of items to offer for getting cash from 
pawnshop lending.  
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5.6.5 Location and Loyalty 
The accessibility of pawnshops is an important issue as well. However, there exists 
scarce information on the importance of location factors for pawnshops. Two 
important studies can be utilized to draw some conclusions. The first study is by 
Mohammed et al. (2005) who argued that location is a significant factor for pawnshop 
development, who also argued that individuals tend to choose pawnshops that are near 
to their houses and work places. Ismail and Ahmad (1997) also suggested the 
importance of location for setting up pawnshops businesses because in their study, 
they discovered that pawnshops are highly unevenly distributed across the Malaysian 
states. In order to promote Islamic pawnbroking, it is expected that there will be less 
pawnshops per capita in states that do not charge interest, whilst more pawnshops per 
capita in states with higher interest rates (Ismail and Ahmad, 1997: 1347). In addition, 
they found that most of the pawnshops were built in town areas to facilitate 
transactions.  
In terms of loyalty, Woloson (1964: 176) discovered that pawners were normally 
loyal to their pawnbrokers because they felt more comfortable negotiating loan terms 
knowing what to expect. 
5.6.6 Microcredit Provision 
There appears to be a clear gap between those with a stable income and with assets 
that can be offered as collateral for loans, and the people who have low income and 
do not have any valuable assets as collateral. The gap between the two income groups 
could be made less obvious by offering an ar-rahn microcredit scheme to help the 
needy; and hence, in such a strategy, ar-rahn can help as a redistributive scheme 
through developing social capital within a microcredit framework. 
According to Ismail et al. (2007) and Awang Kechil et al. (2004), the ar-rahn scheme 
has the potential of being formal credit to small-scale enterprises, which is evidenced 
by Samsudin (2002) who argued that the customers use the ar-rahn scheme for 
education and business purposes. He added that the ar-rahn scheme is also useful for 
small traders who are unable to get loans from banks and other financial institutions 
due to their small income and lack of valuables assets to offer. Normally, traders who 
pawn their jewellery for business capital will repay the loans after they acquire profit 
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from their businesses. Barjoyai (1999) also evidences that the pawnshop system was 
able to help small businesses and market traders in the Klang Valley, Kuala 
Terengganu, and Kota Bharu to acquire more capital. 
5.6.7 Potential for Capital Accumulation through Islamic Pawnbroking  
Ar-rahn can be a better alternative to finance stock purchase compared to credit cards 
and share-financing loans. At least the money individuals obtain via ar-rahn is backed 
by productive assets. However, can the company use the asset to generate income? 
For example, if the collateral is a gold bracelet worth RM10,000.00, can it be sold for 
investment purposes with the proceeds going to the company alone? This may be one 
way to compensate for the opportunity cost forgone to the company for the loan 
given.  
According to Abi Bakar Marghinani in the Hedaya (as noted by Rosly, 2005: 132), it 
is not lawful to take pledges for trusts such as deposits, loans or mudharabah or 
partnership stock. The pawnbroker (murtahin) is not entitled to use the collateral 
(rahn) for his right is only in the possession of the pledge and not in its use. If the 
pawnbroker uses the pledge for its own benefit without informing the debtor, and then 
incurs a loss, it takes full liability for the loss incurred. 
In contrast, Meera (2008) suggests that, in order to make productive use of the 
increasing amount of gold accumulating in the pawnbrokers stock, presumably due to 
a high number of default causes by the lower income group, the pawnbroker can 
convert the unredeemed gold items into gold dinars which can be pushed back into the 
economy.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The emergence of conventional pawnbroking operating side by side with Islamic 
pawnbroking (dual system) provides an option for the customers to choose the best 
pawnbroking service based on the features explained in the preceding section. As for 
Muslims, this opportunity will enable them to reject monetary transactions involving 
riba and gharar. In addition, it is expected that Islamic pawnbroking will be able to 
eliminate the informal lending activities such as loan sharks or „ah-long‟ which have 
clearly oppressed and victimized the lower-income groups. 
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As for Malaysia, the government has always been committed to developing Islamic 
financial products. In order to enhance the growth of this product, the participation of 
mainstream financial institutions in the ar-rahn scheme will complement the existing 
range of Islamic banking products offered by financial institutions. It can be stated 
without any hesitation that pawnshop institutions have a significant impact on the 
development of society and hence contribute to economic growth. Finally, the 
Malaysian experience of Islamic pawnbroking seems to offer a very useful model 
which other countries might wish to consider. 
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Chapter 6 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The foregoing chapters provide a synthesized review of literature that addresses 
several issues regarding conventional pawnbroking operating in China, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, and some of the Southeast Asian countries, 
and the current implementation of Islamic pawnbroking initiated in Malaysia. In this 
chapter, the study proceeds by elaborating on the research methodology designed to 
explore the attributes, behaviours, and perceptions of Malaysian customers and 
pawnbrokers about the role of pawnshop institutions in social development, economic 
growth, and the future prospect of Islamic pawnbroking as opposed to the 
conventional pawnbroking system. 
Following sections in this chapter discuss the research methodology and method 
related in this study in terms of discussing the actual procedure followed. 
6.2 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND QUESTIONS 
In particular, the empirical part of the study in later chapters sets out to seek answers 
to the research questions addressed below, which are identified in the introductory 
chapters: 
(i) What are the attributes of customers getting loans from pawnshop? 
(ii) What is the opinion of different groups in Malaysia regarding the role of 
pawnshop in solving the financial exclusion?  
(iii) What is the opinion of different groups in Malaysia regarding the role of 
pawnshop in solving socio-economic issues? 
(iv) What is the opinion of different groups in Malaysia regarding the role of 
pawnshops as an alternative to formal financial institution? 
(v) Does faith contribute to the choice of pawnshop? 
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(vi) Is financing production purposes instead of consumption purposes 
supportive to the socio-economic development of the customer? 
(vii) What is the opinion of customers in Malaysia towards the services provided 
by pawnshop? 
(viii) Can Islamic pawnbrokers sustain their business without charging any fee or 
small percentage of safekeeping fee?  
(ix) Is there any dilemma between social responsibility and profit maximization 
from the Islamic pawnbrokers‟ point of view? 
(x) Is there any solution from the selected Islamic pawnbroking institutions to 
standardize their policy and regulation? 
(xi) Is there any agreement between customers and pawnbrokers on the factors 
affecting the selection of their preferred pawnshop?   
(xii) Do the processes held in the pawnshop tally with the regulation provided in 
the Pawnbrokers Act 1972?   
(xiii) What is the ultimate role of pawnshops from the perspective of the 
pawnbroker  itself? 
The questionnaire method aims at measuring the participants‟ behaviour and opinions 
related to these main research questions. These should also be considered as the base 
of the hypotheses of this study, which are defined in detail in the following section. 
6.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Asutay (2008), research methodology is “the study of methods and 
principles and of their application in a given field of academic inquiry”. Methodology 
itself is defined as the framework of philosophy and the essential assumptions of 
research (Van Manen, 1990). Similarly, Creswell et al. (2007) refers to research 
methodology as the framework pertaining to the whole process of research. 
Researchers generally agree that there are two natures of research methodology within 
social science research: quantitative and qualitative methods. Normally, the structured 
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approach is classified as quantitative methodology, whereas the unstructured approach 
as qualitative methodology. Both of them differ in the underpinning philosophy as 
well as in design, strategy, methods used, and data analysis. According to Asutay 
(2008), the main objective of qualitative study is to measure the subjects‟ perceptions, 
understanding, and behaviour regarding to the relevant topic, while quantitative 
research aims to discover and examine the interrelationship between related variables.  
Since the aim of this research is to measure the attributes, behaviours and perceptions 
of Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers about the role of pawnshop institutions to 
society‟s development and its contribution to economic growth, and the future 
prospect of Islamic pawnbroking as opposed to the conventional pawnbroking system, 
a qualitative methodology is employed to achieve the research aim.   
6.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
One of the preliminary steps in conducting social research is to identify a research 
design or structure before launching any data collection or completing data analysis. 
According to Jupp (2008), research design is a design or strategy that validates and 
rationalizes the logic, structure, and the principles incorporated in any research 
methodology and methods and how these elements link with the research questions, 
hypothesis, or proposition. In other words, the function of a research design is to 
ensure the proper method of obtaining clear, unambiguous, and strong evidence in 
answering the research questions. There are four types of research design; which are 
experiment, case study, longitudinal design, and cross-sectional design.
59
 
In this study, the researcher adopts the cross-sectional design method, which is also 
the most widely-employed design in social science research. According to Bryman 
(2008), the cross-sectional design, which is also known as a social survey design, is 
popular for those researches which involve questionnaires and structured interviews. 
This is one of the reasons that the cross-sectional design is used in this study. Vaus 
(2003) provides the rationale of employing this research design as follows: 
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(2005), Sekaran and Bougie, (2009), Bryman (2008). 
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(i)  Allow the researcher to gather the data and interpret the results relatively 
easily and quickly. Since the data are collected at one point of time, it is 
unnecessarily for a range of follow-up stages or interventions prior the data 
analysis; 
(ii)  The designs are more cost effective compared to other research designs. 
Cross-sectional surveys can be defined as any collection of data from a sample of 
individuals (or groups) at a specific time as a basis for inferring the populations‟ 
characteristics from which the sample is drawn from. A cross-sectional survey of the 
population may be carried out once or repeatedly at different points of times, thus 
enabling estimates and the monitoring of the population‟s responses toward any 
changes in social, economic and political policies.  
Cross-sectional sample surveys are also described as „descriptive‟ or „analytic‟ 
depending on whether the prime purpose is to provide descriptive estimates of the 
population‟s parameters or to test hypotheses about the relationships between the 
variables encompassed by it. This study includes both descriptive and analytical 
aspects. 
It should also be mentioned that this study is a case study, as it is based on the 
experience of Malaysians in terms of pawnshop behaviour. 
6.5 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
According to Silverman (2000: 88), “choice of method should reflect an overall 
research strategy”. Basically, research strategy can be distinguished between 
quantitative and qualitative research.  
Bryman and Bell (2007: 28) claim that the quantitative study “can be construed as a 
research strategy that emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data 
and that entails a deductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, 
in which the accent is placed on the testing of theories”. In contrast, they believe that 
qualitative study “can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes 
words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data and that 
predominantly emphasizes an inductive approach to the relationship between theory 
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and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories” (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007: 28). 
In other words, the deductive approach begins from the general theory to a specific 
case. On the other hand, the inductive approach is exactly the opposite of the 
deductive approach as it moves from the specific-to-general, where the general 
conclusions are made based on the specific observations (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009: 
28).  
Considering the nature of this study, hence, the inductive approach is applied in this 
research because it is a qualitative research and engages in generating hypothesis by 
commencing the study from field research to establish trends and generalize results.  
6.6 RESEARCH METHOD AND INSTRUMENTS 
The choice of research methods is a necessary step in the research process taken 
between setting objectives and commencing fieldwork. According to Buchanan and 
Bryman (2009), the determinant of methods in the research process is crucial in order 
to find the appropriate tools consistent with research topics and objectives. They also 
note that the “choice of research methods, shaped by aims, epistemological concerns, 
and norms of practice, is thus also influenced by organizational, historical, political, 
ethical, evidential, and personal factors, which are typically treated as problems to be 
overcome” (Buchanan and Bryman, 2009: 1).  
There are three different categories of research methods which consists of: first, the 
qualitative methods which typically involve an instrument such as in-depth interviews 
(both structured and semi-structured), observation, focus groups, or critical incident 
techniques (Fitzgerald and Dopson, 2009: 479); second, the quantitative methods 
which involves surveys using structured questionnaires; and third, the mixed methods, 
also known as triangulation methods, which combine the quantitative and qualitative 
methods (Bryman, 2009: 518).  
For the purposes of this study, the researcher adopts combining methods, or 
employing triangulation using questionnaires and interview with the respondents. 
Henn et al. (2006) had demonstrated the objectives of combining methods as follows: 
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(i) To gain their individual strength and overcome any weaknesses stemmed 
from utilizing one particular method; 
(ii) To overcome bias in research; and 
(iii) To assist the researcher in obtaining an entire overview of the relevant 
matters under investigation.  
Therefore, triangulation methods enable the researcher to explore a specific research 
area from various different points of views and perspectives, focusing on different 
queries and issues, gathering different types of data, evaluating these data using 
different techniques and examining and analyzing the results from a variety of 
different outlooks (Henn et al., 2006: 21). 
As the descriptive method, secondary data is used in this study, which is assembled 
from the reports kept routinely by selected Islamic pawnbroking institutions from 
YaPEIM, MGIT, and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, data collected earlier by 
other researchers such as working papers, journals, magazines and also in the internet. 
No official statistics of the pawnbroking system can be found in the Central Bank of 
Malaysia except for a list of pawnshops‟ brief details (which are regulated under the 
Pawnbrokers‟ Act 1972) from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
website and also data from the annual report of Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia and 
YaPEIM. 
6.6.1 Questionnaire Design 
The design of the questionnaire will largely depend on the research purpose and the 
respondents who are to answer the questions. In order to develop the questionnaires, 
the researcher adapted and modified two questionnaires that were previously 
developed in pawnshop research, such as Johnson and Johnson (1998) and Maamor et 
al. (2005) as well as other relevant Islamic banking and finance studies. In addition, 
other journals, Ph.D theses, and Masters dissertations, Islamic banking and patronage 
factors related studies were also reviewed in order to design a reliable questionnaire.  
When a questionnaire is used, the design must be such that it is easy to administer by 
the researcher and is easily understood by the respondent. In this study, the majority 
 102 
of the respondents who deal with pawnshops came from the lower and middle-income 
group. Therefore, the questions tend to be relatively simple and strive to quantify, to 
make sure that the persons are comfortable in reporting their behaviour and opinions, 
as well as having a certain level of communication skill and memory recall.  
As for this study, the questionnaires were designed to achieve various objectives that 
include the customers and the pawnbrokers of several pawnshop. The questionnaire in 
this study is designed according to identified objectives, which are to enquire about 
the customers‟ and pawnbrokers‟ perception on conventional and Islamic pawnshops 
towards the role of pawnshops in enhancing the socio-economic growth, to evaluate 
the current operations and regulations of the conventional pawnshop as well as the 
Islamic pawnshop, and to improve the services of Islamic pawnshops in order to make 
the institution an alternative financial institution. Thus, two types of questionnaire sets 
were developed: for customers of pawnshops and pawnshop owners or managers. 
Each of the items in the questionnaire were designed according to the hypotheses 
developed for this study. Table 6.1 summarises the variables, the hypotheses and the 
list of items in the questionnaires related to the hypotheses. 
6.6.1.1 Types of questionnaire items 
In asking questions in the questionnaire, researchers have two options regarding the 
questionnaire design: closed questions and an open-ended questions. A closed 
question provides the respondents with a predetermined choice of responses. 
Advantages of this type of questions include their relative ease to be answered and to 
be administered and coded into computer database for subsequent analysis. However, 
the researcher needs to be confident that the limited set of responses provide adequate 
coverage of the range of possible responses (Miller et al., 2005: 250).  
In contrast, open-ended questions offer the respondents the opportunity to express 
their opinions using their own words. The advantage for using this type of question is 
that it allows for elaboration in a response, thus providing insight on the respondents‟ 
ideas, actions and beliefs (Miller et al., 2005: 251). Nevertheless, for coding, open-
ended responses and making comparisons between respondents‟ responses is much 
more difficult.  
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Table 6.1: Variables, Hypotheses and Items on Questionnaire (Refer to Appendix 6A and 6B) 
Variable Name Hypothesis Related Question in 
Questionnaire 
1. Customer 
attributes 
H1: Women go to pawnshop more than men. Q1 (Set A) 
H2: The higher the age, the higher the customers‟ demand for pawnshop. Q2 (Set A) 
H3: The higher the income, the lower the customers‟ demand for pawnshop. Q12, Q13 (Set A) 
H4: The less education level, the greater the customers‟ demand for pawnshop. Q5 (Set A) 
H5: There is a relationship between marital status and the customers‟ demand for 
pawnshop. 
Q6 (Set A) 
H6: There is a relationship between own/ spouse employment status and the customers‟ 
demand for pawnshop. 
Q9, Q10 (Set A) 
H7: The greater the household size, the greater the customers‟ demand for pawnshop. Q7 (Set A) 
H8: The greater the household dependents is in full-time education, the greater the 
customers‟ demand for pawnshop. 
Q8 (Set A) 
2. Sources of 
instant cash 
H9: There is no significant difference among the customers in selection of various sources 
of getting instant cash.  
Q18 (Set A) 
3. Pawnshop vs 
other instant 
cash loan 
H10: There is no significant difference among the customers in reasons of choosing 
pawnshop than other sources of instant cash loan.  
Q19 (Set A) 
4. Determinants 
of pawnshop 
selection 
H11: There is no significant difference among the customers in terms of determinants of 
pawnshop selection. 
Q23 (Set A) 
H12: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers point of view regarding the 
customers‟ determinants of pawnshop selection.   
Q40 (Set B) 
H13: Islamic pawnbrokers are able to distinguish among the various of services that they 
need to improve. 
Q40 (Set B) 
H14: Conventional pawnbrokers are able to distinguish among the various of services that 
they need to improve. 
 
Q40 (Set B) 
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5. Purpose of 
loan 
H15: Customers makes loan from pawnshop for consumption purpose rather than 
production purpose. 
Q26 (Set A) 
H16: There is no significant difference among the customers regarding the degree of 
agreement that when the money received from pawnshop is used for consumption and 
no redemption, it will sustains financial difficulty. 
Q60 (Set A) Item no. 5 
H17: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding the degree of 
agreement that when the money received from pawnshop is used for consumption and 
no redemption, it help to sustains the pawnbroking business. 
Q47 (Set B) Item no. 5 
6. Product 
satisfaction 
H18: There is no significant difference among the customers of the degree of satisfaction of 
all processes involved in pawnshop. 
Q55 (Set A)  
7. Pawnshops‟ 
role 
H19: Pawnbroking business help in a positive manner to Islamic pawnshop rather than 
conventional pawnshop. 
Q58 (Set A) 
H20: There is no significant difference among the customers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop helps to solve financial exclusion. 
Q60 (Set A) Item no. 1 
H21: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop helps to solve financial exclusion. 
Q47 (Set B) Item no. 1 
H22: There is no significant difference among the customers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop helps to solve social problem. 
Q60 (Set A) Item no. 2 
H23: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop helps to solve social problem. 
Q47 (Set B) Item no. 2 
 H24: There is no significant difference among the customers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop is an alternative to the formal financial institution. 
Q60 (Set A) Item no. 3 
H25: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding the degree of 
agreement that pawnshop is an alternative to the formal financial institution. 
Q47 (Set B) Item no. 3 
H26: Customers from Islamic pawnshops are more financially better off pawning their 
belonging as compared to the conventional pawnshops‟ customers. 
Q61 (Set A) 
8. Economic 
downturn 
effect 
H27: There is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of each 
pawnbrokers regarding the impact of pawnbroking business during the economic 
downturn. 
Q43 (Set B)  
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9. Faith effect H28: There is no significant difference among the customers regarding the degree of 
agreement that faith of abstaining from riba effect the selection of pawnshop. 
Q60 (Set A) Item no. 4 
H29: There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding the degree of 
agreement that faith of abstaining from riba effect the selection of pawnshop. 
Q47 (Set B) Item no. 4 
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For the questionnaires in this study, all of the questions were designed as the close-
ended type.  
6.6.1.2 Questionnaire administration 
According to Buckingham and Saunders (2008: 69), questionnaires can be operated 
by a number of different means, such as self-completed questionnaires, face-to-face 
interviewing, and telephone interviewing. Self-completed questionnaire or self-
administrated questionnaires are typically used in mail surveys. A letter of instruction 
is normally included, which informs the respondents how they are to go about 
answering the questionnaire. This type of administration has several advantages: they 
are cheap to administer; there are no interviews involved and the costs are mainly for 
printing and postage; they are rather effective with regard to sensitive questions, 
which respondents would not necessarily want to answer in front of an interviewer; as 
well as being able to collect data from highly motivated and specialized groups. 
However, self-administered questionnaires tend to have a low response rate, which 
can affect the representativeness of the sample. Another disadvantage is that, unlike 
the interviewers, the respondents are not experts with regard to answering 
questionnaires and may encounter problems despite the instructions. If returned, the 
questionnaire may be incomplete or questions may have been misunderstood. 
The above problems are avoided when the researcher administers questionnaires, 
which can either be done by face-to-face interviews or telephone interviews. The 
response rate is normally very high and questionnaires are less incomplete because 
specifically the researcher can help with the more complicated questions and clarify 
misunderstandings. However, this type of questionnaire administration tends to be 
rather cost-intensive based on the sample size and the number of interviewers 
required. 
Based on all the advantages and disadvantages of each administration, the researcher 
combined the three methods in order to get a high response from the respondents. 
Questionnaires were distributed to the customers who dealt with Islamic pawnshops 
as well as those who used conventional pawnshops in getting instant cash. Because 
some of the respondents who dealt with pawnshops came from lower-income groups, 
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the researcher decided to use the face-to-face interview with the group. The researcher 
also had to use this method, plus telephone interviewing, to get more responses from 
the pawnbrokers, especially the Chinese pawnbrokers, to get past language 
difficulties. As for Islamic pawnbrokers, the researcher used a self-administered 
questionnaire and also mail survey. For the mail survey, the recommendation letter 
from the supervisor was attached together with the pawnbrokers‟ questionnaire and 
cover letter to stimulate rensponse. Finally, a stamped, self-addressed envelope was 
provided to facilitate the returning of the questionnaire. 
6.6.1.3 Cover letter 
A cover letter is important in order to influence the respondents‟ willingness to 
participate. Following Buckingham and Saunders (2008) suggestion, the information 
given in the cover letter must be short and informative and in simple language so as to 
be easily understood by the respondents. Anonymity and confidentiality are very 
important. The respondents will be assured that their identity cannot and will not be 
exposed, and their responses will be treated in the strictest confidence. 
The cover letter for questionnaires in this study contains information such as the 
simple background of the researcher, including the supervisor‟s particulars, the title of 
the research, the research purpose, a clear explanation of procedures to be followed, a 
statement about the societal benefits that will be gained from this research, a 
description of the confidentiality that will be maintained, and a contact number and 
email of the researcher if there is any enquiries (refer to Appendix 6C). 
6.6.1.4 Sources of error in questionnaire 
There were a few potential sources of error in questionnaire administration. The first 
error concerns the behaviour of the respondents where they may intentionally provide 
erroneous answers in order to seek the interviewer‟s approval. The embellished 
responses given by the respondents are „socially desirable‟ in their opinions, thus 
preventing interviewers from learning about the true nature of the respondents 
(Bradburn, 1983: 291). 
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The second error relates to the task‟s features, that is, the technique of the 
questionnaire administered through face-to-face or telephone, or the sequence or 
wording of the questions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2006: 702). 
In order to minimize these sources of error in the questionnaire, the sampling design, 
the method of questionnaire administration and the wording of the questions needs to 
be carefully done. This brings validity and reliability issues to the agenda. 
6.6.1.5 Validity and reliability in questionnaire 
In accomplishing a survey research, it is vital to ensure the validity and the reliability 
of the data collected from the questionanaires distributed. According to Babbie (2003: 
275), in general, the survey research method is less valid and robustly reliable. He 
further illustrates that people‟s perceptions on relevant issues in the form of strongly 
agreeing, agreeing, disagreeing, or strongly disagreeing has to be considered as fairly 
accurate indicators of what researchers believe when they design the research 
questions. Additionally, the validity of data can be improved through meticulous 
sampling, right instruments, and the suitable statistical treatment of data (Cohen et al., 
2005). 
In contrast, reliability can be measured clearly. It is through the same questions asked 
in similar ways to respondents that can contribute to the high score of reliability. As 
the standardised form of questions are distributed to population samples, the bias due 
to the effect of researchers is assumed to be minimised. Furthermore, careful choices 
of wording also contibute significantly to the reduction of the respondents‟ own 
unreliability.   
One method that can be used to test the reliability of the questionnaires is by doing a 
pre-test or pilot test on the questionnaires. Another test commonly used to test internal 
reliability is Cronbach‟s alpha. A computed alpha coefficient will vary between 1 
(perfect internal reliability) and 0 (no internal reliability) (Bryman, 2008: 151). This 
study applied the pilot test and also the Cronbach‟s alpha reliability test since they 
appear to result in less bias and produce a more accurate statistical result. The alpha 
was 0.62, which was measured from a subgroup of questions from the customers‟ 
questionnaire. According to Berthoud (2000: 169), the minimum level of 0.60 was 
considered „good‟ reliability. Thus, it shows that the data is reliable and further 
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analysis can proceed. Vaus (2003: 31) concludes that measures will never be perfectly 
reliable and perfectly valid, but the goal is to maximise the reliability and validity. 
6.6.1.6 Translating procedure 
Since the sample of the questionnaire design in this study attempts to collect data 
from people who may not necessarily understand and use English comfortably, the 
questionnaire had to be translated into the Malay language. 
According to Maxwell (1996), the four categories of procedures used in verifying 
translations are, first, multiple-forward translation; second, back-translation; third, 
translation review done by bilingual judges, and lastly statistical review. 
Multiple-forward translation, also known as parallel translation (Peterson, 2009) can 
be carried out by two people separately translating a survey into the target language, 
and then either the translator or others will compare the translations and make 
corrections. Back-translation is a three-step procedure. For example, one party 
translates a survey, another translates it back to the source language, and then both 
engage in a process of comparison and correction. Another type of translation 
procedure is translation review done by bilingual judges which could be deemed as a 
variation of back-translation. Nevertheless, unlike back-translation, translation review 
focus on both the target and the source language. 
The fourth type of translation procedure is the statistical review. This procedure is 
also known as pretest procedure where, once a translation has been completed, it will 
be pretested to ensure the depth of understanding of the respondents towards all 
questions in the future (Brislin, 1970: 187). 
This study combined the back-translation and pretest procedures in an attempt to gain 
translation adequacy. The questionnaire was originally framed in English and was 
translated into Malay language. It was then translated back into English by another 
translator unfamiliar with the English version. Finally the back translation and the 
original questionnaire were compared before the final form was printed. A pilot test of 
thirty customers and six pawnbrokers were conducted in Johor, Malaysia in order to 
measure the understanding of the respondents towards the questions asked and to 
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determine the adequacy of the translation procedure use in devising a well-worded 
question.  
6.6.1.7 Piloting the questionnaire 
Prior to the actual survey, a pilot study was conducted to test the appropriateness and 
relevance of each items in the questionnaires. Before distributing the questionnaires 
for a pilot test, the research supervisors and lecturers mastering in this field were 
invited to comment on the items for content validity. Based on the comments from the 
expertise, several modifications were made to both questionnaires, including the 
wording of some questions, modifying ambiguous questions, adding some relevant 
issues, and omitting some questions in order to reduce the length of the questionnaire. 
Then the pilot test was conducted using the modified questionnaires.The researcher 
conducted a pilot test using the questionnaire administered instruments on ten random 
pawnshops regardless of the type of pawnshop. The researcher selected fifteen 
customers and three pawnbrokers from both types of pawnshops in the state of Johor. 
By using this type of data collection method, a hundred percent of the randomly 
selected pawnshops and purposive sampling customers responded to the pilot survey. 
Then, each of the items on the questionnaires were revised to see whether there were 
still glitches in the questionnaires. Based on the feedback from both respondents, 
several ammendments were made carefully because mistakes in questionnaire design 
cannot be rectified once fieldwork has begun. Finally, the final version of the 
questionnaires were developed and ready to be distributed to the real fieldwork. 
Appendix 6A and 6B provides the final draft of questionnaires (customer and 
pawnbroker) which were distributed to each respondents.  
6.6.1.8 Sampling procedure 
Before doing a sample design, the researcher identified the unit of analysis involved 
in this study: 
(i)  Customers 
Those who are using the pawnshops services to get an instant cash such as 
the working people, self-employed people, housewives, students, retired 
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people, unemployed people etc. The types of pawnshops are divided into 
two categories, which are Islamic pawnbroking institutions and conventional 
pawnshops. The customers may go to pawnshops for lending purposes, 
redemption, extending the redemption period, auctioning, receiving 
compensation due to the lost of their collateral, or making a complaint to the 
pawnbroker. 
(ii)  Pawnbrokers 
This study also assembled data through a questionnaire from the 
pawnbrokers themselves, which includes: all state managers and branch 
managers including the employees of different types of pawnshops in the 
four states (Kelantan, Terengganu, Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, and Johor). The 
institutions involved were the conventional pawnshops and Ar-Rahn 
institutions held by YaPEIM, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, 
MAIDAM/MGIT, PKB, and other cooperatives. 
6.6.1.8.1 Sampling design 
Sampling design can be classified as random/probability sampling, non-random/ 
probability sampling, and „mixed‟ sampling designs (Kumar, 2005).60 A random 
sample indicates the ability of each component in the relevant population to have an 
equal and independent chance of selection. 
There are three random designs which include simple random sampling, stratified 
random sampling, and cluster sampling (Kumar, 2005). Whereas, there are four types 
of non-probability sampling design which consist of reliance on available subjects, 
purposive or judgemental sampling, snowball sampling and quota sampling (Babbie, 
2003).
61
 
As for the latter, systematic sampling is classified under the „mixed sampling‟ design 
as it has the properties of both probability and non-probability sampling designs 
                                                          
60
 In contrast with Kumar (2005), Babbie (2003) classified the „mixed‟ sampling design or systematic 
sampling as a functional equivalent of simple random sampling. 
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 For detailed discussion of non-probability sampling, refer to Jupp et al. (2008), Babbie (2003), 
Kumar (2005), Buckingham et al. (2008), Henn et al. (2006), Denscombe (2005).  
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(Kumar, 2005). The list of advantages and disadvantages of each sampling design is 
discussed in Table 6.2. 
For this study, the practicable mode of tracing suitable respondents would be through 
the use of purposive sampling techniques, since the aim of this research is to measure 
the attributes, behaviours, and perceptions of Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers 
about the role of the pawnshop institution to society‟s development and economic 
growth. The rationale of using purposive sampling is because the reseacher could go 
to those people who, in her opinion, were directly involved with pawnbroking, i.e the 
pawners and pawnbrokers, and who are possibly in the best position to offer the best 
information about the pawnbroking experience, thus answering the targerted research 
questions and achievving the aim of the study.  
Although it will bring up a possible element of bias, the researcher needs the opinion 
of these respondents in order to really explore the overall ideas of pawnbroking with 
them. Additionally, the snowball sampling technique had also been used by the 
researcher to achieve a high response of participants in the study. These sampling 
designs were chosen due to its effectiveness in helping to bring the neccessary data 
but at the same time being time efficient. Figure 6.1 represents a graphic overview of  
the samples developed in this research within three regions in Peninsular Malaysia. 
6.6.1.8.2 The study areas and sampling strategy 
In the actual survey, a sub-sample of 182 (105 from conventional pawnshop and 77 
from Islamic pawnshop) pawnshops from the total population list of 588 was selected 
purposively across three different regions in Peninsular Malaysia with different types 
of pawnshops (refer Figure 6.1). The entire pawnshops in the three regions have equal 
probability to be selected as a sample to the sampling framework based on the state 
that covers the states of Kelantan and Terengganu (Northeast region), Selangor/ Kuala 
Lumpur (Central region) and Johor (Southern region).  
While for the customers, the researcher selected two customers from each pawnshop 
respectively using purposive sampling. Thus, from the total of 364 questionnaires 
distributed, about 311 customers responses were available for further analysis, which 
implies an 83% return rate. As for the pawnbrokers‟ questionnaire, from the total of 
60 questionnaires distributed, only 30 pawnbrokers returned back their questionnaires. 
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Figure 6.1: Purposive Sampling in the Pawnshop Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: CP and IP refer to conventional pawnshop and Islamic pawnshop. 
Northern Zone 
Kelantan CP = 7; IP = 14 
Terengganu CP = 11; IP = 8 
Central Zone Selangor/ Kuala Lumpur CP = 53; IP = 37 
Southern Zone Johor CP = 34; IP = 18 
Northern 
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Southern 
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    Table 6.2: List of Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Types of Sampling Design 
SAMPLING DESIGN TYPE ADVANTAGE DISADVANTAGE 
Probability sampling 
Simple random 
sampling 
It is appropriate for making inferences from 
samples to populations 
It may not be the most statistically 
efficient method of sampling as there are 
inadequate good representative from the 
the subgroups in a population. 
Stratified random 
sampling 
It can ensure that the individuals selected are 
representative of the population in terms of 
certain variables. 
It cannot guarantee that very small groups 
are represented. For example, the 
reseacher would need to know which 
members of the population were in 
employment and which were not. If there 
were only four men who were not in 
employment, the likelihood is that none of 
them would be included in the sample. 
Cluster sampling 
It could be employed if the difficulties such as 
compiling an exhautive list of the relevant 
population elements arise. Target population 
include the population of city residents, all 
Durham University‟ students, and so fort. It is 
also cost-effective. 
The sample does not adequately represent 
the relevant population. 
Non-probability 
sampling 
Reliance on 
available subjects 
This method disallow any control over the 
representativeness of a sample, and is justified 
on the ground of feasibility. 
There is no evidence that the participants 
are representative of the populations to 
which the researchers wish to generalise. 
Purposive or 
judgemental 
sampling 
The researchers are able to distinguish 
respondents who are most likely to provide 
informative, detailed and relevant data. 
There is a source of potential bias because 
purposive sampling depends on the 
subjectivity of the researcher‟s decision 
making. 
Snowball sampling It enables the researcher to identify potential It is dependent upon each participant 
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participants when it would otherwise be 
extremely difficult to do so. 
sufficiently understanding the nature of 
the research in order to be able to identify 
another suitable participant. 
Quota sampling 
It permits the researchers to control variable 
without providing a sampling frame 
There are sources of potential bias. First, 
interviewers may misjudge a potential 
respondent‟s caharacteristic. Secondly, the 
interviewer runs the risk of 
subconsciously making a subjective 
judgement before approaching a potential 
respondent. Thirdly, certain factors may 
hamper certain groups of people from 
being selected for the research. 
   Sources: Babbie (2003) and Jupp et al. (2008). 
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6.6.2 Interview  
The second part of the primary data used in this study was obtained through 
interviews as part of a qualitative research method. Because interview designs is more 
flexible and open-ended, in this research it is used to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the underlying principle of Islamic pawnbroking, its prospects and 
other related issues. Interviews were also used in order to get information on sensitive 
issues which could not be asked in the structured questionnaire. This section, hence, 
provides further details on the interview process pursued in the study. 
6.6.2.1 Types of interviews 
In general, there were three main types of interviews: structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured. The structured interviews shared similar characteristics with the survey 
questionnaire in which they were drawn on a standard format comprising of pre-
determined questions in a fixed order. Also, most structured interviews do not provide 
any room for the involvement of the interviewer‟s independent judgment. 
On the other hand, semi-structured interviews are generally open-ended in order to 
gain richer information about certain issues. Interviewers have power in deciding 
what relevant topics are to be covered and what appropriate questions need to be 
asked. In contrast to the structured questionnaire, the researcher may alter the 
sequence of the question and at the same time probe the interviewee to expand on 
their answer in more detail. In addition, the format of semi-structured interviews is 
primarily discursive, thus allowing the respondents to provide answers in their own 
terms and at their own length and depth (Miller and Brewer, 2003: 167).  
As for unstructured interviews, this method is notably useful when the respondent‟s 
life style, religion, or ethnic culture are obscure to researchers. Thus, the unstructured 
interviews are significant in establising a rapport between the interviewees and 
researchers, as well as granting the researcher a rich information concerning various 
aspects (Miller and Brewer, 2003: 168).  
Since one of the objectives of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding on 
the underlying principles of Islamic pawnbroking and other issues, a semi-structured 
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interview is employed which allows the researcher to pursue topics of particular 
interest from the representatives of the Islamic pawnbrokers i.e. YaPEIM, MGIT and 
Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia. The semi-stuctured interview provides the same 
questions to the respondents which helps with easy classification for analysis purpose 
(See Appendix 6D). 
6.6.2.2 Rationale for Using Interviews  
There are several advantages of using interviews in the qualitative design such as, 
first, respondents are more likely to provide verifiable and important information as 
they would not be observed directly; and second, the researcher is able to completely 
manage the line of questionning (Creswell, 2009: 178).   
In addition, interviews are popular for reasons of cost-effectiveness and for the speed 
of data collection (Jupp, 2006). In contrast, there are also limitations for this type of 
method such as, first, the responses are more likely to biased due to the interviewees‟ 
own interpretation pertaining to the relevant issues and questions. Second, the method 
produces information in a designated situation rather than in a natural field setting. 
Third, partial responses may be produced due to the presence of the researcher, and 
lastly, some respondents may not be articulate, sensitive to, and knowledgeable about 
the related issues which are the interests of the researcher (Creswell, 2009).   
In this study, the researcher conducted interviews on a face-to-face basis and 
electronic communication using email in a form of semi-structured surveys with a 
standardised list of questions. According to Bernard (2000), semi-structured 
interviews were more appropriate to be applied in the research where the interviewer 
and respondents were mainly high-level administrators which viewed efficient time-
management as essential. The more guided the interview, the less time-consuming 
and less problematic the analysis.  
6.6.2.3 Interview Sampling 
The most common approach of sampling in interviews is purposive sampling. 
Creswell (2009: 178) believes that in qualitative research, respondents were 
deliberately choosen by the researcher as it was anticipated that these participants 
would provide the best information and data pertaining to the research problems, 
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issues and questions. Thus, purposive sampling provides effectiveness in collecting 
the expected data.  
In order to gather information on the history of Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia, the 
contribution of this product to the society‟s development and other related issues, the 
researcher identified three main Islamic pawnbroking institutions that pioneered this 
product: Muassasah Gadaian Islam Terengganu (MGIT), YaPEIM (Islamic Economic 
Development Foundation Malaysia) and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia. The detail 
of the interviewees and their respective institutions are shown in Chapter 9. 
By using semi-structured interviews, there were a list of twelve questions written for 
three different Islamic pawnbroking institutions that were interviewed. Among the 
three institutions, only one of them had a shari‟ah scholar who monitored the 
products‟ development, this was Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia. Other Islamic 
pawnbroking institutions such as YaPEIM and MGIT were monitored by an officer 
that would be fully in charge of the development of the product.  
The questions in the interviews covered the salient features of Islamic pawnbroking, 
the purpose of lending, the competitiveness of Islamic pawnbroking, the role of this 
institution and how to increase the awareness of this product to make it competitive to 
the current conventional pawnbroking. 
6.6.2.4 Interview administration 
Before going for the interview, the researchers built an interviewing relationship with 
the potential interviewees by making preliminary contact through telephone, walk in, 
and email, stating a brief introduction concerning the purpose of the interview, the 
clarification of how the interviewer can gain access to the person‟s name, and an 
arrangement on when to meet. Clearly, the details of the interviewees can be obtained 
from their respective institution‟s website. While sometimes participants will easily 
disregard an initial contact by email from an unknown person, however, once the 
contact has been made in person, by telephone, or via regular mail, email becomes 
useful in conforming the interview appointments and maintaining contact throughout 
the research process. In this study, the researcher identified three Islamic 
pawnbroking institutions in Malaysia i.e. MAIDAM/MGIT, YaPEIM and Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia that can provide a sufficient information on the subject 
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matter with an assurance of confidentiality in the information given. Two of the 
representatives from MAIDAM and YaPEIM agreed to be interviewed in a face-to-
face basis, whilst the representative from Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia preferred 
to respond to the interview questions via email. 
6.7 RESEARCH METHODS – DATA ANALYSIS  
After determining possible data collection methods, it is clearly imperative to consider 
how these data will be analysed.  
6.7.1 Analysing Questionnaire Data 
The study adopted a combination of data analysis methods which combined the 
univariate, bivariate and inferential analysis. This simple form of quantitative 
analysis is called univariate analysis, which refers to “summarizing the characteristics 
of some phenomenon in terms of distributions on variables. The most basic format for 
presenting univariate data is to report all individual cases, that is to list the attribute 
for each case under the study in terms of the variable in question” (Blaikie, 2003: 47). 
One of the formats to present univariate data is by using frequency distribution. The 
definition of frequency distribution is “the number of times the various attributes of a 
variable are observed in a sample” (Babbie, 2003: 401). For example, in this study, 
frequency distribution was used to measure the frequency of variables such as gender, 
age, race, religion, educational level, etc. In relation to their pawnshop behaviour and 
opinions.  
Beyond simply representation of the overall distribution of value, a researcher may 
opt to report the results in terms of an average or a measure of the central tendency 
such as by arithmetic means (the result of dividing the sum of the values by the total 
number of cases) and the mode (the most frequently occuring attribute).  
The study also presents subgroup comparisons for descriptive purposes and 
comparative purposes as well. For example, “Women go to pawnshop more than 
men”. In this case, it is assumed that there is something about being a woman that 
result in their behaviour of going to pawnshops. The Likert scale is also used as a 
measurement in order to investigate the customers‟ satisfaction towards the services 
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provided by pawnshops and to find the perception of customers towards the 
pawnshops‟ role in society. Normally the format for indicating the level of agreement 
in the Likert scale is a 5 to 1 which goes from „strongly agree‟ to „strongly disagree‟. 
A common problem in analysing survey data is how to handle the phrase „do not 
know‟ in the Likert scale, which is usually shown as a 3. Whether to include or 
exclude the „do not know‟ will depend on the reseachers purpose in analysing and 
interpreting the data. It is appropriate to put the phrase in the study, for example, if the 
reseacher wanted to know how people react with this issue such as “Does faith effect 
the Muslim customer choice of pawnshop such as riba factor?”. If the respondent said 
that they do not know, then the researcher can make an assumption that some of the 
Muslim customers are still not aware of the term „riba‟ and the prohibition of riba in 
the pawnbroking system. 
While the univariate analysis examines one variable at a time, the bivariate analysis 
involves the analysis of two variables simultaneously. The Bivariate analysis 
incorporates the descriptions of the form and strength of relationships between 
variables, in addition to a comparison of the characteristics of similar variables in 
distinct populations or different variables in the same population (Blaikie, 2003: 47). 
With nominal and ratio level data, this normally involves cross-tabulation. For 
example, the researcher divides the group of subjects into two subgroups i.e. lower 
income and higher income customers, and then describes the behaviour of each 
subgroup. Then, the researcher classifies the subject research into different levels of 
Islamic pawnshops‟ demand and illustrates each of these subgroups in terms of the 
percentage of men and women and other control variables. In such a scenario, this 
relationships will suggest that different level of income will affect the frequency of 
Islamic pawnshops‟ demand. In addition, the chi-square test value is also being 
looked into in order to test the significance for association between nominal level 
variables. 
Finally, inferential analysis is adopted for “estimating whether the characteristics or 
relationships found in a sample, or differences between samples, could be expected to 
exist in the population or populations from which the sample or samples were 
randomly drawn; the procedures allow us to generalize sample statistics to population 
parameters” (Blaikie, 2003: 47).  
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In this study, the sample size for both Islamic and conventional customers and 
pawnbrokers are not equal. As part of the inferential analysis, the Mann–Whitney U 
test is employed, which compares two samples which are unequal (Hardy, 2004: 53). 
Other than that, Blaike (2003: 197) defines that the Mann–Whitney U test as a 
“distribution-free test that is appropriate either when the parametric requirements of 
the t test cannot be met (in particular, when the distribution of the population on the 
variable being considered is not normal) or with ordinal-level variables”. This test is 
also used when members of two categories can be ranked in terms of their scores on 
the same variable. This test was applied to test the difference in perceptions between 
the conventional and Islamic customers‟ and pawnbrokers‟ in certain issues. Another 
non-parametric test is also employed, i.e. the Friedman test for testing the difference 
between several related samples.
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 This test was applied to test the difference of 
preferable sources of instant cash loan between the customers, and also the important 
reasons of choosing pawnshops rather than other sources of instant cash loan. 
6.7.2 Analysing Interview Data 
The main methods of composing texts from interviews is through recording the 
interview using tape and then transcribing it later. Every word uttered by the 
interviewee carries his or her opinions, concerns and knowledge (Vygotsky, 1987). 
Tape-recorded interviews are a permanent evidence, a primary source of information, 
and can be transferred to other researchers for their benefits (Bernard, 2000). 
Recorded interviews offer other benefits as well. The accuracy of the information can 
be confirmed by revisiting the interview transcripts. Later, if they are accused of 
mishandling their interview material, they can go back to their original source to 
demonstrate their accountability to the data. Respondents also well-benefit from the 
tape-recorded interview in terms that the accuracy of their words are assured and 
accounted responsibly by the researcher  (Seidman, 2006). 
This is a strategy followed in this research as well. Transcribing tape-recorded 
interviews is time consuming and a costly task. In the case of this research, it 
approximately took 6 to 8 hours per tape to be transcribed, depending upon several 
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factors such as the clarity of the tape and the researcher‟s language proficiency and 
typing skill.    
The cross-checking of answers given by each interviewee was conducted internally to 
overcome any potential bias answers and to obtain greater validility and reliability in 
interviews. The analysis of the interview focused on the different opinion of each 
interviewee on various research questions identified by the reseacher. According to 
Konold and Well (1981: 5-6), there are three general levels of interview analysis: (i) 
coded analysis; (ii) descriptive analysis; and (iii) interpretative analysis. In this 
research, the descriptive analysis is applied for analysing interview data in an attempt 
to provide a clear restatement of certain issues from the interviewee‟s point of view 
without making any inference on the underlying structures.   
6.8 LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
While every effort was made to overcome any limitations, this research was also a 
control research which faced some potential difficulties and limitations. This research 
has its limitations as follows: 
(i)  The sample in this study could not generalise the population of pawnshops‟ 
customers and pawnbrokers throughout Malaysia because it only covered 
certain states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and 
Johor. It would be beneficial if larger numbers of respondents were 
surveyed. 
(ii)  The semi-structured interviews were only done in three institutions of 
Islamic pawnbroking, excluding other Islamic banks in Malaysia that 
provide pawnbroking products such as AgroBank, RHB Bank, and other 
cooperatives. 
(iii) The data gathering methods were limited to questionnaire and semi-
structured interview because of time and budget constraints.  
Beside its limitation, the researcher also came across several difficulties during the 
fieldwork such as below: 
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(i) Due to a lack of formal statistical data regarding the pawnbroking business 
in Malaysia available in the Central Bank of Malaysia, the researcher had to 
identify which institutions provided Islamic pawnbroking in order to get the 
lists of branches of each institutions with the addresses and contact number. 
For conventional pawnshops, the researcher located the name and the 
address of the pawnshops using the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government‟s website. 
(ii) There was difficulty in getting respondents to fill in the questionnaire. Most 
of the customers of pawnshops came from the lower and middle income 
group. Some of them refused to give full cooperation due to several reasons 
such as the different „dialect‟ used by the interviewer, especially people who 
came from the northern east of Peninsular Malaysia, feeling embarrassed 
about going to pawnshops if they were too desperate for money, and some of 
them were afraid of being interviewed. 
(iii) Due to the background of some of the respondents who were less educated 
and had language difficulties, the researcher had to administer the 
questionnaire using face-to-face interviews. After three months in Malaysia, 
the researcher had to be satisfied with the limited questionnaires that had 
been completed. 
(iv) The researcher also experienced difficulty in getting cooperation from the 
pawnbrokers, especially the conventional pawnbrokers, which was 
dominated by the Chinese. Hence, the number returned of questionnaires 
from the conventional pawnbrokers was very low. 
(v) As for Islamic pawnbrokers, the branches of each Islamic pawnbroking 
institution refused to complete the questionnaire as they claimed that the 
headquarters had already filled it in. Hence, the return rate from Islamic 
pawnbrokers was very low. 
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Chapter 7 
LOCATING THE PROFILE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF CUSTOMERS AND PAWNBROKERS:                                  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief descriptive analysis on the characteristics 
of the responding customers of pawnshops. An understanding of the customers‟ 
characteristics is important as this study represents pioneering work that investigates 
this informal market role in Peninsular Malaysia.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section shows the descriptive and 
crosstabulation analysis of the pawnshops‟ customers profile including their total 
monthly income and expenditure. The second section provides a descriptive and 
crosstabulation analysis of the pawnbrokers‟ respondents as a basic understanding of 
the characteristics of pawnbrokers involved in this research.  
7.2 PROFILE ANALYSIS OF THE CUSTOMERS 
This section presents the demographic characteristics of the pawnshops‟ respondents 
to the survey. It includes characteristics such as the respondents‟ gender, age, race, 
religion, educational level, marital status, total dependents, dependents with full time 
education, occupation, other sources of income, total household income, and total 
household expenditure. It provides the frequency and percentage distribution for the 
responses to each variable and a brief description of the variable‟s general behaviour.  
The customer sample is divided by the pawnshop type they preferred in order to 
identify any differences in characteristics between conventional and Islamic 
pawnshops customers. As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, a total of 311 
customers were generated from 364 questionnaires distributed. The samples were 
taken from three main regions of Peninsular Malaysia (Northeast, Central and 
Southern) respectively to ensure a wide representation of the sample. 
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7.2.1 Profile of Customers by Region 
As reported in table 7.1, the majority (51.8%) of the respondents came from the 
northeast, whilst 24.8% and 23.5% respondent were from the central and southern 
regions respectively. Table 7.1 also depicts that about 38.5% of the representatives of 
conventional pawnshop were taken from the central region, whilst 37.7% and 23.8% 
represent the southern and northeast region of Peninsular Malaysia. As for Islamic 
pawnshops, more than two-thirds (71.8%) of the respondents came from the northeast 
region, whilst 14.9% and 13.3% represent the central and southern region of 
Peninsular Malaysia. States such as Kelantan and Terengganu have a high population 
of Malays, and hence have the tendency of having a large number of Islamic 
pawnshops than conventional pawnshops.  
Since the total number of respondents from each type of pawnshops was not equal, 
the results may undoubtedly affect the significance of any statistical analysis that 
might be carried out due to the possible bias arising from the skewed distribution. 
Therefore, this source of potential bias was considered as a limitation in this study. 
Table 7.1: Profile of Customers by Region 
   
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Region Central Count 50 27 77 
    % within Region 64.9% 35.1% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 38.5% 14.9% 24.8% 
  Northeast Count 31 130 161 
    % within Region 19.3% 80.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 23.8% 71.8% 51.8% 
  Southern Count 49 24 73 
    % within Region 67.1% 32.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 37.7% 13.3% 23.5% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Region 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
7.2.2 Profile of Customers by Gender 
As shown in table 7.2, respondents were closely divided between females (55.3%) 
and males (44.7%). In terms of pawnshops, 52.3% of conventional pawnshop 
customers were male, whereas 47.7% were female. Negatively, the respondents of 
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Islamic pawnshops were predominantly female, constituting about 60.8% compared 
to 39.2% of male respondents.  
Table 7.2: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Gender 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Gender Female Count 62 110 172 
    % within Gender 36.0% 64.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 47.7% 60.8% 55.3% 
  Male Count 68 71 139 
    % within Gender 48.9% 51.1% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 52.3% 39.2% 44.7% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Gender 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
                         Chi-square = 5.238; d.f = 1; Significance = 0.022 
This relationship was supported by the chi-square test value of 5.238 which is higher 
than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 3.841) at 0.05 level of significance. The null 
hypothesis of no relatedness between the types of pawnshop and gender is rejected. 
The significance value is well below the alpha level of 0.05 and its „relatedness‟ is 
therefore significant. 
Based on the horizontal frequencies, i.e. the breakdown of gender according to 
pawnshop type, it can be concluded that the female customers prefer to obtain instant 
cash from Islamic pawnshops, while the male customers do not show a marked 
preference for either pawnshop. 
7.2.3 Profile of Customers by Age 
According to the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, for pledging an item one has to be over 18 
years old. As shown in table 7.3, the majority (78.4%) of conventional pawnshops 
customers fall in the range of 31 to above 50 years old compared to 21.6% of a 
younger age. Combined together, of the 311 respondents, 61.8% were customers of 
Islamic pawnshops with a range of age 31 to 50 years old, followed by almost one-
fifth (19.9%) with the age of 20 – 30 years old.  
In terms of relatedness, the results show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of customers by age. The computed chi-square test 
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value of 7.042 is lower than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 9.488) at 0.05 level 
of significance. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of pawnshop 
and age cannot be rejected because the significance value is above the alpha level of 
0.05 and is therefore insignificant. This implies that the null hypothesis that both 
types of pawnshops are equally preferred by all ranges of age cannot be rejected; and 
hence age is not a significant factor determining pawnshop preference. 
Table 7.3: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Age 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Age < 20 Count 1 4 5 
    % within Age 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .8% 2.2% 1.6% 
  20 – 30 Count 27 36 63 
    % within Age 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 20.8% 19.9% 20.3% 
  31 – 40 Count 35 54 89 
    % within Age 39.3% 60.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 26.9% 29.8% 28.6% 
  41 – 50 Count 32 58 90 
    % within Age 35.6% 64.4% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 24.6% 32.0% 28.9% 
  > 50 Count 35 29 64 
    % within Age 54.7% 45.3% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 26.9% 16.0% 20.6% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Age 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
                         Chi-square = 7.042; d.f = 4; Significance = 0.134 
 
7.2.4 Profile of Customers by Race  
Table 7.4 shows the racial composition of the pawnshop sample. It reveals that more 
than 90% of the respondents belonged to the Malay race. Most Malay respondents 
preferred Islamic pawnshops (61.7%) as compared to conventional pawnshops 
(38.3%) whilst 16.7% of the non-Malays showed interest in dealing with the Islamic 
pawnshop. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of the Chinese (83.3%) and Indian 
(100.0%) tend to chose conventional pawnshops to get instant cash as compared to 
Islamic pawnshops.  
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This relationship is supported by the chi-square test value of 22.520 which is higher 
than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 5.991) at 0.05 level of significance. The null 
hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of pawnshop and race is rejected, as the 
significance value is well below the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore significant. 
Table 7.4: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Race  
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Race Malay Count 111 179 290 
    % within Race 38.3% 61.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 85.4% 98.9% 93.2% 
  Chinese Count 10 2 12 
    % within Race 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 7.7% 1.1% 3.9% 
  Indian Count 9 0 9 
    % within Race 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 6.9% .0% 2.9% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Race 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
                              Chi-square = 22.520; d.f = 2; Significance = 0.000 
Based on the horizontal frequencies, i.e. the breakdown of race according to 
pawnshop type, it can be concluded that the Malay customers prefer to obtain instant 
cash from Islamic pawnshops. In contrast, Chinese and Indian customers show a 
preference for conventional pawnshops rather than the Islamic pawnshops.  
7.2.5 Profile of Customers by Educational Level 
For education level, this study simplified this variable into two categories which 
comprised the less-educated and well-educated. Less-educated people were defined as 
those who did not have a formal education, and those who hold a primary and 
secondary school qualification. Those who held certificates, diplomas, bachelor‟s 
degrees, and postgraduate degrees, were considered well-educated people.  
Overall, more than two-thirds (68.5%) of 311 respondents from the sample were less-
educated and 31.5% were well-educated (table 7.5). In terms of pawnshop selection, 
both groups showed interest in choosing Islamic pawnshops as their loan provider 
compared to other options.  
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In terms of relatedness, the result shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of customers by education level. The computed chi-
square test value of 0.000 is lower than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 3.841) at 
0.05 level of significance. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of 
pawnshop and education level cannot be rejected because the significance value is 
above the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore not significant. This implies that the null 
hypothesis that both types of pawnshops are equally preferred by all ranges of 
education level cannot be rejected.  
Table 7.5: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Education Level 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Education Less educated Count 89 124 213 
    % within Education 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 68.5% 68.5% 68.5% 
  Well educated Count 41 57 98 
    % within Education 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 31.5% 31.5% 31.5% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Education 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
                                     Chi-square = 0.000; d.f = 1; Significance = 0.993 
Based on horizontal frequencies, i.e. breakdown of educational level according to 
pawnshop type, it inferred that either customers with a less or well educated 
background do not show a marked preference for either pawnshops implying that 
education is not a significant factor in determining pawnshop choice. 
7.2.6 Profile of Customers by Marital Status 
Table 7.6 shows the marital status of respondents according to their preferred 
pawnshops. Approximately 75.0% of the respondents who went to both pawnshops to 
get loans were married followed by single people (15.8%) and widows/widowers 
(8.4%). A cross-tabulation of age by marital status indicates that the majority of the 
respondents who were married were in the age of 31 to 50 years old (See Appendix 
7A).  
In terms of pawnshop selection, the married and single respondents would much more 
prefer Islamic pawnshops as compared to conventional pawnshops. As for the 
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widows/widowers, they tend to choose conventional pawnshops (61.5%) as compared 
to Islamic pawnshops which constitute only 38.5%.  
Table 7.6: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Marital Status   
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Marital  Single Count 24 25 49 
    % within Marital status 49.0% 51.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 18.5% 13.8% 15.8% 
  Married Count 90 146 236 
    % within Marital status 38.1% 61.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 69.2% 80.7% 75.9% 
  Widow/widower Count 16 10 26 
    % within Marital status 61.5% 38.5% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 12.3% 5.5% 8.4% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Marital status 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
                                       Chi-square = 6.505; d.f = 2; Significance = 0.039 
This relationship is supported by the chi-square test value of 6.505 which is higher 
than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 5.991) at 0.05 level of significance, 
implying that the null hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of pawnshop and 
marital status of the customers is rejected. The significance value (0.039) is well 
below the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore significant. In other words, personal 
status should be considered as an important determining factor in pawnshop choice. 
Based on horizontal frequencies, i.e. the breakdown of marital status according to 
pawnshop type, it can be concluded that single customers do not show a marked 
preference for either pawnshop, whilst married customers preferred to deal with the 
Islamic pawnshops. On the contrary, most widow/widower customers are more likely 
to go to conventional pawnshops in order to obtain instant cash.   
7.2.7 Profile of Customers by Total Dependents of Household 
Table 7.7 shows that more than half of the respondents (50.8%) had total dependents 
between the ranges of three to five in a household for both types of pawnshops. Of the 
262 respondents to this question, 23.7% of the respondents with large household sizes 
(six to eight people) preferred to go to pawnshops to get quick cash.  
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In addition, by comparing the means of the total dependents of household by number 
of dependents with full-time education, it shows that those with large-sized 
households had more than four people in full-time education in their household (See 
Appendix 7B). Except for households with no dependents and households with more 
than eight dependents, most of the respondents tend to choose Islamic pawnshops as 
their loan provider in order to settle education expenses and to alleviate their financial 
difficulties. 
Table 7.7: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Total 
Dependents 
 
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Dependents None Count 2 0 2 
    % within Dependents 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 1.9% .0% .8% 
  1 – 2 Count 23 28 51 
    % within Dependents 45.1% 54.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 21.7% 17.9% 19.5% 
  3 – 5 Count 53 80 133 
    % within Dependents 39.8% 60.2% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 50.0% 51.3% 50.8% 
  6 – 8 Count 19 43 62 
    % within Dependents 30.6% 69.4% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 17.9% 27.6% 23.7% 
  > 8 Count 9 5 14 
    % within Dependents 64.3% 35.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 8.5% 3.2% 5.3% 
Total Count 106 156 262 
  % within Dependents 40.5% 59.5% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Chi-square = 9.198; d.f = 4; Significance = 0.056 
7.2.8 Profile of Customers by Employment Characteristics 
Table 7.8 summarizes responses to a series of questions about the occupational 
backgrounds of the customers according to the types of pawnshops. Overall, 
approximately 19.0% of the respondents worked as government servants, followed by 
17.8% who worked in private sectors, 17.0% who were small business traders, and 
16.1% housewives. For conventional pawnshops, the majority of the respondents 
were working in the private sector (20%), followed by those involved in small 
business (18.5%), government servants (16.9%), and housewives (13.8%). As for 
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those who patronised Islamic pawnshops, the majority of them worked as government 
servants (20.4%), followed by housewives (17.7%), those working for private sectors 
(16.0%), and those involved in small business (16.0%).  
Table 7.8: Profiling the Respondents Occupations  
Occupation 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
Respondent 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
Respondent 
Percentage 
(%) 
Government servant 
Private sector 
Businessman 
Small businessman 
Shopkeeper 
Petty trader/hawker 
Labour 
Farmer/fisherman 
Student 
Housewife 
Retired 
Unemployed 
Driver 
22 
26 
11 
24 
1 
3 
8 
10 
0 
18 
2 
3 
2 
16.9 
20.0 
8.5 
18.5 
0.8 
2.3 
6.2 
7.7 
0.0 
13.8 
1.5 
2.3 
1.5 
37 
29 
16 
29 
2 
1 
10 
8 
4 
32 
4 
8 
1 
20.4 
16.0 
8.8 
16.0 
1.1 
0.6 
5.5 
4.4 
2.2 
17.7 
2.2 
4.4 
0.6 
59 
55 
27 
53 
3 
4 
18 
18 
4 
50 
6 
11 
3 
19.0 
17.8 
8.7 
17.0 
1.0 
1.3 
5.8 
5.8 
1.3 
16.1 
1.9 
3.5 
1.0 
Likewise, the occupational background of the respondents‟ spouse was quite similar 
to the pattern of respondents‟ occupation where three groups were identified to be the 
main customers of pawnshops which were housewives, government servants and 
those working in the private sector (See Appendix 7C).  
7.2.9 Profile of Customers by Total Monthly Household Income and 
Expenditure 
Table 7.9 shows the categories of total household income of respondents ranging from 
under RM500 to over RM2,000 by the type of pawnshops preferred. The table depicts 
that more than one-third the respondents (35.0%) who got loans from pawnshops 
came from respondents who had a total monthly household income between RM501 – 
RM1,000. Another one-third of the respondents had a range of total monthly income 
between RM1,000 and RM2,000, whereas 24.4% had a monthly income more than 
RM2,000. The remainder (7.4%) had a total monthly household income of less than 
RM500.  
In terms of relatedness, the results show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of customers by total household income. The computed 
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chi-square test value of 3.756 is lower than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 
7.815) at 0.05 level of significance. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the 
type of pawnshop and total household income cannot be rejected because of the 
significance of value is above the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore not significant. 
This implies that the null hypothesis that both types of pawnshops are equally 
preferred by all ranges of total household income cannot be rejected; hence, income is 
not a significant factor determining pawnshop preference. 
Table 7.9: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Total  Monthly 
Household Income  
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Income RM0 – RM500 Count 5 18 23 
    % within Income 21.7% 78.3% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 3.8% 9.9% 7.4% 
  RM501 – RM1,000 Count 47 62 109 
    % within Income 43.1% 56.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 36.2% 34.3% 35.0% 
  RM1,001 – RM2,000 Count 43 60 103 
    % within Income 41.7% 58.3% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 33.1% 33.1% 33.1% 
  > RM2,000 Count 35 41 76 
    % within Income 46.1% 53.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 26.9% 22.7% 24.4% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Income 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Chi-square = 3.756; d.f = 3; Significance = 0.289 
Table 7.10 shows the categories of the total household expenditure of respondents 
ranging from under RM100 to over RM500 by the type of pawnshop preferred. The 
result shows that a majority of the respondents (60.1%) had a total monthly household 
expenditure above RM500, 17.0% from those with total monthly expenditure between 
RM401 – RM500, and 14.8% for RM301 – RM400. The remainders (8.0%) fall in the 
range from under RM100 to RM300.  
In terms of relatedness, the results show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of customers by total household expenditure. The 
computed chi-square value of 8.704 is lower than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 
11.070) at 0.05 level of significance. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between 
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the type of pawnshop and total household expenditure cannot be rejected because the 
significance value is above the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore not significant. 
This implies that the null hypothesis that both types of pawnshops are equally 
preferred by all ranges of total household expenditure cannot be rejected.  
Table 7.10: Crosstabulation: Type of Pawnshop by Respondents’ Total Monthly 
Household Expenditure 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Expenditure < RM100 Count 0 1 1 
    % within Expenditure .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% .6% .3% 
  RM101 – RM200 Count 0 8 8 
    % within Expenditure .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% 4.4% 2.6% 
  RM201 – RM300 Count 4 12 16 
    % within Expenditure 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 3.1% 6.6% 5.1% 
  RM301 – RM400 Count 17 29 46 
    % within Expenditure 37.0% 63.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 13.1% 16.0% 14.8% 
  RM401 – RM500 Count 18 35 53 
    % within Expenditure 34.0% 66.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 13.8% 19.3% 17.0% 
  > RM500 Count 91 96 187 
    % within Expenditure 48.7% 51.3% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 70.0% 53.0% 60.1% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Expenditure 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Chi-square = 8.704; d.f = 5; Significance = 0.121 
Respondents were also asked whether their total monthly household income was 
sufficient enough to support their living expenses. As shown in table 7.11, more than 
half of the respondents (55.3%) reported that their total monthly household income 
was insufficient, whereas the remainder (44.7%) had a sufficient total monthly 
income.  
In terms of relatedness, the results show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of customers by income sufficiency. The computed chi-
square test value of 2.209 is lower than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 3.841) at 
0.05 level of significance. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of 
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pawnshop and income sufficiency cannot be rejected because the significance value is 
above the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore not significant. Thus, income 
insufficiency cannot be a significant determining factor.  
Table 7.11: Respondents Response to Income Sufficiency 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Sufficient Yes Count 49 90 139 
    % within Sufficient 35.3% 64.7% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 37.7% 49.7% 44.7% 
  No Count 81 91 172 
    % within Sufficient 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 62.3% 50.3% 55.3% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Sufficient 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
                           Chi-square = 2.209; d.f = 1; Significance = 0.137 
Furthermore, the respondents had been asked the reasons as to why their total monthly 
income was insufficient. As shown in table 7.12, regardless of the customers‟ 
preferred pawnshop, more than one-third (34.1%) of the respondents indicated the 
main reason for income insufficiency was the high cost of living.  
Table 7.12: Reasons of Total Monthly Income Insufficiency 
Reasons (Respondents 
can state more than one 
reason) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
I have no job 15 7.0 22 9.2 37 8.1 
Dismissed from job 2 0.9 2 0.8 4 0.9 
Self/Children schooling 45 20.9 44 18.3 89 19.6 
Family sick 8 3.7 7 2.9 15 3.3 
Spouse no job 11 5.1 21 8.8 32 7.0 
Increase in family member 15 7.0 22 9.2 37 8.1 
High cost of living 72 33.5 83 34.6 155 34.1 
Tied with debt 29 13.5 28 11.7 57 12.5 
Spouse passed away 7 3.2 1 0.4 8 1.8 
Newly wed 1 0.5 0 - 1 0.2 
Business performance fall 3 1.4 0 - 3 0.7 
Unstable income 7 3.2 10 4.2 17 3.7 
Of the remaining respondents, approximately 19.6% stated that the reasons were 
because of their children‟s schooling expenses, tied with large sum of debt (12.5%), 
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an increase in family members (8.1%) and joblesness (8.1%), unemployed spouses 
(7.0%), and other reasons that contribute to income insufficiency. 
The distribution of the answers to each pawnshop category demonstrates similar 
results, indicating that the reason of economic hardship is not a significant 
determining variable in pawnshop choice. 
7.3 PROFILE ANALYSIS OF THE PAWNBROKERS 
This section presents the demographic characteristics of the pawnbrokers‟ responses 
from the survey which include the pawnbrokers‟ region, years of establishment, type 
of ownership, source of capital and number of staffs employed. It provides the 
frequency and percentage distribution for the responses of each of the control 
variables stated above. 
The pawnbrokers sample is divided by pawnshop type to measure any significantly 
different characteristics between conventional and Islamic pawnbrokers. As 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, a total of 30 pawnbrokers were generated from 60 
questionnaires distributed. The samples were taken from three main regions of 
Peninsular Malaysia (Northeast, Central and Southern) respectively to ensure a wide 
representation of the sample. 
7.3.1 Profile of Pawnbrokers by Region  
Table 7.13 depicts that nearly half (43.3%) of the respondents come from the 
northeast, whilst 36.7% and one-fifth of the respondents were from the central and 
southern regions respectively. From a total of 30 respondents, approximately nearly 
half (46.7%) of the representatives of conventional pawnshops were taken from the 
central region, whilst the remaining (53.3%) were equally divided between northeast 
and southern region of Peninsular Malaysia.  
As for Islamic pawnshops, more than half of the respondents were taken from the 
northeast region, whilst 26.7% and 13.3% represent the central and the southern 
regions of Peninsular Malaysia. This scenario is also similar to the pattern observed in 
the customers‟ distribution due to the willingness of pawnbrokers to cooperate with 
the researchers. As a result of the unequal distribution of the pawnbrokers‟ region, the 
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result may undoubtedly affect the significance of any statistical analysis that might be 
carried out on the data due to the possible bias arising from skewed distribution. 
Therefore, this source of potential bias is acknowledged as a limitation in the study. 
Table 7.13: Profile of Pawnbrokers by Region 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-Rahn 
Zone Central Count 7 4 11 
    % within Zone 63.6% 36.4% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 46.7% 26.7% 36.7% 
  Northeast Count 4 9 13 
    % within Zone 30.8% 69.2% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 26.7% 60.0% 43.3% 
  Southern Count 4 2 6 
    % within Zone 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 26.7% 13.3% 20.0% 
Total Count 15 15 30 
  % within Zone 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
 
7.3.2 Profile of Pawnbrokers by Years of Establishment 
Table 7.14 depicts the range of years of establishment for each pawnshop from the 
year below 10 years to above 30 years. As shown in Table 7.14, a vast majority 
(93.4%) of conventional pawnbrokers fall in the range of 21 to a maturity above 30 
years of establishment, whilst a mere 6.7% of respondents were had been in operation 
for 11 to 20 years. In contrast, more than half (53.3%) of Islamic pawnbrokers fell in 
the range of below 10 years and the remainder (46.7%) were around 11 to 20 years of 
establishment. 
This relationship is supported by the chi-square test value, as the chi-square statistics 
(χ2 = 7.815) is 0.000, which is below the critical level of 0.05. The null hypothesis of 
no relatedness between the type of pawnshop and the years of establishment, hence, is 
rejected. The significant value is well below the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore 
significant. 
Based on horizontal frequencies, i.e. the breakdown of years of establishment 
according to pawnshop type, it can be concluded that a vast majority of pawnshops 
established within less than 10 years to 20 years were from Islamic pawnshops, whilst 
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100.0% of pawnshops established within the range of 21 to more than 30 years were 
from conventional pawnshops. 
Table 7.14: Profile of Pawnbrokers by Years of Establishment  
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-Rahn 
Year < 10 years Count 0 8 8 
    % within Year .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% 53.3% 26.7% 
  11 – 20 years Count 1 7 8 
    % within Year 12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 6.7% 46.7% 26.7% 
  21 – 30 years Count 7 0 7 
    % within Year 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 46.7% .0% 23.3% 
  > 30 years Count 7 0 7 
    % within Year 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 46.7% .0% 23.3% 
Total Count 15 15 30 
  % within Year 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
                       Chi-square = 26.500; d.f. = 3; Significance = 0.000 
7.3.3 Profile of Pawnbrokers by Type of Ownership 
As shown in table 7.15, nearly half (46.7%) of the pawnbrokers are sole proprietors, 
followed by branches, cooperatives, corporations, and partnerships which constitute 
23.3%, 20.0%, 6.7%, and 3.3% respectively. A vast majority (93.3%) of the 
conventional pawnshops were formed as sole proprietorship, whilst the remainder 
(6.7%) were formed as partnership. On the contrary, most of the Islamic pawnbrokers 
were branches and cooperatives, constituting 46.7% and 40.0% respectively, whilst 
the remainder (13.3%) were formed as corporations. 
This relationship is supported by the chi-square test results of 0.000, which is below 
the critical value of 0.05. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the type of 
pawnshop and type of ownership is, therefore, rejected. The significance value is well 
below the alpha level of 0.05 and hence the alternative hypothesis is significant. 
Based on horizontal frequencies, i.e. breakdown of type of ownership according to 
pawnshop type, it can be concluded that sole proprietorship and the partnership form 
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of pawnshops mostly refer to conventional pawnshops, whereas branches, 
cooperatives, and corporations mostly refer to Islamic pawnshops. 
Table 7.15: Profile of Pawnbrokers by Type of Ownership 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-Rahn 
Ownership Sole proprietorship Count 14 0 14 
    % within Ownership 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 93.3% .0% 46.7% 
  Partnership Count 1 0 1 
    % within Ownership 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 6.7% .0% 3.3% 
  Corporation Count 0 2 2 
    % within Ownership .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% 13.3% 6.7% 
  Cooperative Count 0 6 6 
    % within Ownership .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% 40.0% 20.0% 
  Branch Count 0 7 7 
    % within Ownership .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop .0% 46.7% 23.3% 
Total Count 15 15 30 
  % within Ownership 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
Chi-square = 30.000; d.f. = 4; Significance = 0.000 
7.3.4 Profile of Pawnbrokers by Source of Capital 
Table 7.16 shows responses about the source of capital of the pawnbrokers according 
to types of pawnshop. Based on vertical frequencies, obviously most conventional 
pawnbrokers operate their businesses by using their own capital (35.7%), followed by 
getting loan from the family (33.3%) and banks (31.0%).  
However, more than one-thirds (36.4%) of Islamic pawnbrokers obtained their capital 
from their parent company, followed by the cooperative members‟ share (27.3%), and 
subsidised by the government or the state government which comprised 22.7%. 
Combined together, only 13.5% started their business by getting loans from banks 
(9.0%) and the remaining used their own capital (4.5%). 
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Table 7.16: Profile of Pawnbrokers by Source of Capital 
Source of Capital 
(Respondents can 
state more than 
one) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Own capital 15 35.7 1 4.5 16 25.0 
Loan from bank 13 31.0 2 9.0 15 23.4 
Loan from family 14 33.3 - - 14 21.9 
Subsidised by 
Government/State 
Government 
- - 5 22.7 5 7.8 
Parent company  - - 8 36.4 8 12.5 
Cooperative 
members‟ share 
- - 6 27.3 6 9.4 
7.3.5 Profile of Pawnbrokers by Number of Staff Employed 
Table 7.17 shows the number of staff ranging from less than two to five people by the 
type of pawnshop. Based on vertical frequencies or the distribution according to the 
type of pawnshop, the table shows that nearly two-third (65.0%) of the conventional 
pawnshops have between two to three staff employed, followed by a mere 13.4% 
pawnbrokers with employees between four to five and less than two respectively. On 
the other hand, a slim majority (53.3%) of Islamic pawnbrokers employ more than 
four staff, and the remaining (46.7%) out of fifteen Islamic pawnbrokers have two to 
three staff members to manage their business.  
Table 7.17: Profile of Pawnbrokers by Number of Staff Employed 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-Rahn 
No. of staff < 2 Count 1 0 1 
    % within No. of staff 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 6.7% .0% 3.3% 
  2 – 3 Count 13 7 20 
    % within No. of staff 65.0% 35.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 86.7% 46.7% 66.7% 
  4 – 5 Count 1 8 9 
    % within No. of staff 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 6.7% 53.3% 30.0% 
Total Count 15 15 30 
  % within No. of staff 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
Chi-square = 8.244; d.f. = 2; Significance = 0.016 
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The results indicate that there is a significant difference between staff numbers and 
the pawnshop type, which is supported by the chi-square test value of 0.016 which is 
less than the critical value of 0.05. The null hypothesis of no relatedness between the 
type of pawnshops and the number of staff employed is rejected implying that number 
of staff is significantly different between the types of pawnshops. 
Based on the horizontal frequencies or the distribution of staff numbers according to 
pawnshop type, it can be concluded that the number of staff is likely to be small for 
conventional pawnshops, whilst it tends to be slightly larger for the Islamic 
pawnshop.  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
This profile analysis chapter has provided a fundamental understanding on some of 
the characteristics of the responding customers and pawnbrokers for each type of 
pawnshop being studied. In terms of customers, the result shows that the Islamic 
pawnshops were patronised by female customers whilst the males did not show any 
preference. In addition, the results in the preceding section demonstrate that most 
Malays would also prefer to go to Islamic pawnshops whilst other races prefer the 
conventional. Furthermore, most of the pawnshop customers were among the middle-
age and older-age groups from several groups of income-earners who worked as 
government servants, private sector employees, housewives, or small businessmen. 
Moreover, more than half of the respondents obtained cash from pawnshops because 
of the insufficiency of income due to high costs of living, children‟s schooling 
expenses, large sums of debt, an increase in family member and others.   
Whilst, in terms of pawnbrokers, the results reveal that the establishment of Islamic 
pawnshops in Malaysia is very new compared to conventional pawnshop institution, 
which had been in operation since the 15
th
 century. As the findings indicate, Most of 
the conventional pawnshops were sole proprietorships and partnerships, whilst 
Islamic pawnshops had branches, cooperatives, and corporations as their type of 
ownership. As for the source of capital, most conventional pawnshops obtained their 
capital from their own capital, borrowing from banks and family, whilst Islamic 
pawnshop institutions generate their capital from subsidies by the government or state 
government, parent companies, or the cooperative members‟ share. In terms of human 
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resource, the findings depict that the number of staff being employed by the 
conventional pawnshops is less than the Islamic pawnshops, presumably because of 
their capital constraint. 
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Chapter 8 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
(CUSTOMERS AND PAWNBROKERS) 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of descriptive, crosstabulation, statistical analysis, 
and also the results of the testing of the hypotheses that were developed in the 
Research Methodology Chapter. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main 
research objectives are to explore the attributes, behaviours, and opinions of 
Malaysian customers and pawnbrokers about the role of the pawnshop institution in 
enhancing the socio-economic growth of society and hence contribute to the overall 
economic growth of Malaysia, and the future prospect of Islamic pawnbroking as 
opposed to the conventional pawnbroking system. In order to fulfil these objectives, 
this analysis is divided into two sections, (i) the customers‟ perception on 
pawnbroking role; and (ii) the pawnbrokers‟ perception on pawnbroking‟s role in 
economy. 
8.2  CUSTOMER PERCEPTION ON PAWNBROKING 
8.2.1 Sources of Instant Cash Loan 
In this study, seven items were chosen to represent different sources of instant cash. 
These items, which consist of banks, cooperative companies, pawnshops, 
moneylenders, cash advances from credit cards, and relatives and friends were 
adapted from studies by Johnson and Johnson (1998) and Maamor et al. (2006). The 
respondents were asked to rank these items ranging from 1 = the most preferable to 7 
= the least preferable. The null-hypothesis is stated as below: 
 H0:   There is no significant difference among the customers in selection of 
   various sources of getting instant cash. 
As depicted in table 8.1, respondents show different importance levels to sources of 
instant cash. The most preferable source of instant cash loan considered by both 
customers was pawnshops with the lowest mean rank of 2.47, followed by relatives, 
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friends, banks, cooperative companies, cash advances from credit cards, and 
moneylenders with the highest mean rank of 5.69.  
Table 8.1: Friedman Test to Rank the Preferable Sources of Instant Cash Loan 
Sources of Instant Cash Loan Mean Rank Preferable Rank 
Bank 3.50 4 
Cooperative company 4.92 5 
Pawnshop 2.47 1 
Moneylender 5.69 7 
Cash advance from credit card 4.94 6 
Relative 2.99 2 
Friend 3.48 3 
Note: Mean values – Scoring: 1 = The most preferable; 7 = The least preferable  
 
Sources of Instant Cash Loan Mean Rank 
N 127 
Chi-Square 229.859 
Df 6 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
In order to compare the mean scores of all items, the Friedman two-way analysis of 
variance test is applied. Table 8.1 shows that the chi-square value (χ2 = 229.859) was 
higher than the tabulated chi-square value (χ2 = 12.592) at 0.05 confidence interval 
and 6 degrees of freedom. The observed significance level p = .000 was lower than 
the 0.05 confidence level, which implies that variations between the seven items are 
likely to hold in the population. Thus, we may infer that the difference in the preferred 
sources of instant cash among the respondents is statistically significant which implies 
the rejection of the null-hypothesis. 
8.2.2 Pawnshop vs Other Instant Cash Loan 
This research adapted eight items describing the reasons for using pawnshops as 
opposed to other sources of instant cash loans from the studies of Johnson and 
Johnson (1998) and Maamor et al. (2006). The items consist of probability of getting 
loan is high, no credit check, short time to get cash, cost of loan is low, little paper 
work, convenient hours, privacy and possibility of getting back the item. The 
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respondents were asked to rank these items according to the scale ranging from 1 = 
the most important reason to 8 = the least important reason.  
In relation to this, the Friedman two-way analysis was again carried out. Thus, the 
null-hypothesis is stated as below: 
 H0:   There is no significant difference among the customers in reasons of 
   choosing pawnshop than other sources of instant cash loan. 
Table 8.2 shows that the respondents assigned different importance levels to the 
reasons in choosing pawnshops, as opposed to the other sources of instant cash loan. 
The most important reasons for choosing pawnshops is the „short time to get cash‟ 
with the lowest mean rank of 1.66, followed by the „probability of getting loan is 
high‟, „little paperwork‟, „no credit check‟, „cost of loan is low‟, „privacy‟, „possibility 
of getting back the item‟, and „convenient hours‟ as the least important reason.  
Table 8.2: Friedman Test to Rank the Important Reasons of Choosing Pawnshop 
rather than Other Sources of Instant Cash Loan  
Sources of Instant Cash Loan Mean Rank Preferable Rank 
Probability of getting loan is high 3.27 2 
No credit check 4.52 4 
Short time to get cash 1.66 1 
Cost of loan is low 4.66 5 
Little paper work 4.33 3 
Convenient hours 6.67 8 
Privacy 5.14 6 
Possibility of getting back the item 5.75 7 
Note: Mean values – Scoring: 1 = The most important; 8 = The least important  
 
Sources of Instant Cash Loan Mean Rank 
N 311 
Chi-Square 844.574 
Df 7 
Asymp. Sig. .000 
Furthermore, table 8.2 shows that the chi-square value (χ2 = 844.574) is higher than 
the tabulated chi-square value (χ2 = 14.07) at 0.05 confidence interval and 7 degrees 
of freedom. The observed significance level p = .000 is lower than the 0.05 
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confidence level, which implies that variations between the eight items are likely to 
hold in the population. Thus, we may conclude that the difference in the reasons of 
choosing pawnshops as a source of instant cash rather than other small instant cash 
loan among the respondents is statistically significant. Hence, the null-hypothesis is 
rejected. 
8.2.3 Determinants of Pawnshop Selection 
The next issue that arises in this study is regarding the factors that determine the 
selection of pawnshop. This research adapted thirteen items describing the reasons for 
using pawnshop as articulated by Maamor et al.‟s (2006) study. The items consists of 
underlying principle, speed in loan approval, lower interest/fee rate, acceptance of 
various collateral, location being near home/office, confidentiality, convenient park 
and interior comfort, knowledgeable and competent staff, possibility of redemption, 
security of the collateral guaranteed, process is more transparent, image of the 
pawnshop and loyalty. The respondents were asked to rank these items according to 
the scale ranging from 1 = the most important reason to 13 = the least important 
factor.  
In relation to this, the Mann-Whitney U-Test was carried out in order to compare the 
mean ranks of the determinants of pawnshop selection between the Islamic and 
conventional pawnshops‟ customers. Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated as below: 
 H0:  There is no significant difference among the customers in terms of the
  determinants of pawnshop selection. 
Let u1 and u2 be the mean ranks οf customers‟ factors of choosing their preferred 
pawnshop. Thus; 
H0: u1= u2 
H1: u1≠ u2 
As shown in table 8.3, the mean ranks of all factors are not equal for both types of 
customers. The finding shows that the mean ranks of items such as „interest free loan‟, 
„lower fee rate‟, „convenient park and interior comfort‟, „possibility of redemption‟, 
„security of the collateral guaranteed‟, „process is more transparent‟, and „image of the 
pawnshop‟ are lower for Islamic pawnshops‟ customers compared to conventional 
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pawnshops‟ customers. This indicates that the Islamic pawnshops‟ customers are 
more influenced by all the factors stated above in selecting the types of pawnshops 
they preferred. 
On the other hand, the mean ranks of items such as „speed in loan approval‟, 
„acceptance of various collateral‟, „location near to home/office‟, „confidentiality‟, 
„knowledgeable and competent staff‟, and „loyalty‟ are lower for conventional 
pawnshop customers compared to Islamic pawnshop customers which denotes that the 
conventional pawnshops‟ customers are more influenced by all these factors in 
selecting pawnshops. 
Table 8.3: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of the 
Determinants of Pawnshop Selection 
 Pawnshop N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Interest free loan Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
91.00 
246.50 
16471.00 
32045.00 
-16.085 .000 
Speed in loan approval Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
195.31 
101.26 
35352.00 
13164.00 
-9.819 .000 
Lower interest/fee rate Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
132.98 
188.05 
24070.00 
24446.00 
-5.475 .000 
Acceptance of various 
collateral 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
221.00 
65.50 
40001.00 
8515.00 
-16.802 .000 
Location being near to 
home/office 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
188.67 
110.52 
34149.00 
14367.00 
-7.624 .000 
Confidentiality  Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
184.99 
115.63 
33484.00 
15032.00 
-6.747 .000 
Convenient park and 
interior comfort 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
147.76 
167.47 
26744.50 
21771.50 
-1.928 .054 
Knowledgeable and 
competent staff 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
194.77 
102.03 
35252.50 
13263.50 
-9.027 .000 
Possibility of 
redemption 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
144.15 
172.49 
26092.00 
22424.00 
-2.767 .006 
Security of the 
collateral guaranteed 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
118.38 
208.38 
21427.00 
27089.00 
-8.778 .000 
Process is more 
transparent 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
111.80 
217.54 
20236.00 
28280.00 
-10.293 .000 
Image of the pawnshop 
 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
135.31 
184.81 
24400.50 
24025.50 
-5.206 .000 
Loyalty  
 
Ar-rahn 
Conventional 
181 
130 
187.04 
112.78 
33855.00 
14661.00 
-7.284 .000 
Note: Mean values – Scoring: 1 = The most important; 13 = The least important 
Furthermore, the z score for the sample in table 8.3 is higher than the tabulated z0.05 = 
1.645 for all factors that determine the customers‟ preferred pawnshop. In addition, 
the observed 2-tailed probability for all of the factors is smaller than the 0.05 level of 
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significance which implies that there is a significant difference between both types of 
customers in all of the factors. Therefore, the null hypothesis of equal mean ranks for 
all the customers‟ factors of choosing their preferred pawnshop is rejected. 
Ultimately, based on the mean ranks of each pawnshops, it can be inferred that factor 
such as „interest free loan‟ is considered the most important factor for Islamic 
pawnshop customers in choosing their preferred pawnshop, followed by the „process 
is more transparent‟, „security of the collateral guaranteed‟, „lower fee rate‟, „image of 
the pawnshop‟, „possibility of redemption‟, and „convenient park and interior 
comfort‟. Other remaining factors such as „loyalty‟, „confidentiality‟, „location being 
near home/office‟, „knowledgeable and competent staff‟, „speed in loan approval‟, 
and „acceptance of various collateral‟ were ranked by the Islamic pawnshops‟ 
customers as the least important factors in choosing their preferred pawnshop.  
On the other hand, the conventional pawnshops‟ customers ranked „acceptance of 
various collateral‟ as the most important factor in choosing their preferred pawnshop, 
followed by „speed in loan approval‟, „knowledgeable and competent staff‟, „location 
being near home/office‟, „loyalty‟, and „confidentiality‟. Other remaining factors such 
as „convenient park and interior comfort‟, „possibility of redemption‟, „image of the 
pawnshop‟, „lower interest rate‟, „security of the collateral guaranteed‟, „process is 
more transparent‟, and „interest free loan‟ were ranked by conventional pawnshop 
customers as the least important factors in choosing their preferred pawnshop. 
As the test results indicate, except for the „park and interior comfort‟ variable, there is 
a significant difference between Islamic and conventional customers in relation to the 
factors affecting their choice of a particular type of pawnshop. 
8.2.4 Pawnshop Awareness 
As shown in table 8.4, the majority of the respondents from both pawnshops were 
aware of the existence of other pawnshops. As for respondents from conventional 
pawnshops, the sources of their knowledge mainly come from signboards (49.1%), 
friends and relatives (47.9%), and newspapers (3.0%). Other sources of information 
such as television and radio advertisement, and internet were not as effective for 
conventional respondents. In contrast, respondents from Islamic pawnshops are aware 
of the existence of their preferred pawnshops mainly from friends and relatives 
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(33.2%), followed by signboards (32.7%), television and radio advertisements 
(18.1%), newspapers (10.1%), and via the internet (5.9%).  
These results shows that Islamic pawnbroking institutions, as an alternative to 
conventional pawnbroking, have employed a wide range of methods in order to reach 
the customers, especially the lower-income groups.  
Table 8.4: Pawnshops Awareness 
 Conventional (%) Ar-rahn (%) 
1. Aware the existence of other pawnshops? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
80.0 
20.0 
 
92.2 
7.8 
2. Source of knowledge of preferred pawnshop 
(Respondents can state more than one source): 
 Signboard 
 Friends and relatives 
 Newspapers 
 TV or radio advertisement 
 Internet 
 
 
 
49.1 
47.9 
3.0 
- 
- 
 
 
32.7 
33.2 
10.1 
18.1 
5.9 
8.2.5 Lending process 
Table 8.5 reports the procedure of lending in pawnshops. As can be seen, the Islamic 
pawnshop customers use gold as their collateral to obtain loans because gold is the 
only item accepted by the Islamic pawnbrokers.
63
 In contrast, conventional pawnshop 
accept a wide range of items to be used as collateral such as gold, silver, grants, 
electrical appliances, and branded watches. As noted in table 8.5, gold is the most 
popular item to pawn (91.4%) in conventional pawnshops followed by other types of 
collateral which contribute a mere 8.6%.  
In terms of the ownership of the collateral, as can be seen in table 8.5, most of the 
respondents reported that the collateral belongs to them, followed by their spouse, 
relatives and children. Both customers were also required to show some identification 
along with their pledging item during the pawning process. Interestingly, some 
Islamic pawnshops require a receipt of purchase of the pledge item as part of the 
lending process. The result also shows that normally the loan process for each type of 
                                                          
63
 At present, YaPEIM took the first attempt of diversifying their acceptance of collateral to diamond, 
which is stated by YaPEM representative during one of the interview sessions for this research.  
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pawnshops will take only 10 – 20 minutes and only a small percentage of them will be 
settled in more than 30 minutes. 
Table 8.5: Process of Lending 
 Conventional (%) Ar-rahn (%) 
1. Type of collateral  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Gold 
 Silver 
 Grant 
 Electrical appliances 
 Branded watches 
 
 
 
91.4 
0.7 
3.6 
0.7 
3.6 
 
 
100.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2. Real owner of the collateral  
(Respondents can state more than one person): 
 Myself 
 Spouse 
 Children 
 Relatives 
 
 
 
59.8 
29.2 
2.2 
8.8 
 
 
57.2 
32.6 
0.5 
9.6 
3. Things to provide during pawning process 
(Respondents can state more than one source): 
 Collateral 
 Identification card 
 Receipt purchase of item 
 
 
 
50.0 
50.0 
- 
 
 
46.8 
46.8 
6.4 
4. Loan processing last: 
 Less than 10 minutes 
 10 – 20 minutes 
 21 – 30 minutes 
 More than 30 minutes 
 
 
23.1 
39.2 
22.3 
15.4 
 
12.7 
59.1 
18.2 
9.9 
5. Staff knowledgeable and competence: 
 Very knowledgeable and competent 
 Lack of knowledgeable and competent 
 I do not care 
 
 
82.3 
3.1 
14.6 
 
95.0 
- 
5.0 
6. Amount of loan received: 
 Maximum loan 
 Limited to the amount needed 
 
 
65.4 
34.6 
 
69.6 
30.4 
7. Interest rate/ fee paid: 
 No charge 
 Safekeeping fee 
 Interest rate of 2% 
 I do not care 
 
 
- 
- 
48.5 
51.5 
 
7.7 
89.5 
- 
2.8 
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The customers of both types of pawnshops agree that the staff of the pawnshops they 
dealt with were knowledgeable and competent. Only a few of the respondents did not 
care about the knowledge ability and competency of the staff provided that their loan 
was approved.  
As depicted in table 8.5, in terms of the amount of loan received, more than 65% of 
both types of customers revealed that they received the maximum loan they needed, 
whilst less than 35% of both respondents received a limited amount of their loan.   
This research also revealed in table 8.5 that a slim majority (51.5%) of the 
respondents from conventional pawnshops did not care about the interest or fee rate 
charged by the pawnshops, out of which 48.5% of the respondents stated that they had 
been charged an interest rate of 2%. On the other hand, there were mixed results for 
the respondents of Islamic pawnshops, where a vast majority (89.5%) knew that they 
had been charged a safekeeping fee, followed by 7.7% with no charge, and the 
remaining (2.8%) who did not care about the charge.    
Respondents were also asked to identify their purpose of getting loans from 
pawnshops. As shown in table 8.6, the primary purpose of getting a loan from both 
types of pawnshops was to settle „household expenses‟ (25.2%) and „repayment for 
other loan‟ (23.4%). Settling „education expenses‟ (16.5%) and „extend business‟ 
(12.0%) were also among the common purposes of getting loans from pawnshop. The 
remaining respondents (22.8%) acquired loans from pawnshops to settle „medical 
expenses‟, „car expenses for personal‟, „treat yourself/buy gift‟, „buying property‟, 
„start-up business‟, and „car expenses for business‟.  
Table 8.6: Purpose of Lending  
Purpose of lending 
(Respondents can state 
more than one reason) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Medical expenses 10 3.1 10 2.5 20 2.7 
Bills 12 3.7 18 4.4 30 4.1 
Household expenses 62 19.3 69 17.0 131 18.0 
Repayment for other loan 58 18.0 61 15.1 119 16.4 
Car expenses (personal) 17 5.3 34 8.4 51 7.0 
Festival expenses 10 3.1 13 3.2 23 3.2 
Refinancing household 
appliances 
22 6.8 30 7.4 52 7.1 
Treat yourself 20 6.2 19 4.7 39 5.4 
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Buy gift 4 1.2 - - 4 0.5 
Buying property 7 2.2 9 2.2 16 2.2 
Education expenses 51 15.8 70 17.3 121 16.5 
Start-up business 6 1.9 14 3.5 20 2.7 
Extend business 38 11.8 50 12.3 88 12.0 
Car expenses (business) 5 1.5 8 2.0 13 1.8 
In investigating the impact of each type of pawnshops‟ loans towards the socio-
economy of the society, the researcher split the usage of lending into two categories, 
i.e. consumption and production purpose. The usage that fell under consumption 
purposes were „medical expenses‟, „bills‟, „household expenses‟, „repayment for other 
loan‟, „car expenses for personal‟, „festival expenses‟, „refinancing household 
appliances‟,  „treat yourself‟, and „buy gift‟. As for the remaining such as „buying 
property‟, „education expenses‟, „start-up business‟, „extend business‟, and „car 
expenses for business‟, these usage were categorized as production purpose. Table 8.7 
indicates that both types of customers tend to obtain loan from pawnshops for 
consumption purpose (approximately 60.0%) rather than production purpose 
(approximately 40.0%).  
Table 8.7: Consumption vs Production Purpose 
Purpose of lending  
Conventional Ar-rahn Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Consumption 215 66.8 254 62.7 469 64.5 
Production 107 33.2 151 37.3 258 35.5 
8.2.6 Redeeming, Extending and Auctioning Processes 
Table 8.8 reports the procedure of redeeming, extending, and auctioning in pawnshop 
lending. Of 311 respondents, more than 40% of both types of pawnshop customers 
redeemed their collateral in one to six months, followed by 36.1% of conventional 
pawnshops‟ customers and 35.3% Islamic pawnshops‟ customers redeeming their 
collateral in seven to twelve months. The remaining respondents could only redeem 
their belongings more than once a year. 
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Table 8.8: Process of Redeeming, Extending, and Auctioning 
 Conventional (%) Ar-rahn (%) 
1. Period of redemption: 
 1 – 6 months 
 7 – 12 months 
 More than 12 months 
 
 
40.8 
36.1 
23.1 
 
48.1 
35.3 
16.6 
2. If no repayment within 6 months:  
(Respondents can state more than one statement) 
 The pawnbroker will endorse a notice. 
 The pawnbroker will allow extension. 
 If collateral value below RM200, it will 
become the pawnbroker property. 
 If the collateral value more than RM200, the 
pawnbroker can dispose it by auction. 
 
 
 
34.2 
44.2 
6.8 
 
14.7 
 
 
34.2 
36.2 
14.5 
 
15.1 
3. Extension period offered by pawnbroker: 
 Less than 3 months 
 More than 3 months 
 
 
39.2 
60.8 
 
35.4 
64.6 
4. Ever failed to redeem? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
36.2 
63.8 
 
16.7 
83.3 
5. Reason of failing to redeem:  
(Respondents can state more than one statement) 
 Not enough cash to redeem 
 Being dismissed from employment 
 Spouse dismissed from employment 
 Children begin schooling 
 Family member sick 
 Increase in family member 
 Money used for festival expenses 
 Pay other debt 
 Business performance fall 
 
 
 
42.4 
5.7 
0.9 
17.9 
11.3 
9.4 
4.7 
5.7 
1.9 
 
 
53.7 
1.8 
1.8 
24.1 
5.5 
9.2 
3.7 
- 
- 
6. Reason managed to redeem:  
(Respondents can state more than one statement) 
 Used money productively 
 Salary/ bonus 
 Received unexpected money 
 Borrowed from family/ friends/ relatives 
 Monthly allowance 
 Saving 
 
 
 
35.7 
19.4 
15.3 
21.4 
5.1 
3.1 
 
 
31.7 
20.3 
6.9 
19.8 
8.9 
12.4 
7. Ever received notice regarding unclaimed item? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
14.6 
85.4 
 
13.3 
86.7 
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8. Redeem collateral after receiving notice? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
42.1 
57.9 
 
37.5 
62.5 
9. Receive any surplus after auctioning process? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
7.7 
76.9 
 
92.3 
23.1 
 
According to the findings, if the pawnbrokers did not receive any repayment within 
six months of lending, most of the respondents reported that the pawnbroker would 
allow them to have loan a extension, followed by endorsing a notice of reminder. As 
can be seen in table 8.8, nearly two-thirds of the respondents noted that they were 
normally offered, by the pawnbrokers, an extension period of more than three months. 
Although the pawnbrokers granted an extension period, the findings reveals that more 
than one-third (36.2%) of conventional pawnshops‟ customers and 16.7% of Islamic 
pawnshops‟ customers failed to redeem their collateral in the last twelve months. A 
majority of the respondents stated „not enough cash to redeem‟ as the major reason of 
this issue. Presumably, the reason of „not enough cash to redeem‟ can be linked to the 
usage of money for their children‟s schooling expenses when term begin, sick family 
members, an increase in family members, dismissed from employment, etc. On the 
contrary, more than 30% of the respondents of each type of pawnshop‟s customers 
managed to redeem their collateral by using the money that they lent productively. 
Other than that, „salary/bonus‟, „borrowed money from family/friends/relatives‟, 
„unexpected money‟, „saving‟ and etc. were among the sources to get back their 
collateral.  
Respondents who failed to redeem their collateral were also asked whether they had 
ever received any notice of reminder from the pawnbroker about the unclaimed items 
that would be auctioned. As can be seen in table 8.8, of 311 respondents, only 19 
respondents from conventional pawnshops and 24 respondents from Islamic 
pawnshops received a notice of reminder from the pawnbrokers regarding this issue. 
From the total of 43 respondents who received notices, almost 40% of the respondents 
did redeem their collateral and the remaining failed to redeem due to problems that 
had been mentioned previously. In terms of the auctioning process, a vast majority of 
Islamic pawnshop customers (92.3%) received a surplus from the auctioning process 
compared to only 7.7% from conventional pawnshop customers. In contrast, a large 
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percentage of respondents who did not receive any surplus of the sale of the item 
came from conventional pawnshops. A majority of the respondents claimed that they 
did not know that could claim the surplus (See Appendix 8A). 
8.2.7 Complaining and Compensating Processes 
Table 8.9 reports the problems that respondents faced in dealing with their preferred 
pawnshops and the process of complaining. Most of the items listed for the types of 
problems were adopted from Adnan (2004) who considered those factors as the 
weaknesses of conventional pawnshops in Malaysia. Of 311 respondents, only 23 of 
the respondents experienced problems with pawnbrokers. From the total of 23 
respondents who faced problem, almost 74.0% of the respondents were dealing with 
conventional pawnshops and the remaining 26.0% dealt with Islamic pawnshops. It is 
reported that „pawner do not receive any notice from the pawnbroker‟ (18.9%) as the 
main problem faced by the pawner in conventional pawnshops, followed by 
„decreasing value of the collateral‟ (16.2%), „low collateral value‟ (13.5%), „higher 
interest rate‟ (13.5%), and „inappropriate use of term on the pawn ticket‟ (13.5%). 
„Pawnbroker charge for replacement of lost ticket‟ (10.8%), „pawnbroker do not 
return any surplus from the auction‟ (10.8%), and „collateral lost in the hand of 
pawnbroker‟ (2.7%) constituted the least problems to the pawner. For Islamic 
pawnshop customers, most of them complained that „pawners do not receive any 
notice from the pawnbroker‟ (42.9%), followed by „collateral lost in the hand of 
pawnbroker‟ (28.6%), „pawnbroker do not returned any surplus from the auction‟ 
(14.3%), and „pawnbroker charge for replacement of lost ticket‟ (14.3%).  
Table 8.9: Process of Complaining and Compensating 
 Conventional  Ar-rahn  
1. Ever experienced problem? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
17 (13.1%) 
113 (86.9%) 
 
6 (3.3%) 
175 (96.7%) 
2. Nature of the problem  
(Respondents can state more than one statement):  
 Decreasing value of the collateral. 
 Low collateral value. 
 Higher interest/ fee charge. 
 Pawnbroker charge for a replacement of lost 
ticket. 
 Inappropriate use of term on the pawn ticket. 
 
 
6 (16.2%) 
5 (13.5) 
5 (13.5% 
4 (10.8%) 
 
5 (13.5%) 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
1 (14.3%) 
 
- 
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 Pawnbroker do not returned any surplus from 
the auction. 
 Pawners do not received any notice from the 
pawnbroker. 
 Collateral lost in the hand of pawnbroker. 
 
4 (10.8%) 
 
7 (18.9%) 
 
1 (2.7%) 
1 (14.3%) 
 
3 (42.9%) 
 
2 (28.6%) 
3. Make any complaint? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
10 (58.8%) 
7 (41.2%) 
 
6 (100.0%) 
- 
4. To whom make complaint? 
 Pawnbroker itself 
 FOMCA 
 
 
7 (70.0%) 
3 (30.0%) 
 
6 (100.0%) 
- 
5. Any action taken? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
6 (60.0%) 
4 (40.0%) 
 
5 (83.3%) 
1 (16.7%) 
6. Was the outcome in favour of you? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
4 (66.7%) 
2 (33.3%) 
 
4 (80.0%) 
1 (20.0%) 
 
In terms of making a formal complaint, all of the six Islamic pawnshop customers 
who faced problems made a complaint, whilst only 58.8% out of 17 respondents from 
conventional pawnshops did so. Apart from forwarding complaints to the 
pawnbrokers themselves, the conventional pawnshop customers also referred the 
complaint to FOMCA, whilst the Islamic pawnshop customers would prefer to 
forward any complaints to the pawnbrokers themselves. As a result, they revealed that 
the respective pawnbrokers or institutions had overcome the problems that had been 
raised, and most of the outcome was in favour of the respective pawner. For example, 
pawners who lost their collateral had been given a compensation of cash of 25% more 
than the amount of loan from the respective conventional pawnbrokers, whilst those 
customers who dealt with Islamic pawnshops had been given compensation with the 
value of the item minus the amount of the loan given and the accumulated 
safekeeping fee before the collateral was lost. 
8.2.8 Services Satisfaction 
As a conclusion of this section, respondents were asked to rate their level of 
satisfaction for all the procedures of pawn lending which consists of lending, 
redeeming, extending, auctioning, compensating, and complaining according to the 
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five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (absolutely not satisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). 
The results in table 8.10 do not indicate much difference between conventional and 
Islamic pawnshop customers for all processes involved in pawnshop lending. Both 
types of customers were satisfied with the „lending‟, „redeeming‟, and „extending‟ 
processes practiced by their selected pawnshop, whilst „auctioning‟, „compensating‟, 
and „complaining‟ processes were ranked as „do not know‟. Presumably, they 
reported the latter transaction as „do not know‟ due to the fact that they had never 
experienced the related processes.  
However, in terms of overall satisfaction, the results in table 8.10 show that the mean 
value of customers‟ satisfaction for all the processes involved in the Islamic 
pawnshops was slightly higher (3.69) than the mean value of satisfaction from the 
conventional pawnshops‟ customer (3.56). 
Table 8.10: Level of Satisfaction of all Processes  
 Conventional Ar-rahn 
Mean Implications Mean Implications 
Lending 4.22 S 4.54 VS 
Redeeming 4.15 S 4.25 S 
Extending 4.02 S 4.18 S 
Auctioning 2.94 DNK 3.12 DNK 
Compensating  2.99 DNK 3.04 DNK 
Complaining 3.02 DNK 3.04 DNK 
Overall satisfaction 3.56  3.69  
Note: (VS = Very satisfied; S = Satisfied; DNK = Do not know; NS = Not satisfied; 
ANS = Absolutely not satisfied)  
In further analysing the differences in the satisfaction level, the Mann-Whitney U-
Test was carried out to see whether both types of customers had the same mean score 
for each of the processes involved in pawn lending. Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated 
as below:  
 H0:  There is no significant difference among the customers of each 
pawnshops of the degree of satisfaction of all processes involved in 
pawnshop. 
Table 8.11 shows that the mean ranks of the degree of satisfaction experienced by 
each customer of all the processes involved in each type of pawnshops are not equal 
between the Islamic and conventional pawnshop customers.  
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Table 8.11: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of Customers’ 
Satisfaction of all the Processes Involved in Pawnshop  
 Pawnshop N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Lending Ar-rahn 181 174.11 31514.00 
-4.846 .000 
  Conventional 130 130.78 17002.00 
Redeeming Ar-rahn 181 163.23 29544.00 
-1.857 .063 
  Conventional 130 145.94 18972.00 
Extending Ar-rahn 181 163.59 29610.00 
-1.909 .056 
  Conventional 130 145.43 18906.00 
Auctioning Ar-rahn 181 163.40 29574.50 
-2.975 .003 
  Conventional 130 145.70 18941.50 
Compensating Ar-rahn 181 158.28 28649.00 
-2.216 .027 
  Conventional 130 152.82 19867.00 
Complaining Ar-rahn 181 156.43 28313.00 
-.257 .797 
  Conventional 130 155.41 20203.00 
Note: Mean values – Scoring: 1 = Absolutely not satisfied; 5 = Very satisfied  
Based on the result, the mean ranks of the degree of satisfaction of all processes (such 
as lending, redeeming, extending, auctioning, compensating, and complaining) 
undergone in pawnshops are higher for Islamic pawnshop customers compared to 
conventional pawnshop customers. For example, in terms of the lending process, the 
mean rank for those involved in the ar-rahn transaction is 174.11 as compared to 
130.78 for the conventional.  
It can be concluded that Islamic pawnshop customers are highly satisfied with all the 
processes (such as lending, redeeming, extending, auctioning, compensating, and 
complaining) held in Islamic pawnshops compared to the conventional.  
In addition, the z score shown in table 8.11 is higher than the tabulated z0.05 = 1.645 
for all items except for the „complaining‟ variable. On the other hand, the observed 2-
tailed probability for items such as „lending‟, „extending‟, „auctioning‟, and 
„compensating‟ is smaller than the 0.05 level of significance which implies that there 
is a significant difference in the degree of satisfaction between each type of pawnshop 
customers in all the processes mentioned above. Therefore, the null hypothesis of 
equal means ranked among customers of each pawnshops of the degree of satisfaction 
of all processes involved in pawnshop is rejected, except for two processes which are 
„redeeming‟ and „complaining‟. No significant differences existed between Islamic 
and conventional pawnshop customers in terms of „redeeming‟ and „complaining‟. 
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However, with a small degree of relaxation of the statistical rule, the „redeeming‟ 
category can be accepted as significant at 7% level of significance. 
8.2.9 Customers Perception towards the Role and the Impact of Pawnshops 
In this section, the customers‟ perception towards the role of pawnshops to society is 
investigated. Respondents were asked whether pawnbroking had helped them in a 
positive manner in making their socio-economic situation better. Table 8.12 depicts 
that a vast majority of them (98.4%) agreed with the statement while only a mere 
1.6% of respondents denied the pawnshops‟ positive role.  
Table 8.12: Pawnbroking Having Positive Impact  
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Positive Yes Count 128 178 306 
    % within Positive 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 98.5% 98.3% 98.4% 
  No Count 2 3 5 
    % within Positive 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Positive 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
     
Chi-square = 0.007; d.f = 1; Significance = 0.934 
Following the crosstabulation analysis, the results reveal that there is no statistically 
significant difference between both types of customers regarding their opinion about 
the role of pawnbroking. The computed chi-square value is lower than the critical chi-
square statistics (χ2 = 3.841) at 0.05 level of significance and 1 degree of freedom. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no relatedness between the customers‟ type 
of pawnshop and the positive role of pawnshops cannot be rejected due to having the 
significance value above the alpha level of 0.05.  
Subsequent to the above statement, the researchers listed eight statements in order to 
identify the positive impact brought from pawnshop lending as shown in table 8.13. 
The eight items are finance economic activity, overcome money shortage, finance 
consumption purpose, finance education expenses, improved standard of living, 
improved business performance, helped survived during recession and as safekeeping.  
 160 
The results in table 8.13 show that both types of customers ranked „overcome money 
shortage‟ as the highest priority followed by „finance consumption purpose‟, „finance 
economic activity‟, and „finance education expenses‟ as the second, third and forth 
priority of pawnshops‟ positive contributions. This result is expected since these are 
the main roles of pawnshops in providing loans to people in need, as was discussed in 
Chapter 3 and 4.  
Table 8.13: Contribution of Pawnshops’ Lending  
In what ways 
(Respondents can 
state more than one 
statement) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
 
% 
 Frequency (%) Rank Frequency (%) Rank 
Finance economic 
activity 
52 15.8 3 77 16.6 3 129 16.3 
Overcome money 
shortage 
108 32.9 1 136 29.4 1 244 30.8 
Finance 
consumption 
purpose 
76 23.2 2 83 17.9 2 159 20.1 
Finance education 
expenses 
46 14.0 4 67 14.5 4 113 14.3 
Improved standard 
of living 
12 3.7 6 27 5.8 7 39 4.9 
Improved business 
performance 
23 7.0 5 37 8.0 5 60 7.6 
Helped survived 
during recession 
10 3.0 7 31 6.7 6 41 5.2 
As a safekeeping 1 0.3 8 5 1.1 8 6 0.8 
In addition, respondents were also asked about their opinions regarding the 
pawnshops‟ role towards the following statements: solve financial exclusion, solve 
social problem, alternative to banks, conforms to my faith and when it is used for 
consumption and no redemption, it sustains financial difficulty.   
It is also essential to look into whether there is any significant difference in the 
perception of customers regarding the role of pawnshops in the community as 
mentioned above. The null hypothesis reads:  
 H0:  There is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of 
each customer regarding the positive role of pawnshop in the 
community. 
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To test this particular hypothesis, the Man-Whitney U-Test was again undertaken and 
the results are reproduced in table 8.14. 
As shown in the results of table 8.14, the mean ranks of all statements regarding the 
positive role of pawnshops in the community are not equal for both types of 
customers. The findings show that the mean ranks of roles such as „solving financial 
exclusion‟, „solving social problem‟, „alternative to banks‟, „conforming to my faith‟, 
and „when it is used for consumption and no redemption, it sustains financial 
difficulty‟ were higher for Islamic pawnbroking customers compared to conventional. 
It indicates that the Islamic pawnbroking customers very much agreed with the 
positive roles of pawnshop in the community. 
Table 8.14: Man-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of Customers 
Perception on the Positive Role of Pawnshop  
  
Pawnshop N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Helps solve financial  Ar-rahn 181 159.41 28852.50 
-.980 .327 
exclusion Conventional 130 151.26 19663.50 
Helps solve social  Ar-rahn 181 169.99 30768.00 
-3.420 .001 
Problem Conventional 130 136.52 17748.00 
An alternative to formal Ar-rahn 181 165.09 29881.50 
-2.736 .006 
institution  Conventional 130 143.34 18634.50 
Abstaining from riba Ar-rahn 181 220.43 39897.50 
-15.442 .000 
  Conventional 130 66.30 8618.50 
Used for consumption  Ar-rahn 181 177.58 32142.50 
-5.834 .000 
and no redemption  Conventional 130 125.95 16373.50 
Note: Mean values – Scoring: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree 
In addition, the z score for the sample in table 8.14 is higher than the tabulated z0.05 = 
1.645 for all of the pawnshops‟ roles being mentioned earlier. The observed 2-tailed 
probability for all of these variables is smaller than the 0.05 level of significance 
which implies that there is a significant difference between both types of customers 
on these roles except for „helping to solve financial exclusion‟. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of 
each customer regarding the role of pawnshops to the community therefore can be 
rejected except for „helping to solve the financial exclusion‟ variable. Thus, it seems 
that the opinions on financial exclusion are close in both types of customers. 
 
 162 
Table 8.15: Overall Conclusion 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Better off Yes Count 73 171 244 
    % within Better off 29.9% 70.1% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 56.2% 94.5% 78.5% 
  No Count 57 10 67 
    % within Better off 85.1% 14.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 43.8% 5.5% 21.5% 
Total Count 130 181 311 
  % within Better off 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Chi-square = 65.735; d.f. = 1; Significance = 0.000 
Finally, the respondents were asked whether pawning their belongings to the 
pawnshops to obtain cash could result in a financially better off situation. Overall, 
table 8.15 shows that approximately more than two-third of the respondents (78.5%) 
agreed with the statement and the remaining (21.5%) disagreed with it. In addition, 
the table also shows that the Islamic pawnbroking customers very much agreed 
(70.1% out of 181 Islamic pawnbroking respondents as compared to 56.2% out of 130 
respondents from the conventional pawnshop) with the statement that after pawning 
their belongings, they were financially better-off. Based on the results from the open-
ended question, the remaining customers who disagreed with the statement argued 
that pawning would only help them financially better-off for a temporary period or 
under emergency circumstances but not for long-term period. Thus, the customers 
were in agreement in terms of the temporary positive impacts of pawnshoping; 
therefore, the long-run welfare impact remains an issue to be resolved. 
As can be seen table 8.15, this argument is also supported by the chi-square value of 
65.735 which is higher than the critical chi-square statistics (χ2 = 3.841) at 0.05 level 
of significance and 1 degree of freedom. The null-hypothesis of no relatedness 
between the type of pawnshop customers‟ preferred and pawning could lead to 
financially better-off results can be rejected, as the significance value is well below 
the alpha level of 0.05 and is therefore significant.   
Based on the horizontal frequencies, i.e. the breakdown of financially better off 
according to pawnshop type, it can be concluded that Islamic pawnshop customers 
felt that using the ar-rahn will lead them to financial better off, whilst conventional 
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pawnshop customers disagreed with the statement, indicating a particular difference 
between both types of pawnshop customers. 
8.3  PAWNBROKER’S PERCEPTION ON PAWNBROKING 
The previous section focused on the perceptions and opinions of the clients of 
conventional and Islamic pawnbrokers on various aspects of pawnbroking. The 
following section, however, aims at analyzing the data collected from the 
pawnbrokers in terms of the issues identified. 
8.3.1 Lending Process 
Table 8.16 reveals the differences of lending practices imposed in both types of 
pawnshops, which shows that conventional pawnshops accept a wide spectrum of 
items as collateral such as gold and branded watches as the most popular items, 
followed by grant (66.7%), electrical appliances (53.3%), silver (46.7%) and diamond 
which contribute to only 20.0%. On the other hand, Islamic pawnshops show that the 
acceptance of collateral is limited to gold (100.0%) and diamond (20.0%).  
Table 8.16: Process of Lending 
 Conventional (%) Ar-rahn (%) 
1. Acceptance of collateral (Respondents can state 
more than one): 
 Gold 
 Silver 
 Diamond 
 Grant 
 Electrical appliances 
 Branded watches 
 
 
 
100.0 
46.7 
20.0 
66.7 
53.3 
100.0 
 
 
100.0 
- 
20.0 
- 
- 
- 
2. Service charge: 
 No charge 
 Safekeeping fee 
 Interest rate of 2% 
 
 
- 
- 
100.0 
 
6.7 
93.3 
- 
3. Determinant of the fee/ interest charge: 
 Based on the amount of loan 
 Based on the value of collateral 
 
 
100.0 
- 
 
- 
100.0 
4. Financing margin (Percentage loan offered of 
collateral): 
 50 – 60% 
 61 – 70% 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
33.3 
46.7 
20.0 
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 71 – 80% 
 Depends on the customers‟ demand 
 
100.0 - 
5. Things to provide: 
 Collateral 
 Identification card 
 Purchasing receipt 
 
 
100.0 
40.0 
- 
 
100.0 
100.0 
53.3 
6. Person in charge of measurement (Respondents 
can state more than one): 
 Owner 
 Qualified staff 
 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
 
 
- 
100.0 
7. Method used to record customer profile: 
 Database in the computer 
 Pawnbrokers‟ sale book 
 
 
26.7 
73.3 
 
100.0 
- 
8. Details in receipt (Respondents can state more 
than one): 
 Pawner‟s name 
 Pawner‟s address 
 Type of collateral 
 Date of pawning 
 Total of loan 
 Identification card no. 
 Collateral value 
 Fee charge 
 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
6.7 
100.0 
100.0 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
 
9. Number of customer per day: 
 Less than 10  
 11 – 20 
 21 – 30  
 More than 30  
 
 
6.7 
13.3 
53.3 
26.7 
 
6.7 
20.0 
20.0 
53.3 
10. Length of loan approval: 
 Less than 10 minutes 
 10 – 20 minutes 
 
 
73.3 
26.7 
 
40.0 
60.0 
In terms of service charges, all of the conventional pawnbrokers report that they 
impose a 2% interest rate based on the amount of loan, which is prohibited in Islam. 
On the contrary, by definition, there is no element of interest in Islamic pawnbroking. 
Almost all of the responding Islamic pawnbrokers (93.3%) offer interest-free loans 
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with a minimum fee charged
64
 for the safekeeping of the pawning items based on the 
value of the collateral, whilst the remainder (6.7%) did not charge any fee. The only 
ar-rahn institution that did not charge any fees to the loan given is the MGIT which 
was the pioneer of Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia.  
In general, pawnshops will offer a financing margin which is lower than the value of 
the collateral. As shown in table 8.16, the loan offered by Islamic pawnbrokers fall in 
the range of 50% to up to 80% depending on the value of the collateral. Nearly half 
(46.7%) of Islamic pawnbrokers offer a percentage of loans between 61% and 70% 
from the collateral value, following one-third (33.3%) offered up to 50% to a 60% per 
transaction, while the remaining one-fifth (20.0%) offered a maximum financing of 
up to 71% to 80%. In contrast, all of the conventional pawnbrokers offer instant cash 
depending on customers‟ demand.  
In terms of the procedure of lending, both types of pawnshops require customers to 
bring identification cards, to ensure that they are 18 years old and above, along with 
their collateral. In addition to collateral and an identification card, a slim majority of 
the Islamic pawnbrokers (53.3%) require their customers to show the purchasing 
receipt of their collateral as an evidence of possession.  
Table 8.16 also shows that the owner, or a qualified staff member of the conventional 
pawnshop, will be in charge of measuring the value of the collateral. As for Islamic 
pawnshops, the measurement of collateral value will be done by a qualified staff 
member employed by each institution.  
As for recording customer profile purposes, as can be seen in table 8.16, more than 
two-thirds (73.3%) of conventional pawnbrokers are still using traditional methods of 
recording such as the pawnbrokers‟ sale book, whilst the remaining 26.7% are more 
modernized by entering the customers‟ profile in the computer database.  
Generally, after a loan has been approved, a pawnbroker will produce a receipt as an 
evidence of pawning a transaction. As was reported in table 8.16, some of the items 
listed in the receipt are similar for both types of pawnshops such as the pawner‟s 
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 The schedule of safekeeping fee for various Islamic pawnbroking institutions has been discussed in 
Chapter 5. In comparison to conventional pawnshops, the fee charge is relatively very low with only 1 
percent from the total loan given per month.    
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name, address, type of collateral, date of pawning and the total of the loan. 
Additionally, all Islamic pawnbrokers list more details in the receipt, such as 
identification card number, the collateral value, and the safekeeping fee charge.    
Table 8.16 also shows the total average of customers that attend each of the 
corresponding pawnshops regardless of their intention. On average, a slim majority 
(53.3%) of conventional pawnshops receive customers of around 21 to 30 people per 
day, followed by 26.7% of them receiving more than 30 customers, 13.3% with 
customers between 11 and 20 people, while the remaining 6.7% with less than 10 
customers a day. On the other hand, of 15 respondents of the Islamic pawnbrokers, 
more than half of them (53.3%) received customers of more than 30 people a day, 
followed by 40.0% between the range of 11 to 30 people, while the remaining 6.7% 
with less than 10 customers per day. Specifically, those pawnbrokers dealing with 
many transactions per day were from the central and northern east regions (See 
Appendix 7B). This scenario is predictably due to the higher cost of living in the 
central region such as Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, and the high demand of pawn 
lending from customers in the northern east region, such as Terengganu and Kelantan, 
to obtain instant cash to finance their businesses. 
The result, as depicted in table 8.16, also show that 11 out of 15 transactions in 
conventional pawnshops can be settled in less than 10 minutes, whilst the remaining 
26.6% of them finish between 10 and 20 minutes. Meanwhile, more than half (60.0%) 
of the Islamic pawnbrokers experience lengths of 10 to 20 minutes for the loan 
approval process, while the remaining 40.0% stated that they can settle the process in 
less than 10 minutes.    
8.3.2 Redeeming, Extending, Auctioning, Complaining and Compensating 
Processes 
The findings in table 8.17 revealed the differences in redeeming, extending, 
auctioning, complaining, and compensating processes imposed on both types of 
pawnshops. As shown in table 8.17, both types of pawnbroking are similar with 
regards the person who can redeem the collateral. Both pawnbrokers agreed that the 
owner of the collateral and the person who has the pawn receipt are the ones entitled 
 167 
to redeem their belongings. In addition, Islamic pawnbrokers also allow a person who 
has a representative letter from the real borrower to redeem the item.  
In terms of the period of redemption, the majority of pawnbrokers, regardless of the 
type of pawnshop, offered six months and above for a period of redemption. Only a 
small percentage (20.0%) of conventional pawnbrokers and 6.7% of the Islamic 
pawnbrokers offered three months or less, as depicted in table 8.17. According to 
Chan and Owyong (2007), this is one of the advantages of using pawnshops, which is 
their capability of giving a flexible repayment period compared to their counterparts 
such as banks and other mainstream lending institutions which tend to fix their 
repayment schedules. 
Normally, the pawnbrokers will grant an extension period if the customers fail to 
redeem their belonging within six months. The result in table 8.17 reveals that more 
than two-thirds (73.3%) of conventional pawnbrokers were willing to offer less than 3 
months of extension to their customers. Nearly half of them (46.7%) endorsed a 
notice of reminder to the customers about their loan expiration, and the others did not 
apply. Unlike conventional pawnbrokers, all of the Islamic pawnbrokers send a notice 
of reminder of the expiration period to the customer and a majority of Islamic 
pawnbrokers (80.0%) tend to grant more than 6 months as an extension period with a 
notice sent earlier if the customers want to postpone their settlement, as long as they 
can settle the outstanding safekeeping fee.    
The responding pawnbrokers were also asked about the percentage of collateral that 
was unredeemed in their pawnshops. Almost half of conventional pawnbrokers 
(46.7%) had a range of 5% to 10% of collateral that was left unredeemed, following 
one-third (33.3%) with the range of 11% to 15% and the remaining one-fifth with 
16% to 20.0%. On the other hand, a majority of Islamic pawnbrokers (86.7%) had a 
range of 5% to 10% unredeemed collateral and only small percentage of them 
(13.3%) held less than 5%.   
Despite the amount of unredeemed collaterals that were quite high (5% to 20% from 
the total amount of loan given), conventional pawnbrokers can still survive from this 
loan forfeit by putting the collateral into auction, selling the forfeited collateral at their 
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pawnshops or by melting the gold
65
. Table 8.17 shows that the second and third 
methods of disposal were more preferable to the conventional pawnbrokers than 
auctioning off the pledges. These two options are not contravened by the Pawnbrokers 
Act 1972, Section 23(1) (a) provided that the total amount of loan given to the 
customer did not exceed RM200. However, if the loan given is exceeding RM200, the 
pawnbroker is obliged to dispose of the unclaimed pledges by auction conducted by a 
licensed auctioneer. Presumably in this research, the amount of loan given was not 
exceeding RM200, which would lead to the undeliverance of the notice to the 
customer and no auction need to be conducted by the conventional pawnbrokers. 
Table 8.17: Process of Redeeming, Extending, Auctioning, Complaining and 
Compensating 
 Conventional 
(%) 
Ar-rahn 
(%) 
1. Person who can redeemed  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Owner 
 Person with pawn ticket 
 Person with has a representative letter 
 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
- 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
2. Period of redemption  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 3 months or less 
 6 months and above 
 
 
 
20.0 
100.0 
 
 
6.7 
93.3 
3. Extension period: 
 Less than 3 months 
 More than 3 months 
 
 
73.3 
26.7 
 
20.0 
80.0 
4. Notice about expiration period: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
46.7 
53.3 
 
100.0 
- 
 
5. Percentage of collateral not redeemed: 
 Less than 5% 
 5 – 10% 
 11 – 15% 
 
- 
46.7 
33.3 
 
13.3 
86.7 
- 
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 From the pawnbroker‟s survey, it shows that the conventional pawnbrokers not only accept gold as 
collateral but other items as well, such as branded watches, electrical appliances, grant, silver, and 
diamond. Presumably, the pawner did not want to redeem their belonging because they expect the price 
of the collateral (such as electrical appliances, watch, vehicle, etc.) will drop which led to the debt 
owed greater than the value of the collateral. As discussed in Chapter 2, this scenario can be considered 
as „strategic default‟ where the borrowers decide to stop making payments on loan although they have 
the ability to pay the debt because they believe that it is in their financial interest. 
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 16 – 20% 
 
20.0 - 
6. Action taken towards unredeemed collateral: 
 Auctioned collateral 
 Sells collateral at pawnshop 
 Melting the gold 
 
 
- 
93.3 
6.7 
 
100.0 
- 
- 
7. Notice about auctioning: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
- 
100.0 
 
100.0 
- 
8. Surplus return after auctioned: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
- 
- 
 
100.0 
- 
9. If no claim for the surplus: 
 Surplus will be transferred to Baitulmal 
 Surplus will be transferred to the company‟s account 
 
 
- 
- 
 
100.0 
- 
10. Ever received complaint from customer? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
- 
100 
 
6.7 
93.3 
11. Nature of the problem  
(Respondents can state more than one statement):  
 Decreasing value of the collateral. 
 Low collateral value. 
 Higher interest/ fee charge. 
 Pawnbroker charge for a replacement of lost ticket. 
 Inappropriate use of term on the pawn ticket. 
 Pawnbroker do not returned any surplus from the auction. 
 Pawner do not received any notice from the  pawnbroker. 
 Collateral lost in the hand of pawnbroker. 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
100 
12. Collateral damaged/ stolen: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
- 
100 
 
6.7 
93.3 
 
13. Compensation given: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
- 
- 
 
100 
- 
14. The value of compensation: 
 25% more than the amount of loan. 
 Value of the item minus the amount of loan given and 
accumulated fee/interest charge before the collateral lost. 
 Depends on the pawnbroker‟s judgement.  
 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
100 
 
- 
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Unlike conventional pawnbrokers, all Islamic pawnbrokers dispose of unclaimed 
pledges by auction. According to table 8.17, before putting the items into auction, all 
the Islamic pawnbrokers will send a notice informing the customers about the 
auctioning process, whereas conventional pawnbrokers do not send any reminder to 
their customers. They will only auction off the unredeemed collateral after getting no 
response from customers. According to the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, Section 25(1), 
pawnbrokers are obliged to return any surplus from the sale of the collateral over the 
amount owed to the pawnbroker, including accumulated deposit fees and any costs 
related to the sale. In the event of no claim on the surplus, the Islamic pawnbrokers 
will transfer the entire surplus into the Baitulmal account in case the owner or their 
relatives makes a claim in the future.  
In terms of the complaining and compensation process, as the table in 8.17 shows, 
there is one institution of Islamic pawnbroking which receive complaints from the 
customers regarding the issue of collateral lost or being robbed in its premises which 
was from the PKB branch. Due to the incident, the state government gives 
compensation to all customers involved with a total amount of the value of the item 
minus the amount of loan given and the accumulated safekeeping fee before the 
collateral was lost. 
8.3.3 Determinants of Pawnshop Selection 
The next issue that arises in this study is related to the factors that affect the 
customer‟s choice of pawnshops from the pawnbrokers‟ point of view. Similar to the 
customers questionnaire, the items consist of the underlying principle/interest free 
loan, speed in loan approval, lower interest/ fee rate, acceptance of various 
collateral, location being near home/office, confidentiality, convenient park and 
interior comfort, knowledgeable and competence staff, possibility of redemption, 
security of the collateral guaranteed, process is more transparent, image of the 
pawnshop and loyalty. The respondents were asked to rank these items according to 
the scale ranking from 1 = the most important reason to 13 = the least important 
factor.  
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In relation to this, the Mann-Whitney U-Test was carried out in order to compare the 
mean ranks of the pawnbrokers opinion on the determinants of the nature of 
pawnshops. Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated as below: 
 H0:  There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers point of 
view regarding the customers‟ determinants of pawnshop selection. 
Let u1 and u2 be the mean ranks οf customers‟ determinants of pawnshop selection 
from the pawnbrokers point of view. Thus; 
H0: u1 = u2 
H1: u1 ≠ u2 
As shown in table 8.18, the mean ranks of all factors are not equal for both types of 
pawnbrokers. The findings show that the mean ranks for variables such as „underlying 
principle/interest free loan‟, „lower fee rate‟, „convenient car park and interior 
comfort‟, „possibility of redemption‟, „security of the collateral guaranteed‟, „process 
is more transparent‟, and „image of the pawnshop‟ were lower for Islamic 
pawnbrokers compared to conventional pawnbrokers. It indicates that Islamic 
pawnbrokers believe that the customers were more influenced by all the factors stated 
above in choosing their preferred pawnshops. 
On the other hand, the mean ranks of items such as „speed in loan approval‟, 
„acceptance of various collateral‟, „location being near home/office‟, „confidentiality‟, 
„knowledgeable and competence staff‟, and „loyalty‟ were lower for conventional 
pawnbrokers compared to Islamic pawnbrokers, which denotes that the conventional 
pawnbrokers deem that customers were more influenced by all these factors in 
choosing their preferred pawnshop.  
In further analysis, the z score for the sample in table 8.18 is higher than the tabulated 
z0.05 = 1.645 for some factors that influenced the customers‟ selection of pawnshops 
from the pawnbrokers‟ perspectives such as „underlying principle/interest free loan‟, 
„speed in loan approval‟, „acceptance of various collateral‟, „knowledgeable and 
competence staff‟, „possibility of redemption‟, and „process is more transparent‟. In 
addition, the observed 2-tailed probability for these factors is smaller than the 0.05 
level of significance which implies that there is a significant difference between both 
types of pawnbrokers on these factors. Therefore, the null hypothesis of equal mean 
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rank οf factors affecting the choice of pawnshop through the type of pawnbrokers‟ 
perspective is therefore rejected; implying that there is a significant differences. 
Table 8.18: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of the 
Pawnbrokers Opinion in the Customers’ Determinants of Pawnshop Selection 
  Pawnshop N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Interest free loan Conventional 15 23.00 345.00 
-5.385 .000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 8.00 120.00 
Speed loan approval Conventional 15 8.00 120.00 
-4.934 .000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 23.00 345.00 
Lower fee/ interest rate Conventional 15 20.30 304.50 
-3.231 .001 
  Ar-Rahn 15 10.70 160.50 
Acceptance of various Conventional 15 8.00 120.00 
-5.008 .000 
collateral Ar-Rahn 15 23.00 345.00 
Location near Conventional 15 12.33 185.00 
-2.088 .037 
  Ar-Rahn 15 18.67 280.00 
Confidentiality Conventional 15 14.47 217.00 
-.690 .490 
  Ar-Rahn 15 16.53 248.00 
Convenient park and  Conventional 15 19.10 286.50 
-2.436 .015 
interior comfort Ar-Rahn 15 11.90 178.50 
Knowledgeable staff Conventional 15 10.97 164.50 
-2.951 .003 
  Ar-Rahn 15 20.03 300.50 
Possibility of  Conventional 15 23.00 345.00 
-5.099 .000 
redemption Ar-Rahn 15 8.00 120.00 
Security of collateral Conventional 15 18.83 282.50 
-2.158 .031 
  Ar-Rahn 15 12.17 182.50 
Process transparency Conventional 15 23.00 345.00 
-4.770 .000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 8.00 120.00 
Image Conventional 15 22.00 330.00 
-4.709 .000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 9.00 135.00 
Loyalty Conventional 15 8.00 120.00 
-4.891 .000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 23.00 345.00 
Note: Mean values – Scoring 1 = The most important factor; 13 = The least important 
factor 
On the contrary, table 8.18 also shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both types of pawnbrokers on other factors such as „lower 
interest/fee rate‟, „location being near home/office‟, „confidentiality‟, „convenient car 
park and interior comfort‟, „security of the collateral guaranteed‟, „image of the 
pawnshop‟, and „loyalty‟ due to the computed z score for these factors that is lower 
than the tabulated z0.05 = 1.645. In addition, the observed 2-tailed probability for these 
factors is higher than the 0.05 level of significance, which implies that there is no 
significant difference among the pawnbrokers‟ point of view in relation to these 
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variables affecting the customers‟ pawnshop selection. Hence, the null hypothesis is 
therefore accepted.  
Ultimately, based on the mean ranks of each pawnshop type, it can be inferred that, 
according to the perceptions of the Islamic pawnbrokers, factors such as „underlying 
principle/interest free loan‟, „process is more transparent‟, and „possibility of 
redemption‟ were considered as the most important factors in determining customers‟ 
pawnshop selection, followed by the „image of the pawnshop‟, „lower fee rate‟, 
„convenient car park and interior comfort‟, „security of the collateral guaranteed‟, 
„confidentiality‟, and „location being near to home/office‟. Other remaining factors 
such as „knowledgeable and competence staff‟, „speed in loan approval‟, „loyalty‟, 
and „acceptance of various collateral‟ were ranked by the Islamic pawnbrokers as the 
least important factors determining customers‟ pawnshop selection. 
On the other hand, conventional pawnbrokers ranked „speed loan approval‟, 
„acceptance of various collateral‟, and „loyalty‟ as the most important factors in 
determining conventional customer‟s pawnshop selection, followed by 
„knowledgeable and competence of staff‟, „location being near home/office‟, and 
„confidentiality‟. Other remaining factors such as „security of the collateral 
guaranteed‟, „convenient car park and interior comfort‟, „lower interest rate‟, „image 
of the pawnshop‟, „process is more transparent‟, „possibility of redemption‟, and 
„underlying principle/interest free loan‟ were ranked by the conventional pawnbrokers 
as the least important factors affecting customers‟ pawnshop selection. 
8.3.4 Frequencies of Customers Involved in Pawn Lending Process 
The responding pawnbrokers were also asked to rate the frequencies of customers 
involved in all pawn lending process which consisted of lending, redeeming, 
extending, auctioning, compensating and complaining according to the Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (very often). The results in table 8.19 do not present much 
of a difference between the conventional and Islamic pawnbrokers‟ responses for all 
processes involved in pawnshop lending. The results shows that both types of 
pawnshops were either experienced a very often or quite often transactions on the 
„lending‟, „redeeming‟, and „extending‟ processes, whilst rarely experiencing the 
„auctioning‟ process. Interestingly, as stated by the participants from pawnshops, both 
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types of the pawnshops have never experienced „compensating‟ and „complaining‟ 
from their customers in the last 12 months.  
Table 8.19: Frequencies of Customers Involved in Pawn Lending Processes  
 Conventional Ar-rahn 
Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Lending 4.00 VO 4.00 VO 
Redeeming 3.07 QO 3.47 QO 
Extending 3.47 QO 3.73 VO 
Auctioning 1.60 R 1.93 R 
Compensating  1.00 N 1.27 N 
Complaining 1.13 N 1.13 N 
Overall satisfaction 2.38  2.59  
Note: (VO = Very often; QO = Quite often; R = Rarely; N = Never)  
However, in terms of overall frequency, the results in table 8.19 show that the mean 
value for all the categories of processes in the Islamic pawnbrokers is slightly higher 
(2.59) than the mean value for their counterpart (2.38). In other words, considering 
that all these categories coming together constitute satisfaction from the services 
offered by the pawnshops, the results in table 8.19 depicts that according to the 
pawnshop representatives‟ perceptions, Islamic pawnshop customers are more 
satisfied compared to conventional ones. 
To substantiate this, the Mann-Whitney U-Test was carried out to see whether both 
types of pawnbrokers have the same mean scores for each of the processes involved in 
pawn lending. Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated as below:  
H0:  There is no significant difference among the pawnbrokers regarding 
the frequency of customers involved in each of the pawn lending 
processes. 
The findings in table 8.20 show that the mean ranks of frequency customers involved 
in following processes such as „redeeming‟, „extending‟, „auctioning‟, and 
„compensating‟ were not equal between Islamic and conventional pawnbrokers. Based 
on the result, the mean ranks for those processes were higher for Islamic pawnbrokers 
compared to conventional pawnbrokers. It can be indicated that customers were more 
frequently dealing with the Islamic pawnbrokers rather than the conventional 
pawnbrokers in the categories of processes mentioned above. As for the „lending‟ and 
„complaining‟ processes, both pawnbrokers showed no difference in the mean ranks 
of how frequent customers were involved in these processes at their pawnshops.  
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Table 8.20: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Mean Ranks of Customers 
Involved in Pawn Lending Processes  
  Pawnshop N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Lending Conventional 15 15.50 232.50 
.000 1.000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 15.50 232.50 
Redeeming Conventional 15 12.73 191.00 
-2.091 .036 
  Ar-Rahn 15 18.27 274.00 
Extending Conventional 15 13.50 202.50 
-1.466 .143 
  Ar-Rahn 15 17.50 262.50 
Auctioning Conventional 15 12.97 194.50 
-1.972 .049 
  Ar-Rahn 15 18.03 270.50 
Compensating Conventional 15 13.50 202.50 
-2.112 .035 
  Ar-Rahn 15 17.50 262.50 
Complaining Conventional 15 15.50 232.50 
.000 1.000 
  Ar-Rahn 15 15.50 232.50 
Note: Mean Value – Scoring 1 = Never; 5 = Always  
Furthermore, as shown in table 8.20, the tabulated z0.05 = 1.645 for half of the items 
such as „redeeming‟, „auctioning‟, and „compensating‟ shows a significant difference 
in terms of the frequencies of customers involved between each type of pawnshops. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of equal mean ranks among the pawnbrokers regarding 
the frequency of customers involved in each of the pawn lending processes except 
„lending‟, „extending‟, and „complaining‟ can be rejected.  
8.3.5 The Challenge of Pawnbroking Business 
This research also enquired the challenges faced by the pawning business by asking 
the opinions of the respondents on these issues. Table 8.21 discusses the challenges 
that the pawnbrokers are facing in running their business in terms of regulation, 
common problem in pawnbroking and competition. The results reveal that both types 
of pawnbrokers are regulated under the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 with an exceptional 
under Section 17(1) for Islamic pawnbroking which allows licensed pawnbrokers to 
take profit on pawn lending. As a result, a majority of the corresponding Islamic 
pawnbrokers (86.7%) were unsatisfied with the current regulative environment which 
stems from the ambiguousness of the Act, not having specific regulations for Islamic 
pawnbroking, and facing very stringent license granting by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government. In addition, as the results show, both pawnbrokers are also 
governed by the Weight and Measurement Act 1972 to verify their measurement 
tools. 
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As was discussed in Chapter 5, there are three institutions that are exempted from the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972, namely all banks operating in Malaysia, AgroBank, and 
cooperative societies. Cooperatives and franchise cooperatives are governed by the 
Cooperatives Societies Act 1993, and Franchise Act 1998 alongside the ar-rahn 
Manual Guideline which was developed differently by each institution. 
In terms of auditing, as the results indicate, all Islamic pawnbrokers follow a formal 
auditing procedure which is conducted mostly by internal auditors (80%) and one-
fifth by auditors from the state government. However, the results show that almost 
none of the conventional pawnbrokers follow formal auditing in their business. 
Normally, the operation of conventional pawnshops is handled by the owner himself 
with support from a few staff that can be categorized as loyal and reliable.   
Table 8.21: The Challenge of Pawnbroking Business 
 Conventional 
(%) 
Ar-rahn 
(%) 
1. Regulation related to pawnbroking  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
 Cooperatives Societies Act 1993 
 Weight and Measurement Act 1972 
 Franchise Act 1998 
 Ar-rahn Manual Guideline 
 
 
 
100.0 
- 
53.3 
- 
- 
 
 
100.0 
40.0 
100.0 
13.3 
100.0 
2. Happy with current regulative environment: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
100.0 
- 
 
13.3 
86.7 
3. Reasons of unhappy  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Ambiguous regulation 
 No specific regulation 
 Stringent license granted 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
4. Follow formal auditing: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
6.7 
93.3 
 
100.0 
- 
5. Audit institution involved: 
 Internal auditor 
 Auditor from state government 
 
 
 
 
100.0 
- 
 
80.0 
20.0 
 177 
6. Business challenge  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Loan default 
 Customer pawn stolen good 
 Difficulty in ascertaining the market value of the item 
 Collateral being stolen/ damage 
 Competition from other pawnshops 
 Unreachable address 
 
 
86.7 
33.3 
60.0 
- 
100.0 
- 
 
 
46.7 
6.7 
20.0 
6.7 
100.0 
6.7 
 
7. Action to be taken if customer mislead  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Report to the police 
 Stringent in loan approval 
 Blacklist the customer 
 
 
 
53.3 
100.0 
- 
 
 
60.0 
100.0 
100.0 
8. Accuracy of measurement  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Send their staff training 
 Use the instrument verified by Inspector 
 
 
 
100.0 
53.3 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
 
9. Competition  
(Respondents can state more than one): 
 Ar-rahn pawnshops 
 Conventional pawnshops 
 Banks 
 Cooperatives 
 Microcredit institution 
 Moneylender 
 Middleman 
 
 
 
66.7 
100.0 
6.7 
26.7 
6.7 
73.3 
13.3 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
53.3 
100.0 
- 
46.7 
26.7 
In terms of business challenges, the most common problem faced by both 
pawnbrokers was the competition from other financial providers. In addition, the 
second challenge faced by both types of pawnbrokers was loan default especially, 
with conventional pawnbrokers (86.7%). The third common problem faced by both 
pawnbrokers is the difficulty in ascertaining the market value of collateral items. 
Other than these challenges mentioned above, conventional pawnbrokers (33.3%) 
faced the tendency of customers pawning stolen goods at their pawnshops, as 
compared to the Islamic pawnbrokers (6.7%). Furthermore, a mere 6.7% of Islamic 
pawnbrokers reported that they had problems with the customers‟ collateral being 
stolen or damaged and having problems in reaching the customers‟ address, which 
lead to information about the expiration of the loan period or the auctioning process 
not reaching the customers. 
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As depicted in table 8.21, in order to have an accurate measurement on the item 
pledge, both pawnbrokers send their staff for training and use the measuring 
instrument which is verified by the Inspector.  
In terms of customers‟ who mislead, all conventional pawnbrokers have a stringent 
loan approval process and, as the results indicate, half of them will report the case to 
the police. As for the Islamic pawnbrokers, all of them follow stringent loan approval 
processes, blacklist the customer, and more than half of them (60.0%) report it to the 
police when the case emerges.  
Finally, table 8.21 also reveals the perceptions of the participants on the competition 
faced by pawnshop in small lending business. All of the conventional pawnbrokers 
stated that they were competing with the other conventional pawnshops, followed 
73.3% by money lender (or known as „ah-long‟ in Malaysia), 66.7% by the ar-rahn 
pawnshops, 26.7% by cooperatives, 13.3% by the middleman (informal lender who 
buy and sell gold in the Northeast of Peninsular Malaysia), and 6.7% by banks and 
microcredit institutions respectively. On the other hand, all of the Islamic 
pawnbrokers stated that they were threatened by other ar-rahn pawnshops, 
conventional pawnshops, and cooperatives, followed by banks and moneylender, but 
also by middleman who were found to be the least competitors for Islamic 
pawnbrokers. 
8.3.6 Performance of Pawnshops Business in Economic Downturn 
This research also attempted to reveal the perceptions of the participants from the 
pawnshops on the impact of economic downturn on the performance of pawnshops. 
The findings in table 8.22 reveal that all the pawnbrokers agree with the impact of 
economic downturn on the pawnbroking business.  
Table 8.22: Pawnshops’ Performance in Economic Downturn 
 Conventional (%) Ar-rahn (%) 
Impact in the economic downturn: 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
100.0 
- 
 
100.0 
- 
In order to identify the impact of economic slowdown on the pawnbroking business, 
this research provided six possible impact areas to the participants to choose from, the 
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results of which are shown in table 8.23. The six impacts are increased number of 
loan, increased repayment rate, increased profit, alternative to bank, and 
microbalancing the total economy.
66
 
The results in table 8.23 clearly indicate that all of the responding pawnbrokers of 
each pawnshop are either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that their 
pawnshops experience an increase in the number of loans during economic 
downturns.  
As the results in table 8.23 show, although the demand for the loan from both 
pawnshops has increased, there was mixed response from both pawnshops in terms of 
the repayment rate during the economic downturn. Despite the increasing demand for 
pawnshops‟ loans in economic downturn, nearly half (46.7%) of the conventional 
pawnbrokers faced a problem with the repayment rate, whilst the remaining 53.3% of 
them agreed with the statement. In terms of regional distribution, it can be concluded 
that the pawnbrokers from the central and southern regions were adversely affected in 
gaining profit during the economic downturn. Considering that findings from the 
previous chapter (Chapter 7) showed that the majority of the customers of 
conventional pawnshops in these two regions work as government servants and staff 
in private sectors (Selangor/Kuala Lumpur), whilst in Johor, most of the participants 
are full-time housewives. With the economic contraction, individual pawners have 
difficulty in paying back their loan within the agreed period of time. 
In contrast, all of the Islamic pawnbrokers experienced an increase in the rate of 
repayment from the customers during the same economic downturn. Since the 
majority of the respondents of Islamic pawnbroking were from Kelantan and 
Terengganu, a repayment of loans was not an issue because most of their customers 
work as government servants or small businessmen (as described in Chapter 7). 
Presumably, such customers obtained instant cash from pawnshops to finance 
                                                          
66
 “Microbalancing the total economy: in the globalised sophisticated financial and money markets, the 
small economic units and individual financial needs are not paid the due attention. As the main focus of 
the economies are the large financial institutions and mostly the high-network and the middle class 
individuals. The lower strata of the societies are excluded in the financial system not only in terms of 
borrowing but also in terms of investing. Therefore, small financial institutions such as pawnbroking 
and microfinancing institutions aims at filling such a gap so that a stable society can be possible, hence 
they provide microbalancing role to the economy”. (The definition of „microbalancing the total 
economy‟ is obtained from an interview with Dr. Asutay in 20th January, 2009).  
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emergency expenses needed prior to the next payday or as rolling capital in the case 
of entrepreneurs. 
As for the impact of the economic downturn towards the pawnbroking business‟ 
profit, different patterns emerged as a response between the conventional and Islamic 
pawnbrokers. As the results show, approximately, more than two-thirds (73.3%) of 
the conventional pawnbrokers disagreed with this statement, followed by more than 
one-fifth (26.7%) of them agreeing with it. Although they experienced bulking 
pledges in their storage, half of them had a problem with an increasing number of loan 
defaults, and yet they were facing difficulty in selling some items (other than gold). 
On the contrary, the majority of Islamic pawnbrokers (80.0%) agreed with the 
statement, whilst one-fifth (20.0%) of them disagreed with it. The Islamic 
pawnbrokers who did not gain profit claimed that they were still new in business and 
faced competition from other pawnbrokers (the YaPEIM cooperatives branches) and 
the others (MGIT and PKB) have expressed social obligation to the borrowers rather 
than profit maximization. 
Table 8.23 also shows that both types of pawnbrokers either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement of pawnbroking as an alternative to banks during the economic 
downturn. With the economic downturn, mainstream financial institutions such as 
banks will be more selective in giving loans to customers. The „unfortunate‟ 
customers who are unable to meet the requirement will definitely go to pawnshops to 
obtain small cash loans for a short term with least documentation and procedure. 
Although, Caskey (1994: 115) claimed that the negative perception of pawnbroking 
business will still remain even if there is an effort to change the image. Table 8.23 
reveals that all of the Islamic pawnbrokers agreed that the establishment of the 
shari‟ah based pawnshops has improved the image of business, especially during the 
economic downturn. Similarly, conventional pawnbrokers either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 7, which 
show that customers from well-educated backgrounds and, middle and higher income 
customers seek assistance from pawnshops, although previously, these lenders served 
mainly for lower income groups. Thus, the economic downturn had an impact in 
changing their attitude and also helped to remove the negative stigma of the 
pawnbroking business. 
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  Table 8.23: Degree of Agreement on the Impact of Pawnbroking Business in Economic Downturn  
Degree of 
Agreement 
Value 
Increased 
number of loan 
(%) 
Increased 
repayment rate 
(%) 
Increased profit 
(%) 
Alternative to 
bank 
(%) 
Improve their 
image 
(%) 
Microbalancing 
the total economy 
(%) 
Con. Ar-rahn Con. Ar-rahn Con. Ar-rahn Con. Ar-rahn Con. Ar-rahn Con. Ar-rahn 
Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
1 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
46.7 
- 
- 
- 
13.3 
- 
40.0 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
13.3 
- 
- 
Cumulative (%)  - - 46.7 - 13.3 40.0 - - - - 13.3 - 
Agree 
Strongly agree 
4 
5 
66.7 
33.3 
13.3 
86.7 
53.3 
- 
100.0 
- 
86.7 
- 
60.0 
- 
93.3 
6.7 
33.3 
66.7 
66.7 
33.3 
- 
100.0 
53.3 
- 
26.7 
73.3 
Cumulative (%)  100.0 100.0 53.3 100.0 86.7 60.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 53.3 100.0 
Do not know 3 - - - - - - - - - - 33.3 - 
Mean value 
Standard deviation 
 4.33 
0.488 
4.87 
0.352 
3.07 
1.033 
4.00 
0.000 
3.73 
0.704 
3.20 
1.014 
4.07 
0.258 
4.67 
0.488 
4.33 
0.488 
5.00 
0.000 
3.40 
0.737 
4.73 
0.458 
Overall Mean Conventional = 3.822; Ar-rahn = 4.412 
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As the results show, there were different patterns of response between the conventional 
and Islamic pawnbrokers in the statement regarding pawnshops‟ role in microbalancing 
the total economy. Approximately, more than half (53.3%) of the conventional 
pawnbrokers agree with this statement, followed by one-third (33.3%) of them being 
undecided with it, while the remaining 13.3% disagreed with the statement. On the 
contrary, all of the responding Islamic pawnbrokers either strongly agree or agree with 
the statement. 
Overall, it can be concluded that Islamic pawnbrokers acknowledge the positive impact 
of the pawnbroking business during the economic downturn, as evidenced from each 
mean value of the listed impacts: the overall mean value is higher (4.412) than the 
conventional pawnshops (3.822).  
Furthermore, a statistical analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-Test was applied in order 
to find whether the respondents from both types of pawnbrokers had the same level of 
agreement in terms of the impact of pawnbroking business in the economic downturn. 
Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 H0:   There is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of  
   each pawnbroker regarding the impact of pawnbroking business in the  
   economic downturn. 
Table 8.24 shows that the mean ranks of agreement of each type of pawnbrokers towards 
the impact of the pawnbroking business in the economic downturn were not equal. It 
shows that the mean ranks of all the statements mentioned above are higher for Islamic 
pawnbrokers compared to the conventional. The result reveals that Islamic pawnbrokers 
very much agreed with the positive impacts of the pawnbroking business in the economic 
downturn, such as experiencing an increased number of loans, repayment rate, and profit, 
plus being an alternative to the banks, thus improving their image and microbalancing the 
total economy.  
Furthermore, table 8.24 also shows that the probability for all of the statements is smaller 
than the 0.05 level of significance, which implies that there is a significant difference 
between the levels of agreement of each type of pawnbroker regarding the impact of the 
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pawnbroking business in the economic downturn. Therefore, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. 
Table 8.24: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Level of Agreement of 
Pawnbrokers’ towards the Pawnbroking Business in Economic Downturn  
  Pawnshop N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Increased number of  Conventional 15 11.50 172.50 
-2.931 .003 
loan  Ar-Rahn 15 19.50 292.50 
Increased repayment  Conventional 15 12.00 180.00 
-2.971 .003 
 rate Ar-Rahn 15 19.00 285.00 
Increased profit Conventional 15 11.50 172.50 
-2.878 .004 
  Ar-Rahn 15 19.50 292.50 
Alternative to bank Conventional 15 11.00 165.00 
-3.352 .001 
  Ar-Rahn 15 20.00 300.00 
Improved their  Conventional 15 10.50 157.50 
-3.808 .000 
image  Ar-Rahn 15 20.50 307.50 
Microbalancing the  Conventional 15 9.07 136.00 
-4.260 .000 
total economy  Ar-Rahn 15 21.93 329.00 
Note: Mean value – Scoring: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree  
Additionally, respondents were asked whether they had managed to gain any profit for 
the last twelve months. Overall, the result in table 8.25 show that approximately more 
than two-thirds (86.7%) of conventional pawnbrokers did not make a profit for the last 
twelve months, whilst the remaining (13.3%) did not gain any profit. Similarly, more 
than half of the Islamic pawnbrokers (60.0%) experienced a positive profit, whilst 40.0% 
of them did not make any profit. 
Table 8.25: Pawnshops’ Gain Profit 
  
  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Conventional Ar-Rahn 
Profit? No Count 2 6 8 
    % within Profit? 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 13.3% 40.0% 26.7% 
  Yes Count 13 9 22 
    % within Profit? 59.1% 40.9% 100.0% 
    % within Pawnshop 86.7% 60.0% 73.3% 
Total Count 15 15 30 
  % within Profit? 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
  % within Pawnshop 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Following the questions, seven possible statements were provided for the respondents to 
locate what triggered the profit to the pawnbrokers. These are: increased number of loan, 
impact from the economic downturn, competitive pricing, increased of collateral price, 
increased of customers‟ repayment rate, acceptance of various collateral and a wide 
promotion. 
Table 8.26: The Reasons of Pawnbrokers Obtaining Profit  
List of Reasons 
(Respondents can state 
more than one reason) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Increased number of loan 13 100.0 9 100.0 22 100.0 
Impact from the economic 
downturn  
9 69.2 9 100.0 18 81.8 
Competitive pricing 13 100.0 9 100.0 22 100.0 
Increased of collateral 
price 
9 69.2 0 - 9 40.9 
Increased of customers‟ 
repayment rate 
7 53.8 9 100.0 16 72.7 
Acceptance of various 
collateral 
13 100.0 1 11.1 14 63.6 
A wide promotion 2 15.4 9 100.0 11 50.0 
The results in table 8.26 clearly indicate that all of the responding Islamic pawnbrokers 
agreed that the „increased number of loan‟, „impact from the economic downturn‟, 
„competitive pricing‟, „increased of customers‟ repayment rate‟, and „a wide promotion‟ 
are the factors contributing to the increased profit in the last twelve months. In addition, 
one of the Islamic pawnbrokers (YaPEIM) claimed that the introduction of acceptance of 
other collateral such as diamonds also contributed to the increase of profit for their 
business.  
Similarly, as shown in table 8.26, conventional pawnbrokers considered an „increased 
number of loan‟, „competitive pricing‟, and „acceptance of various collateral‟ as the push 
factors of gaining a profit for their business, followed by „impact from the economic 
downturn‟ and „increased of collateral price‟. Other remaining factors such as „increase 
of customers‟ repayment rate‟ and „a wide promotion‟ are ranked by the conventional 
pawnbrokers as the least important factors in contributing to business profit. Presumably, 
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conventional pawnbrokers did not have to promote their business to attract the customers 
as they had been established for so long as compared to their competitors. 
Those pawnbrokers who did not gain profit for the last twelve months provided several 
reasons for this, for which they were given nine possible reasons of not making profit to 
the pawnbrokers, as in table 8.27: increased in loan default, impact from the economic 
downturn, competition from other pawnbrokers, competition from other informal 
financial institution, the decreased on collateral price, social obligation rather than 
profit maximisation, limited of collateral acceptance, lack of promotion, and the business 
is still new. 
The results in table 8.27 reveals that the main reason for not making profit by all the 
conventional pawnbrokers was due to the increase of loan default, stiff competitiveness 
among pawnbrokers in the industry and other informal institutions, and the lack of 
promotion. Other than that, they also did not reject the fact that the economic downturn 
and the decreased market price of the collateral, other than gold, led to the decreased 
profit in that year. 
Table 8.27: The Reasons for Not Making Profit   
List of Reasons 
(Respondents can state 
more than one reason) 
Conventional Ar-rahn 
Total 
(N) 
Percentage 
(%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Increased of loan default 2 100.0 - - 2 25.0 
Economic downturn  1 50.0 - - 1 12.5 
Competition from other 
pawnbrokers  
2 100.0 6 100.0 8 100.0 
Competition from 
informal financing 
- - 2 33.3 2 25.0 
Decreased on the market 
price of the collateral 
1 50.0 - - 1 12.5 
Social obligation rather 
than profit maximisation 
- - 6 100.0 6 75.0 
Limited collateral 
acceptance 
- - 2 33.3 2 25.0 
Lack of promotion 2 100.0 - - 2 25.0 
Still new in business - - 3 50.0 3 37.5 
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As for Islamic pawnbrokers who did not gain profit in that year, as the results 
demonstrate, they were more focused towards the social obligation of the customers and 
not on profit maximisation as practiced by conventional pawnbrokers. In addition, the 
competition from other rivals in the pawning business was also among the possible 
reasons for not making profit by the Islamic pawnbrokers. Furthermore, the reason of 
being new in the pawning business also contributed to the failure in making profit in that 
year, followed by competition from other informal financial institutions and the limited 
acceptance of collateral by Islamic pawnbrokers. 
8.3.7 Pawnbrokers’ Perception towards the Role of Pawnshop 
Respondents were also asked about their opinions regarding the pawnshops‟ role through 
a number of statements: solve social problem, alternative to mainstream financial 
institution such as banks, conforms to the pawnbrokers faith of abstaining from riba, and 
when it is used for consumption and no redemption, it helps to sustain the business. 
The results in table 8.28 clearly indicate that all the responding pawnbrokers of each 
pawnshop type either agreed or strongly agreed with the role of pawnshop to solving the 
financial exclusion which was probably faced by the lower income groups who have 
constraints in accessing mainstream financial institutions, and therefore, it can be an 
alternative source of obtaining instant cash to financial institutions. 
Moreover, table 8.28 also reveals a similar pattern of response on the role of pawnshop as 
an alternative to the mainstream financial institution such as bank, for which all of the 
pawnbrokers either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.  
As for the role of pawnshops in solving social problems, there were different patterns of 
responses between the conventional and Islamic pawnbrokers. About one-third (66.7%) 
of the conventional pawnbrokers disagreed with this statement, followed by one-fifth 
(20.0%) of them agreeing with it, while the remaining 13.3% were undecided. On the 
contrary, a majority of the Islamic pawnbrokers (86.7%) were either agreed or strongly 
agreed and only a small percentage (13.3%) of them disagreed with the statement. 
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Table 8.28: Degree of Agreement on the Role of Pawnshop  
Degree of 
Agreement 
Value 
Solve 
financial 
exclusion 
 
 
(%) 
Solve social 
problem 
 
 
 
(%) 
Alternative to 
bank 
 
 
 
(%) 
Abstaining 
from riba 
 
 
 
(%) 
Consumption 
usage and no 
redemption, 
sustain the 
business 
(%) 
Con. Ar-
rahn 
Con. Ar-
rahn 
Con. Ar-
rahn 
Con. Ar-
rahn 
Con. Ar-
rahn 
Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
1 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
66.7 
- 
13.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.7 
13.3 
46.7 
Cumulative (%)  - - 66.7 13.3 - - - - 6.7 60.0 
Agree 
Strongly agree 
4 
5 
73.3 
26.7 
26.7 
73.3 
20.0 
- 
80.0 
6.7 
93.3 
6.7 
26.7 
73.3 
- 
- 
6.7 
93.3 
66.7 
13.3 
20.0 
- 
Cumulative (%)  100.0 100.0 20.0 86.7 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 80.0 20.0 
Do not know 3 - - 13.3 - - - 100.0 - 13.3 20.0 
Mean value 
Standard deviation 
 4.27 
0.458 
4.73 
0.458 
2.53 
0.834 
3.80 
0.775 
4.07 
0.258 
4.73 
0.458 
3.00 
0.000 
4.93 
0.258 
3.87 
0.743 
2.47 
0.990 
Overall Mean Conventional = 3.548; Ar-rahn = 4.132 
A similar pattern of contradicting responses between both types of pawnbrokers can also 
be seen on the last role listed in table 8.28, where a vast majority (80.0%) of the 
conventional pawnbrokers were either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement of 
„when the money from pawning is used for consumption and no redemption, it helps to 
sustain the business of the pawnbroker‟, followed by 13.3% who were undecided, and the 
remaining 6.7% disagree with the statement. Conversely, Islamic pawnbrokers show a 
mixed response towards this statement when more than half (60.0%) of them were either 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 40.0% of them were either agreed or remained 
undecided with the statement.  
As for the role of pawnshops in providing services in conforming to the pawnbrokers‟ 
faith in terms of abstaining from riba, table 8.28 clearly indicate that hundred percent of 
the Islamic pawnbrokers strongly agree and agree with this statement. Predictably, all of 
the responding conventional pawnbrokers did not know about the term riba as they were 
non-Muslim.  
In terms of the mean value of each of the assigned roles, table 8.28 shows a distinct result 
between both types of pawnbrokers. For example, the mean value for Islamic 
pawnbrokers in terms of the role of pawnshops for solving financial exclusion is greater 
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(4.73) as compared to conventional pawnbrokers (4.27). Overall, the mean value for each 
of the roles listed for the Islamic pawnshops was greater than the conventional 
pawnshops, except for the last role regarding the consumption usage without redemption 
that sustains the pawnbrokers‟ business (the mean value for conventional pawnshop for 
this role is 3.87 as compared to only 2.47 for Islamic pawnshop). Overall, it can be 
concluded the Islamic pawnbrokers acknowledge the positive role of the pawnshop to 
society based on evidence shown from the overall mean value, which is higher (4.132) 
than conventional pawnshops (3.548). Presumably, conventional pawnbrokers will very 
much agree with this statement because the main objective is to maximise their profit, 
unlike Islamic pawnbrokers, which are more towards social obligation. However, it can 
be concluded that the Islamic pawnbrokers acknowledge the positive role of the 
pawnshop to society based on evidence shown from the overall mean value which is 
higher (4.132) than conventional pawnshops (3.548). 
Furthermore, a statistical analysis using the Mann-Whitney U-Test was applied in order 
to find out those pawnbrokers who rated a higher level of agreement on each statement 
regarding the role of pawnshops to the society. Thus, the null-hypothesis is stated as 
below: 
 H0:   There is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of  
   each pawnbroker regarding the role of pawnshop to the society. 
Let u1 and u2 be the mean ranks οf pawnbrokers rated a higher level of agreement on each 
statement regarding the role of pawnshop to the society. Thus; 
H0: u1= u2 
H1: u1≠ u2 
Table 8.29 shows that the mean ranks of agreement of each type of pawnbrokers towards 
the positive role of pawnshop to the society are not equal. It shows that the mean ranks of 
all the statement mentioned above are higher for the Islamic pawnbrokers compared to 
the conventional, except for the last statement which is „when it is used for consumption 
and no redemption, it helps to sustain the business‟. The results reveal that the Islamic 
pawnbrokers very much agreed with the positive role of pawnshop such as solving 
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financial exclusion, reducing social problems such as crime, an alternative to mainstream 
financial institutions, and it can eliminate the element of riba and gharar in the pawn 
lending business. However, in terms of the last role listed, Islamic pawnbroker disagreed 
with the statement because their main objective was not only to eliminate the element of 
riba and gharar but also to fulfil the social obligation towards society rather than profit 
maximisation. 
Furthermore, table 8.29 also shows the z score to be higher than the tabulated z0.05 = 
1.645 for all statements regarding the role of pawnshops to the society. In addition, the 
observed 2-tailed probability for all the statements is smaller than the 0.05 level of 
significance which implies that there is a significant difference between the levels of 
agreement of each type of pawnshop regarding the role of pawnshops. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the levels of agreement of each 
type of pawnshop regarding the positive role of pawnshops to the society is therefore 
rejected. 
Table 8.29: Mann-Whitney U-Test Comparing the Level of Agreement of 
Pawnbrokers towards the Role of Pawnshop 
  
Pawnshop N 
Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
z value 
Probability 
(2-tailed) 
Helps solve financial  Conventional 15 12.00 180.00 
-2.513 .012 
exclusion  Ar-Rahn 15 19.00 285.00 
Helps solve social  Conventional 15 10.53 158.00 
-3.430 .001 
problem Ar-Rahn 15 20.47 307.00 
An alternative to formal  Conventional 15 10.50 157.50 
-3.664 .000 
institution  Ar-Rahn 15 20.50 307.50 
Conforms to faith of  Conventional 15 8.00 120.00 
-5.303 .000 
abstaining from riba  Ar-Rahn 15 23.00 345.00 
Used for consumption Conventional 15 20.77 311.50 
-3.463 .001 
and no redemption  Ar-Rahn 15 10.23 153.50 
Note: Mean value – Scoring: 1 = Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree  
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a comprehensive analysis on the primary data collected through the 
questionnaire survey which was conducted with customers and pawnbrokers for each 
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type of pawnshop from three different regions in Malaysia. The following summarizes 
the major findings from the analysis which have been conducted throughout this chapter:  
(i)  Pawnshops are the most preferable source to obtain instant cash for both types 
of customers compared to other financial institutions. 
(ii)  In determining pawnshop selection, the results reveal that both customers and 
pawnbrokers from each type of pawnshop have a similar opinion regarding this 
matter. The result shows that both customers and pawnbrokers from the Islamic 
pawnbroking were more concerned with the services provided by the pawnshop 
such as the underlying principle, transparency, security, lower fee charge, the 
image, possibility of redemption and conveniences. Whilst, for the conventional 
customers and pawnbrokers, they assumed that they can capture the market by 
offering services such as accepting various items of pledge, speed in loan 
approval, knowledgeable and competent staff, location near to home/office, 
loyalty, and confidentiality.    
(iii) Although the lending, redeeming, extending, auctioning, complaining, and 
compensating process more or less are very much similar for both type of 
pawnshops, the Islamic pawnbroking system demonstrates positive attributes 
such as transparency, honesty, and reliability as compared to conventional 
pawnbroking which oppresses the borrower.  
(iv) Customers of both types of pawnshops also agreed with the potential role of 
pawnshop lending in enhancing the socio-economic development of the 
community, as they are not only financing for consumption but production 
purposes as well. But for some of them, they argued that pawning would only 
help them become financially better-off for a short-term period and not for a 
long-term period. 
(v)  The Islamic pawnbrokers were relatively more concerned with social objectives 
rather than profit maximisation as compared to the conventional pawnbrokers.  
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Overall, the results of the analysis in this chapter revealed that Islamic customers and 
pawnbrokers show more positive perceptions and attitudes towards the role of pawnshops 
in enhancing the socio-economic development of the community, as well as the 
promising prospect of the pawnshop business in the long-run, as compared to 
conventional pawnshops, which concentrate more towards profit maximisation and 
neglect the social welfare of the customer. 
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Chapter 9 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF 
THE ISLAMIC PAWNBROKERS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two empirical chapters focused on the behaviour and opinions of the clients 
of Islamic pawnbrokers on various issues. This chapter aims to extend the analysis by 
analysing the opinions of those early Malaysian pioneers of Islamic pawnbroking 
regarding their motivations for establishing Islamic-based pawnshop, and other 
significant issues underlying the Islamic pawnbroking business in Malaysia.  
For this semi-structured interview conducted with three main Islamic pawnbroking 
institutions; the detail of the interviewees and their respective institutions are shown in 
table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Details of the Interviewees and their Respective Institutions 
 Name Job Title/ Institution 
1. Mr. Wan Farid Imran Wan A. Latif Assistant Manager of Ar-Rahn 
Management Unit, MAIDAM 
 
2. Mr. Rozaidi Abdul Majid Accountant of Ar-Rahn 
Management Unit, YaPEIM 
 
3. Mr. Meor Haris Meor Akim Senior Officer of Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, 
Tanjung Malim, Perak 
 
These institutions were objectively chosen as they were among the pioneers of the 
Islamic pawnbroking business in Malaysia. All the responses from the interviewees were 
evaluated in order to assess the impact of Islamic pawnbroking in enhancing the socio-
economic development of the society. The questions for the interviewees are attached in 
Appendix 6D. 
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In analysing the primary data collected from the interviewees, descriptive analysis is 
used, which is described in details in the Research Methodology Chapter. Accordingly, 
all the recorded answers from the interviewees were restated according to each particular 
question followed by further analysis. 
9.2 ANALYSING INTERVIEW DATA 
A number of questions were established for the interview in an attempt to have a clear 
understanding on the development of the three main Islamic pawnbroking institutions in 
Malaysia, i.e. MAIDAM/MGIT, YaPEIM, and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia. The 
analysis and the findings are presented in the following sections. 
9.2.1 The Establishment of the Ar-rahn Product and the Motivating Factors 
The first two questions of the semi-structured interview were combined due to the 
relatedness of the questions. The purpose of asking these questions such as: „(i) The 
establishment of the responding institutions‟; and „(ii) Their motivation of initiating the 
product‟ was to know when the product was launched and to understand the motivating 
factors for introducing the first Islamic pawnbroking scheme in Malaysia.  
Table 9.2 shows the responses from the representatives of the each institution regarding 
the establishment of their ar-rahn products and also the motivation for doing so.  
From the interviews conducted, it was revealed that the establishment of the Islamic-
based pawnbroking can be traced back to 1992, and that the MGIT was the pioneer in the 
field. According to Mr. Wan A. Latif, the initiative to form Islamic pawnbroking was 
discussed in a meeting of National Council of Islamic Matters on April 1983. The 
meeting suggested that the State Islamic Council or Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad should 
implement Islamic pawnbroking. However, the two parties did not show any interest 
except for the Terengganu Islamic Religious and Malay Customs Council (MAIDAM) 
and Permodalan Kelantan Berhad (PKB). This institution took up the first step to launch 
Islamic pawnbroking which is based on the concepts of ar-rahn and al-qardhul hasan. 
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Table 9.2: Responses of the Interviewees to Questions 1 and 2 
When did the institution establish the ar-rahn product and what is the motivation of 
doing so? 
Interviewees Responses 
1 We initiated the product on the 23 January 1992. The 
motivations of establishing the ar-rahn scheme were to 
provide an alternative to the conventional pawnbroking 
system and to fulfil the social obligation of the needy 
customers. 
 
2 We have launched the product on the November 2000. The 
motivations of establishing the ar-rahn scheme were to 
provide a micro-credit loan to the community and to fulfil the 
shari‟ah principle in providing an Islamic-based pawnshop. 
 
3 We have established the ar-rahn scheme on the 27 October 
1993. The motivations of establishing the ar-rahn scheme 
were to provide an alternative source of obtaining immediate 
cash using collateral and circumvent from using the 
conventional pawnshops which oppressed the borrowers. 
 
Conclusion All of the institutions have been operating for more than ten 
years and their motivation of launching the ar-rahn scheme 
was to provide an Islamic alternative financing to the 
conventional pawnbroking with the objective of responding to 
short-term cash needs of the customers in a shari‟ah 
compliant manner. 
 
Subsequently, on 27 October 1993 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia launched the first 
phase of the ar-rahn scheme in collaboration with YaPEIM after being requested by the 
Central Bank of Malaysia. Later in November 2000, YaPEIM finally commenced its‟ 
first ar-rahn branch at Sik, Kedah through the YaPEIM co-operative. 
All of the interviewees agreed that their motivation for launching the Islamic 
pawnbroking system in Malaysia on one hand was to provide the community, especially 
the low-income groups who held their savings in movable assets, with an important 
source of liquidity; on the other hand, it was due to the needs of the Muslim community 
towards this product in order to provide an alternative to conventional pawnbroking and 
moneylenders (loan shark/ah-long) which do not follow shari‟ah principles and exploit 
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the lower strata of the society by imposing very high interest rates. Thus, as one of the 
interviewees mentioned, the main motivation was to provide a response to such financial 
matters with the objective of fulfilling social obligations through an Islamic manner. 
9.2.2 The Salient Shari’ah Features of Islamic Pawnbroking  
Table 9.3 also combined the response of interviewees for questions 3 and 4. The purpose 
of asking these questions such as: „(i) The salient shari‟ah features of Islamic 
pawnbroking‟; and „(ii) The shari‟ah problems encountered in Islamic pawnbroking‟ was 
to identify the underlying principles implied in the Islamic pawnbroking contract and the 
shari‟ah problems encountered in Islamic pawnbroking.  
Table 9.3: Responses of the Interviewees to Questions 3 and 4 
What are the salient shari’ah features of Islamic pawnbroking and what particular 
shari’ah problems encountered in Islamic pawnbroking sector? 
Interviewees Responses 
1 The salient shari‟ah features applied in Islamic pawnbroking 
are ar-rahn, al-qardhul hasan and al-wadiah yad dhammanah. 
The shari‟ah problems encountered in Islamic pawnbroking 
are the element of riba and gharar. 
 
2, 3 The salient shari‟ah features applied in Islamic pawnbroking 
are ar-rahn, al-qardhul hasan, al-wadiah yad dhammanah and 
al-ujrah. The shari‟ah problems encountered in Islamic 
pawnbroking are the element of riba and gharar. 
 
Conclusion There are no major differences between the contracts of 
Islamic pawnbroking applied in all the institutions. The 
shari‟ah problems encountered by all the institutions also 
shown the same response which were avoiding the element of 
riba and gharar. 
  
According to the responses given by all the interviewees, they agreed that the loan 
granted by Islamic pawnbroking was based on three concepts, namely; (i) ar-rahn which 
refers to a valuable item that is collateralized to a debt which may be utilized as payment 
if the debt is not repaid within the agreed period; (ii) al-qardhul hasan which refers to an 
interest free loan which only requires the borrower to repay the principal amount 
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borrowed, but the borrower may pay an additional amount at his/her absolute discretion 
as a token of appreciation; and (iii) al-wadiah yad dhammanah, which refers to a contract 
between the borrower and the lender for safekeeping purposes. However, for YaPEIM 
and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, there is an additional concept, other than the ones 
stated above, which is al-ujrah which refers to the charge for the services rendered in 
keeping the asset/collateral.   
In responding to the epistemological sources of pawnbroking in Islam, according to Mr. 
Abdul Majid from YaPEIM and Mr. Meor Akim from the Bank Kerjasama Rakyat 
Malaysia, Islamic pawnbroking is based on fardhu kifayah which is basically 
relinquishing a social obligation by helping those who are in need. It is also based on 
social responsibility (element of charity) and not on profit making. Mr. Abdul Majid 
added that the implementation of the ar-rahn scheme based on the al-qardhul hasan 
principle or interest free loans actually promotes a sense of cooperation and mutual aid 
among Muslims. 
As was mentioned by all the interviewees, one of the shari‟ah features of Islamic 
pawnbroking is that it is free from elements of riba and is in line with Islamic principles. 
With the implementation of Islamic-based pawnbroking, it helps prevent customers from 
being involved with usury. It should be noted that the safekeeping fee charged on the 
collateral is allowed by the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Religious 
Affairs of Malaysia as long as it does not exploit the borrower.  
Another shari‟ah feature observed with the ar-rahn product is the element of gharar. The 
element of gharar occurs naturally in the conventional pawnbroking business such as 
giving a much lower value for the collateral, issuing an unclear pawn receipt which may 
be confusing to the borrower, and other unethical practices which are fully mentioned in 
Chapter 8‟s findings. By offering Islamic-based pawnbroking, YaPEIM helps to motivate 
Islamic pawnbrokers to practice positive attributes of honesty, reliability, transparency, 
knowledge, and management skills in the pawnbroking business as well as prevent the 
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exploitation of Muslim lower income groups by conventional pawnbrokers, of which a 
majority are owned by the Chinese.
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In addition, Mr. Wan A. Latif from the MAIDAM claimed that in order to avoid the 
element of gharar in the Islamic pawnbroking transaction, all the pawners‟ details 
including the value of the item pledged, the total amount of the loan, the fee charged, the 
period of redemption, and other terms and conditions of loan default are all stated in the 
pawning receipt in order for the customer to get a clear information about their 
transaction. 
9.2.3 The Sustainability of Islamic Pawnbroking  
The next section in the interviews explored the participants‟ perceptions on the 
sustainability of Islamic pawnbroking; the results of the analysis of questions 5, 6 and 7 
are depicted in table 9.4. The purpose of asking these questions such as: „(i) Can Islamic 
pawnbroking system sustained by charging minimal of safekeeping fee compared to the 
conventional‟; „(ii) The possibility of accepting other type of collateral‟; and „(iii) The 
current regulation and the intention of developing a standard regulation among the 
Islamic pawnbroking institutions‟ was to justify whether the Islamic pawnbroking can 
sustain their businesses in the long-run with these conditions.  
From the interviews conducted, it seems that all of the institutions offering the ar-rahn 
product accept gold jewellery type 18K – 24K with an addition of Bank Kerjasama 
Rakyat Malaysia accepting gold bars as collateral. In recent times, MAIDAM is still 
exploring ways of diversifying the types of collateral and accepting a trust fund is one of 
the suggestions. However, there is need to discuss with the trust fund institutions 
regarding the security of certain trust funds. Previously, MAIDAM used to accept white 
gold as collateral. However, a problem occurred when the white gold items were not 
claimed by the customers, and the jewellery had to be auctioned off in some branches. It 
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 According to the statistic endorsed by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government of Malaysia, only 
0.8% of the conventional pawnbrokers in Malaysia are Malay, and the remaining (99.2%) is operated by 
the Chinese. (Retrieved 1
st
 August 2010 from: http://emaps.kpkt.gov.my/emaps/umum/cari_ppg.cfm) 
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is rather difficult to sell off white gold jewellery as people from the East Coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia do not prefer this type of jewellery. 
Table 9.4: Responses of the Interviewees to Questions 5, 6 and 7 
Can Islamic pawnbroking sustain their business in long-run by charging a minimal 
safekeeping charge, accepting only gold as collateral and regulated by the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972? 
Interviewees Responses 
1 At present, we only accept gold as collateral. Other than the 
Pawnbrokers Act 1972, we also obliged to the Manual 
Procedure of Ar-rahn Scheme MAIDAM 2006. By 
emphasizing the volume of customers and low fee charge, the 
Islamic pawnbroking can sustain their business in the long-
run. The role of government is crucial in order to promote the 
ar-rahn scheme in a more effective and systematic manner. 
  
2 At present, YaPEIM accepts diamond other than gold. We are 
not governed by the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. Instead, we 
referred to our own Ar-rahn Manual Guideline. YaPEIM can 
sustain their business in the long-run because the safekeeping 
fee is considered competitive and the government role is 
crucial for the development of the product in future.  
 
3 At present, we only accept gold as collateral. Regarding 
regulation, our Islamic pawnbroking product has its own 
manual guideline which is known as Operation Guideline – 
Pawnbroking-i. Islamic pawnbroking business can sustain in 
the long-run due to their positive attribute as compared to the 
conventional pawnbroking. In addition, the government plays 
an important role in order to promote and educate the 
community with this product. 
 
Conclusion Apparently, all of the institutions accept only gold as 
collateral with an exception of YaPEIM that accepts diamond 
as well. Each of them established their own manual guideline. 
All of the representatives of each institution were very 
optimistic about the sustainability of the product in the long-
run but admitted the important role of government in 
promoting this product and to overcome any issues related to 
the product.  
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Alternatively, YaPEIM took the first attempt at accepting diamond as collateral alongside 
with gold. According to Mr. Abdul Majid, previously, YaPEIM only calculated gold and 
excluded precious jewellery such as diamonds that were tied to the ornament. In order to 
give more value to the customer, YaPEIM introduced a combined measurement of gold 
and diamond when granting a loan. Prior to the introduction of diamonds as acceptable 
collateral, YaPEIM sent their staff for training in the Institute Gemology Paramita in 
Jakarta, Indonesia in order to train them in diamond grading. 
Although there were discussions among all the institutions of Islamic pawnbroking in the 
issue of establishing a standard regulation for the ar-rahn scheme, to date there is no 
solid act or guideline imposed other than the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. From the 
interviews, all the corresponding institutions such as YaPEIM and Bank Kerjasama 
Rakyat Malaysia are exempted from being obliged with the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, as 
was stated in Section 46, except the MGIT.
68
 Each of these institutions established their 
own ar-rahn manual guidelines as a reference for Islamic pawnbroking operations. 
Despite the different manual guidelines imposed by each institution, the contract is more 
or less the same; they may differ in terms of the loan margin and safekeeping fee.  
In terms of the sustainability of the Islamic pawnbroking system, all the interviewees 
agree that the future of this institution in Malaysia as a loan provider is quite promising. 
According to Mr. Wan A. Latif, although MAIDAM has moved towards corporatisation, 
the original objectives such as focusing on social responsibility to the customers will not 
be disregarded. In order to be competitive to the conventional pawnbrokers without 
abandoning their main objective, MAIDAM concentrates more on the customers‟ 
volume. If the safekeeping fee is kept low, there will be an increase in customers; 
likewise, if the safekeeping fee is high, the number of customers would decrease. By 
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 According to Section 46 in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972, there are three organisations that shall be 
exempted from this act which are; (1) any bank licensed to carry on banking business in Malaysia; (2) Bank 
Pertanian Malaysia, and (3) any co-operative society registered under any written law in force in Malaysia. 
Due to that, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia and YaPEIM are exempted from this act. As for MGIT, they 
are obliged with this act with an exemption of Section 17 (1) regarding allowing taking profit on a loan. 
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implementing a minimal safekeeping fee, the institution aims at helping to contribute to 
the community‟s socio-economic development could be realised.  
Mr. Abdul Majid added that the sustainability of the business can be retained because 
pawn lending is a type of loan that could decrease the risk of loan default as all of the 
loans given to the borrower are back up with collateral. At present, although competition 
between ar-rahn institutions and conventional pawnshops in providing loans to the 
customers cannot be avoided, YaPEIM is very optimistic that the ar-rahn scheme is 
capable of replacing the conventional pawnbroking business in the future. 
As for Mr. Meor Akim, the Islamic pawnbroking business can be sustained in the long-
run due to the loans being conducted under Islamic principles and their positive attribute 
such as honesty (in terms of keeping the customers‟ assets) and transparency (in terms of 
valuing the collateral based on the current value) as compared to conventional 
pawnbroking. With banks operating the Islamic pawnbroking scheme,
69
 it is expected 
that this could remove the negative stigma of the pawnbroking concept; hence it would 
improve the public view about Islamic pawnshops‟ lending and attract more customers, 
not only the Muslim customers but also the non-Muslims to deal with them. In fact, he 
added that the ar-rahn scheme should not be seen as a lender for the lower income 
groups, but it should also be introduced to the whole strata of community in Malaysia, as 
a resort of short-run liquidity needs for business as well. He also mentioned that if a bank 
operates the ar-rahn scheme, the cost of operation would be lessened as compared to 
establishing the ar-rahn shop individually. 
All of the responding interviewees unanimously agree that the government plays an 
important role in ensuring that the Islamic pawnbroking business is sustainable in the 
long-run. According to Mr. Abdul Majid from YaPEIM, the Central Bank of Malaysia 
has been very supportive from the beginning for the introduction of Islamic pawnbroking 
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 Normally, the Malaysian bank such as Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia who offered the ar-rahn 
schemes will conduct the pawnbroking transaction (lending, redeeming, and extending) in a separate room 
off the main office and the customers will be attend privately. Thus, this makes the customers feel at ease 
and not embarrassed to do their transactions. 
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system in Malaysia. In a wider implementation, he explained that the ar-rahn scheme 
was established following a decision from the Malaysia Cabinet on the 30 January 1985. 
As a result, YaPEIM and the Central Bank of Malaysia have set up the Scheme 
Committee which was chaired by Tan Sri Dato‟ Nor Mohamed Yakcop (the Advisor of 
Central Bank at that time) with the objective of establishing Islamic pawnbroking in 
Malaysia. YaPEIM had planned to implement an Islamic pawnshop immediately but it 
faced problems as it was against the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. Due to the needs of the 
Muslim community for an Islamic based pawnshop, the Central Bank of Malaysia 
requested Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia to implement the ar-rahn scheme through 
the capital injection from YaPEIM. Consequently, a memorandum of understanding was 
signed between Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia and YaPEIM as a partnership 
agreement with an equal profit-sharing agreement. The pilot project was started on 27 
October 1993 by Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, followed by Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad on November 1997 and YaPEIM co-operative on November 2000. One of the 
major aspects that need to be explored seriously by the government is the issue of 
regulation and how it could affect the operation and development of the Islamic 
pawnbroking industry. It should be noted that up to now, there is only one legal act 
regulating the pawnbroking business, which, however, is more applicable to conventional 
pawnbroking.  
As for Mr. Wan A. Latif, the issue of licence granting should also be focused and revised 
by the government in order to make the Islamic pawnbroking business sustainable in the 
long-run. MAIDAM, for example, previously faced difficulty in acquiring a license from 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government to open new branches due to a few 
requirements that needed to be fulfilled as well as political difficulties. In the latest 
meeting among the MAIDAM management board, they were concerned with the 
proposal for the State Islamic Council to be exempted from acquiring a pawnshop licence 
from the ministry. With more new branches opening by the establishment of MAIDAM 
cooperatives and joint-ventures with other cooperatives, MAIDAM anticipates that they 
can operate more effectively and obtain sufficient funds to provide „halal‟ (permissible) 
pawnbroking loans to Terengganu‟s community. Regarding funds, Mr. Wan A. Latif said 
that MAIDAM pawnshops (MGIT and MAR branches) faced a problem of fund shortage 
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to cover the high and growing demand of pawnshop services, especially during 
school/university opening terms and also during the economic recession in 1997. Due to 
these circumstances, the State Fatwa Council issued a fatwa saying that MAIDAM can 
borrow funds from zakah funds in order to cover the shortage.  
For Mr. Meor Akim, in order to make the pawnshop business one of the financial 
institutions that will contribute to the economy, the government should put further efforts 
to plan and develop the pawnshop system systematically because up to now, the 
pawnshop business is still being seen as informal financing. Unlike MAIDAM, Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia, the first bank established the ar-rahn scheme does not face 
any problem raising capital to provide loan to the customer. Given enough working 
capital, human resources, equipment, and facilities needed, they could run the business 
very smoothly. At present, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia has expanded the ar-rahn 
scheme with another product called the az-zahab scheme which is a product enabling 
individuals to get a bigger sum of loan from RM10,001.00 to RM100,000.00 with a 
comfortable and longer payment plan. 
9.2.4 Consumption vs Production Purpose 
The summary of the responses of interviewees for questions 8 and 9 were analysed and 
depicted in table 9.5. The purpose of asking these questions was to find out the opinion of 
the participants about the use of Islamic pawn lending for consumption as opposed to 
production purposes and what happens to the asset base of society if it is only used for 
consumption purpose. 
As indicated in table 9.5, all the interviewees agreed that the maslahah
70
 (public interest 
consideration) of the customers is more important than arguing about the purpose of 
pawning whether for consumption or production purpose.  
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 According to Dusuki (2009: 5), maslahah is “one of the juristic devices that have always been used in 
Islamic legal theory to promote public benefit and prevent social evils or corruption. The plural of the 
Arabic word maslahah is „masalih‟ which means welfare, interest, or benefit. Literally, maslahah is 
defined as seeking the benefit and repelling harm”.    
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Table 9.5: Responses of the Interviewees to Questions 8 and 9 
What do you think of the used of Islamic pawnbroking for consumption purpose as 
opposed to production purpose and does it undermine the asset base of the society if the 
loan is mainly used for consumption purpose? 
Interviewees Responses 
1 The maslahah of the borrower should be considered in understanding 
the use of the loan given regardless of their purpose of pawning. 
  
2 Although it makes a difference whether lending for consumption 
purpose or production purpose in terms of economic impact, but our 
mission is to help those especially those from the lower income group 
and people who are excluded from the mainstream financial institution 
who may require immediate cash based on Islamic-based 
pawnbroking.  
 
3 Though from the economic perspective, lending for production 
purpose can generate the customers‟ income as compared to 
consumption purpose; we still have to consider the maslahah of the 
customer if they used it for consumption purpose.  
 
Conclusion All institutions agreed that the maslahah should be taken into 
consideration regardless the purpose of the customers obtaining cash 
from pawning. 
 
As explained during the interview process, based on the informal survey done by 
MAIDAM, most of the customers used the loans given for consumption purposes rather 
than production purposes. They claimed that the ratio for customers who borrowed for 
daily usage and production purpose was 70: 30. Although it can be argued that borrowing 
for consumption purposes can undermine the asset base of the society, MAIDAM‟s main 
objective is to help people who need instant cash, regardless of the purpose for using the 
cash, as long as it is not being misused for negative purposes as identified by shari‟ah 
law. Despite Islamic financing encouraging production as opposed to consumption 
purposes in loans, the maslahah should be considered in understanding when it is used 
for consumption. They presume that if the domestic needs are fulfilled (such as paying 
bills and household expenses), it can be predicted that the customers can then focus on 
making loans for the purpose of production, which will generate their total income and 
most of all improve their socioeconomic circumstances. For that reason, MAIDAM has 
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introduced entrepreneur package courses to potential customers (loyal customers) in 
order to use the funds obtained from pawnshops in a more productive manner; hence 
solving the issue of poverty or crime that usually emerge from their financial problem. 
On the other hand, if the customers pawn off their belongings for productive purpose 
(such as a start-up capital for business or extending their business), this would actually 
increase their asset base. According to Mr. Wan A. Latif, it is the culture of the 
community in Terengganu (especially the Malay) to buy more gold if they have extra 
money, which then can be used in pawning for borrowing money for business as well as 
social needs. 
Likewise, although Mr. Abdul Majid and Mr. Meor Akim agree that, from an economic 
perspective, lending for production purposes will give more value-added to the customers 
in terms of generating their total household income rather than lending for consumption 
purposes, the main objective of launching Islamic pawnbroking is to assist those in need, 
especially the lower income groups and people who are being excluded from the 
mainstream financial institution and may require immediate cash based on shari‟ah 
compliant pawnbroking regardless of the purpose of pawning. In addition, Islamic 
pawnbroking can also save Muslim customers from being exploited and being treated in 
an unfair manner by the conventional pawnbrokers.  
9.2.5 Product Awareness of Islamic Pawnbroking 
Table 9.6 summarises the responses of the interviewees for questions 10, 11 and 12. The 
purpose of asking these questions are as follows: „(i) Why do Muslims still use the 
conventional pawnshop while Islamic alternative is available‟; „(ii) Is there any demand 
from non-Muslim towards the Islamic pawnbroking product‟; and „(iii) What can the 
institution do to increase product awareness‟.  
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Table 9.6: Responses of the Interviewees to Questions 10, 11 and 12 
What do you think about the awareness of the community towards the existence of the 
Islamic pawnbroking institutions and what steps have been taken in order to attract the 
customers? 
Interviewees Responses 
1 There is still lack of awareness among the Muslims 
community and definitely to the non-Muslims about the 
existence of this scheme, thus MAIDAM has taken a huge 
effort to promote awareness of the ar-rahn scheme amongst 
the community especially in Terengganu. 
 
2 Some of the Muslims customers still prefer to go to the 
conventional pawnshops even though the Islamic 
pawnbroking has been introduced for quite some time in 
Malaysia. More marketing activities have been taken in order 
to promote awareness of this product. 
  
3 Some of the Muslims customers still use the conventional 
pawnshops services due to some reasons. The non-Muslims 
customers have shown their interest in using the ar-rahn 
scheme especially among the Indian customers. Campaigns 
have been developed in order to capture the market and high 
awareness to the community.  
 
Conclusion All the institutions agreed that they have a huge responsibility 
to increase the awareness of the community in the existence of 
an alternative source of pawning which is permissible by the 
shari‟ah principles, which encourage social justice to the 
borrower. 
 
According to the defined questions, the analysis in this section is divided into three sub-
sections which is the product awareness from the Muslim and non-Muslim perspective, 
and finally, how the responding institutions promote the ar-rahn product. The analysis of 
the interviews indicate that all of the institutions have a responsibility towards educating 
and increasing the awareness of the community for Islamic pawnbroking which, as such, 
is permissible according to shari‟ah principles, which as a product has positive attributes 
such as fairness, justice, transparency, and honesty to both parties involved.  
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9.2.5.1 Muslims awareness 
According to Mr. Wan A. Latif, although MAIDAM Islamic pawnshops (MGIT and 
MAR) offer a cheaper safekeeping fee, more conducive environment, customer-friendly, 
and easily accessible locations, there are still some Muslim customers who prefer to go to 
the conventional pawnshops. From their observation, they argue that factors such as the 
„embarrassment‟ factor, loyalty to traditional pawnbroking, and no hassle with filling any 
form or showing any evidence of possession right may encourage many Muslims to 
choose conventional pawnshops over Islamic pawnshops.  
According to all the participants, the negative stigma with the word „pawning‟ still 
prevails, as, for many people, pawning assets imply losing face, losing assets, and 
dignity. In showing the shift taking place in pawning perception, Mr. Wan A. Latif noted 
in his interview that, “currently the demand trend for pawnshop is not dominated only by 
the lower income group, but also from the middle income group. Perhaps due to 
emergency needs or other factors forces them to pawn their belonging. To be fair with 
them, we can think of the pawnshop customers as those who actually have valuables 
compared to the bank customers. This is because the latter may not have any valuables as 
they are only required to present their payslips to secure the bank loans. In fact, the 
negative stigma should be removed as the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself was 
involved in the pawning process.”  
The interview analysis also indicates that some of the customers could not identify the 
difference between interest charges in conventional pawnshops and safekeeping fees 
charged in Islamic pawnshops. They still used the word interest even though they were 
apparently dealing with Islamic pawnshops. As for the issue of differentiating between 
interest rates and safekeeping fees, MAIDAM has instructed the staff (in-front desk) of 
each of its branches to explain and educate customers while doing the transaction.  
In addition to the above mentioned factors, Mr. Abdul Majid expressed that conventional 
pawnbroking is still preferable due to the lack of awareness and knowledge about the 
existence of alternative sources of pawning which are in line with shari‟ah principles. In 
addition, Mr. Meor Akim claimed that due to the total amount of Islamic pawnshops 
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available that is still low compared to the conventional pawnshops, people still go to the 
conventional pawnshops. 
Another issue raised by respondents relates to accessibility and facilitation. In order to 
minimise the documentation procedure required by MAIDAM in the pawning process, 
they plan to introduce the use of MyCard (identification card for Malaysian) for 
verification, which would hold the details of the cardholder.  
9.2.5.2 Non-Muslims awareness of Islamic pawnbroking 
According to MAIDAM, there seems to be low demand from non-Muslims in dealing 
with Islamic pawnshops. For example, the MAR branch from Kemaman, Terengganu has 
received only one Chinese customer and one Indian customer. Presumably, this is 
because they are the minority group in the state and they are usually not interested in 
pawnshops services and are also not fond of collecting gold items. Unlike Malays, most 
Chinese would prefer to get loans from moneylenders (ah-long) which do not require any 
items to pledge in exchange for the loan. 
Conversely, YaPEIM and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia found that the non-Muslim 
community, especially the Indians, are now aware of the existence of Islamic 
pawnbroking and their demand for this scheme is quite promising. Therefore, these 
institutions are more optimistic that the Islamic pawnbroking scheme will attract even 
more non-Muslim customers in future. However, Mr. Abdul Majid stated that as the 
scheme is still in the early stages, in comparison to conventional pawnbroking, ar-rahn is 
only able to control 9.3% of the overall pawnshop market.  
9.2.5.3 Promoting the product  
Since the literature as well as the empirical analysis shows that Islamic pawnshops are 
new institutions, more time will be needed to further penetrate into the formal financial 
system. Thus, the promotion of the ar-rahn scheme is needed so that the lack of 
awareness can be overcome. 
208 
 
In discussing promotion issues, according to Mr. Wan A. Latif, MAIDAM with its ten 
branches of Islamic pawnshops around the Terengganu state has organised awareness 
campaigns on the ar-rahn scheme for lower income groups like small traders, as they are 
more likely to have less knowledge about shari‟ah principles, especially regarding riba 
and gharar. As mentioned before, some customers still refer to the safekeeping fee as 
interest when making a transaction.  
Interview analysis also indicates that, in order to enhance awareness, information is 
disseminated through Friday prayers, pamphlets, posters, videos, and on Terengganu FM 
radio. He added that the Islam Hadhari approach
71
 (introduced by the former Prime 
Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi) has helped greatly in enhancing 
society‟s awareness towards the product. 
As for YaPEIM, they have initiated some promotional activities to the target customers 
by opening kiosks at supermarkets and in other public areas, circulating information 
through radio and television advertisements, using balloons and billboards along 
highways, and even setting up an event called „A Day with Customers‟ to improve 
rapport with current customers and potential customers. In addition, Mr. Meor Akim 
from Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia urged that the government needs to make an 
initiative to establish more ar-rahn premises by granting more licenses and decreasing 
the tax as an incentive for companies which are interested to open ar-rahn premises. 
9.3 CONCLUSION  
This chapter analysed the semi-structured interviews which were conducted on three 
different institutions known as the pioneers of the Islamic pawnbroking institution in 
Malaysia such as MAIDAM, YaPEIM, and Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia. The 
following summarises the major findings from the analysis which have been conducted 
throughout this chapter:  
                                                          
71
 According to Ahmad Badawi (2006: 3), Islam Hadhari approach is “an effort to bring the ummah (the 
worldwide community comprising all adherents of the Muslim faith) back to the basic of Islam, back to the 
fundamentals as prescribed in the Quran and the hadith which form the foundation for an Islamic 
Civilisation”. 
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(i)  All of the participating institutions have been operating for more than ten years 
and their motivation for launching the ar-rahn scheme was to provide an 
Islamic financing alternative to conventional pawnbroking with the objective of 
responding to the short-term cash needs of customers in a shari‟ah compliant 
manner. 
(ii)  There are no major differences between the contracts of Islamic pawnbroking 
applied in the participating institutions. The shari‟ah problems encountered by 
all the participating institutions also show the same response, that is the 
avoidance of the elements of riba and gharar. 
(iii) All the participating institutions accept only gold as collateral with the 
exception of YaPEIM which accepts diamond as well. Each of them has 
established their own manual guidelines. All of the representatives of each 
institution were very optimistic about the sustainability of the product in the 
long-run but admitted to the important role of the government in promoting this 
product and to overcome any difficulties related to the product.  
(iv) All institutions agreed that the maslahah, or the interest of the public, should be 
taken into consideration regardless of the purpose of the customers obtaining 
cash from pawning. 
(v)  All the participating institutions agreed that they have a huge responsibility to 
increase the awareness of the community for an alternative source of pawning 
which is permissible to shari‟ah principles and encourages social justice to the 
borrower. 
In summary, the findings from these semi-structured interviews are useful for prospective 
customers, either Muslim or non-Muslim, in order for them to opt to Islamic 
pawnbroking which certainly is not involved in riba and gharar. In addition, the findings 
are also useful for businesses and the government to take the initiative to set up more ar-
rahn shops and establish standard regulations in order to promote Islamic-based 
pawnbroking as an alternative to conventional pawnbroking in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 10 
DISCUSSING AND CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSION 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to reflect on the findings in a critical manner after highlighting the 
main findings of the research. Additionally, this chapter also discusses the prospect of 
Islamic pawnbroking in future by using SWOT analysis. Based on the findings and 
further reflections in this chapter, recommendations are also provided. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with the limitations and future work to further the study.  
10.2 SUMMARISING THE RESEARCH 
The aim of this research was to analyze the socio-economic impact and the consequences 
of pawnshop crediting in Malaysia. Following this aim, the first objective was to explore 
and explain the aspects of the exclusion of the low-income groups from main financial 
institutions as a result of lack of creditworthiness. The results show that banks are 
reluctant to offer credit to this group due to high costs, high risks, and insufficient 
collateral.  
Given the exclusion of low-income groups from mainstream financial institutions, the 
second objective was to explore the role of other alternative financial institutions that can 
outreach the informal credit demand of these groups. The evidence in the developing 
countries, as mentioned in the survey chapter, articulated by Braverman and Gausch 
(1986), Bouman (1988), Ghate et al. (1992), Waldron (1995), Schrader (1996), and Azam 
et al. (2001) show that the informal financial markets has filled the gap created by 
mainstream financial institutions towards constraining credit to the „excluded‟ parts of 
society. 
Therefore, the objective in Chapter 3 was to investigate what type of informal financing 
was popular among lower-income groups. The research found that informal credit 
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institutions, such as pawnshops, were recognised as an alternative credit provider to those 
in society that were excluded from mainstream financial institutions, as was discussed in 
depth in Chapter 3. Despite being the „financial saver‟ to the financially „excluded‟ 
segments of society, this research discovered that pawnbrokers impose a very high 
interest rate and implement unethical lending practices, which lead to prioritizing profit 
with disregard for their social obligation towards society.  
In order to find an appropriate mechanism of pawning which eliminates the element of 
interest, avoid unethical procedures, and aims for social justice, Chapter 4 elaborated the 
concept of pawnbroking in the shari‟ah framework. Three important norms for Islamic 
financial ethics, such as freedom from riba and gharar, and social justice were discussed 
in Chapter 4. In addition, it also showed several samples of countries that had established 
Islamic pawnbroking after Malaysia. All the countries surveyed seemed to experience 
stable growth on the Islamic pawnbroking business, which forecasted great potential for 
the future.  
Given the potential development of the scheme in the future, the fifth objective was to 
explore the weaknesses of conventional pawnshops in terms of the shari‟ah perspective 
and unethical procedures in lending, redeeming, auctioning, complaining and 
compensating processes which led to the introduction of Islamic pawnbroking in 
Malaysia in 1992, is presented in Chapter 5. Although the Islamic pawnbroking scheme 
seems to be a viable alternative to conventional pawnshops, there are still some issues in 
Islamic pawnbroking which need to be highlighted based on prior studies such as: (i) 
shari‟ah view (Ismail and Sanusi, 2005; Mohammed et al., 2005; Skully, 2005); (ii) 
funding capital (Baharuddin, 2002); (iii) pricing system (Mohammed et al., 2005; Ismail 
and Ahmad, 1997; Muhammad Naim, 2007); (iv) pledge asset (Sanusi and Johari, 2006; 
Mohammed et al., 2005, Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; Ismail, 2002; Johari et al., 2008; Khan 
and Nisar, 2004); (v) location of the pawnshop (Mohammed et al., 2005; Ismail and 
Ahmad, 1997); (vi) purpose of pawning (Ismail et al., 2007; Awang Kechil, 2004; 
Samsudin, 2002; Barjoyai, 1999); (vii) regulation of Islamic pawnbroking (Ismail and 
Sanusi, 2005); and (viii) use of collateral as an investment (Rosly, 2005; Meera, 2008).  
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To further investigate whether pawnshops have a significant role in improving the socio-
economic situation of society, Chapter 7, 8 and 9 discussed the empirical evidence based 
on surveys and semi-structured interviews from three different groups (customers, 
pawnbrokers and the pioneer institutions of Islamic pawnbroking) which were conducted 
in three different regions in Peninsular Malaysia. Overall, the results of the analysis in 
these chapters revealed that the customers and also the Islamic pawnbrokers showed 
more positive perceptions and attitudes towards the role of the pawnshop in enhancing 
the socio-economic development of the community, especially for the low-income 
groups. The findings also indicate that there is a promising prospect for the pawnbroking 
business in the long-run, as compared to conventional pawnshops, which is mostly due to 
the social welfare concerns of Islamic pawnbroking by definition. 
10.3 REFLECTING ON THE FINDINGS: AN INTERPRETATIVE 
DISCUSSION 
10.3.1 The Influence of Demographic on Consumers’ Preference Pawnshop 
10.3.1.1 Gender 
With regards to the significance of the gender, the findings in this study show that the 
pawnshops‟ customers are predominantly female, which is consistent with other studies 
by Francois (1998), Schrader (1999 and 2000), and Maamor et al. (2006). However, the 
findings of this study were inconsistent with Johnson and Johnson (1998), among other 
studies. In terms of pawnshop, the results show that female customers prefer to obtain 
instant cash from Islamic pawnshops, whilst male customers do not show as strong 
preference for either type of pawnshop. This result tends to be in line with the findings of 
previous research on pawnshop studies (See Maamor et al., 2005 and 2006; Johari et al., 
2007; Amin et al., 2007). As was mentioned in Chapter 7, the strong Northeast 
respondents‟ bias in the sample, with most of them dealing with Islamic pawnshops, led 
to the female bias with regard to their choice of pawnshop. Female dominance in most 
pawning transactions also reflects that, in this modern day, women have to work for a 
living in addition to managing their household work in order to move away from 
dependency on men.  
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10.3.1.2 Age  
As far as the significance of the age of the respondents is concerned, the findings in this 
study reveal that there is no significant difference between the respondents‟ age and type 
of pawnshops they preferred. However as a whole, both types of pawnshops were 
patronised by the middle-age and older-age groups, presumably because they required 
short-term credit in order to bridge income gaps for making a living, which is similar to 
the results found by Schrader (1999 and 2000). In addition, Johnson and Johnson (1998) 
linked the relationship between the respondents‟ age and customer type (active borrower, 
inactive borrower, and shop only). Their results indicates that active borrowers of 
pawnshops came from customers in the 25 – 34 years group, which is considered as the 
age group that is just starting a family and is facing instability in their job and marital 
status. 
10.3.1.3 Race 
Generally, Maamor et al. (2005; 2006) found that, in Malaysia, the highest customers of 
pawnshops are Malays followed by the Indian and Chinese. Results show that there is a 
significant difference between race and the type of pawnshops the customers preferred. 
The results of this study confirmed the findings of Johari et al. (2007) in which the 
majority of the Malay customers preferred to obtain instant cash from Islamic 
pawnshops, whilst the Chinese and Indian customers showed a preference for 
conventional pawnshops, rather than Islamic pawnshops. The results were predictable 
because the main religion of the Malays is Islam, so they are more likely to deal with 
Islamic pawnshops in order to eliminate riba and gharar transactions in pawn lending. 
Nevertheless, based on the findings, although Islamic pawnshops have been operating 
side by side with the conventional, it is expected that some Malaysian Muslims still 
prefer conventional pawnshops as their instant cash lender due to various reasons that 
have been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 8 (from the customers‟ and pawnbrokers‟ 
perspectives) and 9 (from the Islamic pawnbrokers‟ perspective). In a similar manner, 
Johnson and Johnson (1998) found that race varied significantly by type of customer in 
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the case of pawnshops in the U. S. where customers from the black ethnic group were 
larger in percentage compared to ethnically white customers. 
10.3.1.4 Education level 
Results reveal that pawnshops were patronised by less-educated customers, which is in 
line with the finding of Caskey (1991), Johnson and Johnson (1998) and Maamor et al. 
(2005; 2006) but is inconsistent with the findings from Schrader (1999 and 2000) because 
of the education policy of the Soviet Union at that time. It is important to note that well 
educated segments of society have better economic and financial circumstances, and, 
therefore, their need for instant cash through pawnshops is limited as, even if they need 
such short-term cash, they have access to other financial means to meet their need. 
Although pawnshops are still patronised by less-educated customers, there is no doubt 
that the trend has already been changing with the education level of the customers which 
has increased over time and is evidenced by this study. 
In terms of pawnshops, this study inferred that either customers with a less or well 
educated background do not show a marked preference for either pawnshop. This result is 
in line with Johari et al.‟s (2007) findings, except for the well-educated customers who 
opt out conventional pawnshop as their preferred pawnshop.  
10.3.1.5 Marital status 
The finding of this study show that pawnshops are highly influenced by married 
respondents as compared to single persons and widows/widowers, which typically face 
expensive family formation, child rearing demands, and high costs of living. These 
findings support the findings of Johnson and Johnson (1998), and Schrader (1999 and 
2000). 
10.3.1.6 Total dependents of household 
The findings in this study indicate that the majority of pawnshop customers were 
generally from middle-sized and large-sized households, mostly in order to settle the 
education expenses of their children and to alleviate their short-term and emergent 
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financial difficulties. These findings are in line with the results established by Maamor et 
al. (2005; 2006) and Johari et al. (2007), but inconsistent with the findings established by 
Schrader (1999), in which he found that the majority of Russian pawnshops were 
patronised by married couples who did not have any children, followed by those with one 
child and more. In terms of pawnshop choice, these groups preferred Islamic pawnshops 
rather than the conventional, which supports the findings of Johari et al. (2007). 
10.3.1.7 Employment characteristics 
The findings of this study show that both types of pawnshops have a similar pattern of 
customers who work in the private sector, being proprietors of small businesses, 
government servants, and housewives. Having small business proprietors to demand such 
services for their short-term financing need is important, as it implies that they either they 
do not have access to short-term financing or they prefer pawnshops due to the fact that 
the transaction costs are low and without any formality.   
The findings of this study, hence, are parallel with the research conducted by Mohamed 
(1986) and Maamor et al. (2005; 2006). Likewise, the occupational background of the 
respondents‟ spouses were quite similar to the patterns of respondents‟ occupations 
where three groups were identified to be the main customers of pawnshops which were 
housewives, government servants, and those working in the private sector. However, 
findings by Maamor et al. (2005; 2006) only focused on the customers‟ occupational 
background and not on their spouses. In addition, Schrader (1999) found that pawnshop 
customers in Russia were mostly among pensioners, the unemployed, teachers and social 
workers, and their partners‟ jobs were pensioners, office jobs, the unemployed, and those 
still in education. 
10.3.1.8 Total monthly household income  
The findings of this study show that there was no significant difference between the total 
monthly household income and the types of pawnshop. However as a whole, results show 
that the majority of the pawnshop customers were among those from lower-income and 
middle income groups. The finding also shows that the mean for the total monthly 
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household income of the pawnshops‟ customers (See Appendix 10A) was between the 
range of RM1,001.00 to RM2,000.00, which is higher than poverty-level income for 
Malaysia (based on the Economic Report of 2010 which is RM750.00 and below). This 
indicates that the pawnshop customers as sampled in this study were not from individuals 
with abject poverty. This is reasonable, as Mottershead (1938), Schrader (1999), and 
Chechovskich and Schrader (2000) argued that these groups had nothing to offer as 
collateral, but the lower and middle-income groups which had belongings to pawn in 
exchange for a small amount of cash which corresponds to Oeltjen‟s (1996) study. In 
addition, the survey also revealed that more than half of the respondents claimed that they 
went to pawnshops due to the insufficiency of their income to cover household expenses, 
a result in line with Woloson (1964). Based on this findings, the customers of pawnshops 
were not only patronaged by the lower-income and middle-income groups but also by the 
higher-income groups. This is in line with the findings of Mottershead (1938), Caskey 
(1991), Schrader (2000), Maamor et al. (2005; 2006), and Johari et al. (2007). However, 
Schrader (2000) added the predominantly poor as one of the main customers of the 
Lombard pawnshop due to the transformation process after the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the introduction of market economy in Russia.  
10.3.1.9 The reasons of insufficient income 
With regards to the income level being one of the factors for utilizing the financial 
facilities offered, the findings show that more than half of respondents claim that their 
income was not sufficient due to various reasons such as having to face a high cost of 
living, followed by children‟s schooling expenses, tied with large sums of debt, an 
increase in family members, no job, and spouses not having a job. All these were found 
to be the reasons incentivising individuals to get financial access through pawnshops.   
It should be noted that the results of this study are consistent with the findings of Maamor 
et al. (2005; 2006) in which they found children‟s schooling expenses to be the main 
reason for using pawnshops. 
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10.3.2 The Pawnbrokers’ Background  
This research also investigated the profiles of pawnbrokers and also their opinions on 
various issues related to pawnbroking. Upon analysis of previous literature, only one 
research also investigated the background of pawnshops in Malaysia, which was by 
Maamor et al. (2005). 
10.3.2.1 Years of establishment 
The findings of this study reveal that the majority of Islamic pawnshops were established 
within the past 10 years to 20 years, while all conventional pawnshops had a maturity of 
21 to more than 30 years. It should be noted that this finding is in line with the findings of 
Maamor et al. (2005). Since conventional pawnshops in Malaysia have been established 
since the 15
th
 century, and, hence, most pawnshops have been operating for a very long 
period, compared to Islamic pawnbroking which had only been initiated by the MGIT in 
1992.    
10.3.2.2 Type of ownership and source of capital 
In terms of ownership and the source of capital of the pawnshops, the results showthat the 
form of ownership in all conventional pawnshops were sole proprietorships and 
partnerships, whilst branches, cooperatives, and corporations are mostly referred to 
Islamic pawnshops.  
The types of ownership can also reflect the source of capital of the pawnshop. Obviously 
most of conventional pawnbrokers operate their business by using their own capital, 
followed by getting loans from their families and banks. As for the Islamic pawnbrokers, 
they obtained their capital from their parent company, followed by their cooperatives 
members‟ share and were subsidised by government or the state government.  
As a comparison between both types of pawnshops, conventional pawnbrokers 
experienced the limitation of expanding their business and the establishment of Islamic 
pawnshops could be a threat or rival to their business. As mentioned earlier, the only 
study that supports these findings is Maamor et al. (2005). 
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10.3.2.3 Number of staff employed 
Results reveal that conventional pawnshops were likely to have a small number of staff, 
while Islamic pawnshops tend to have a slightly larger staff number. In order to reduce 
operating costs, most of conventional pawnbrokers employ few staff. However, Islamic 
pawnbrokers faced no problem in employing many staff members due to the sources of 
capital that they had gained and the support that they had received from the government 
or state governments.  
10.3.3 The Determinants of Pawnshop Selection 
This section of the research presents the findings related to the determinants of pawnshop 
selection by providing a more detailed discussion. 
10.3.3.1 Sources of instant cash loan  
The findings in this study show that the most preferable sources of instant cash loans 
considered by both Islamic and conventional customers was pawnshops, followed by 
relatives, friends, banks, cooperative companies, cash advances from credit cards, and 
moneylenders. Possibly, customers chose not to deal with banks, credit cards, and 
cooperative companies to obtain instant cash loans due to the strictness and formalities of 
bank regulations, excessive formal documentation, or not having access to the financial 
system. Moneylenders were considered as the last choice of the source of funding, 
probably due to high interest rates leading to further hardship and misery to the borrowers 
if they failed to repay their loans. In addition, the exorbitant interest rates and strong-arm 
debt collection tactics have driven dozens of moneylenders‟ debtors to commit suicide. 
Therefore, with this finding it can be said that pawnshops have an important role in 
providing instant cash loans or small loans to the people in need.  
It should be noted that the selection of pawnshops as the most preferable source of instant 
cash by respondents, compared to other sources, was consistent with the findings by 
Maamor et al. (2006). Similar results were also found by Johnson and Johnson (1998) 
which shows that the best alternative to pawnshops was borrowing from a relative or 
friend. 
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10.3.3.2 Pawnshop vs other instant cash loan 
In terms of the reason for using pawnshops as opposed to other sources of instant cash 
loans from the customers‟ point of view, the findings reveals that pawnshops were 
preferred due to easy access due to the short period process, having the probability of 
getting the loan being high, having less hassle on procedure which requires less 
documentation and not having a credit check as compared to formal financing, and also 
the low cost of the loan.  
These results are in line with the findings of Johnson and Johnson (1998) and Maamor et 
al. (2005, 2006). Other factors such as privacy, the higher possibility of getting back the 
collateral, and convenient hours seems to be less important to the customers in terms of 
opting for pawnshops as their main source of instant cash loan.  
10.3.3.3 Determinants of pawnshop selection from the customers’ and 
pawnbrokers’ point of view  
The findings reveal that both types of pawnshop customers and pawnbrokers have 
different points of view in terms of factors that motivate them to deal with their preferred 
pawnshops to make loan.  
According to the results, customers patronised Islamic pawnshops mainly because of (i) 
no element of interest in loan; (ii) practicing more transparent processes in terms of 
procedures to determine the authenticity and valuing the collateral, the usage of 
computers for keeping the customers‟ profile and details of the loan, and the production 
of a very detailed receipt after the loan is approved; (iii) the security of the collateral is 
guaranteed in which all the collateral will be kept safe in a deposit boxes and are insured 
under the takaful insurance policy; (iv) a minimum fee is charged for the safekeeping of 
the pawned items based on the value of the collateral, whilst conventional pawnshops 
charge 2 – 3% of interest based on the amount of loan; (v) positive images such as Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia who conduct the pawn lending in a private room off the 
main office and the customer will be attended to privately, and this transaction would not 
be too obvious to other customers; and (vi) a high possibility in redeeming collateral as 
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compared to conventional pawnshops where, according to the conventional pawnbrokers‟ 
survey, most of them did not send a notice of the reminder of the expiration period to 
customers which led to a high percentage of unredeemed collateral in their pawnshops.  
It should be noted that the above findings correspond to Maamor et al. (2006) and 
Skully‟s (2005) findings, as they found that the underlying principles imposed by Islamic 
pawnshops such as loan free from interest, the collateral is guaranteed secured, and a very 
low safekeeping fee were among the main factors of customers patronising Islamic 
pawnshops. Undoubtedly, this result revealed that the cost of obtaining a loan from 
Islamic pawnshops was substantially lower than other sources of informal credit whereby 
Islamic pawnbroking charged about 1% per month of safekeeping fee rather than 
conventional pawnbrokers with 2% of interest rate, and moneylenders as high as 20% per 
month, which were consistent with Bhatt and Sinnakkannu (2008), Mohammed et al. 
(2005), Skully (2005), and Ismail and Ahmad‟s (1997) findings.  
However, on the contrary, the six factors mentioned above were revealed to be the major 
reasons as to why customers opted out of the conventional pawnshop. For example, the 
negative stigma or image of pawnshops still cannot be removed by society due to a very 
high/exorbitant interest rate per loan charged by the pawnbrokers (Bouman and Houtman, 
1988; Oeltjen, 1996; Visser and MacIntosh, 1998) and other malpractices mentioned by 
Adnan (2004) in Chapter 5. As practiced in Malaysia, the counters in conventional 
pawnshops are built high off the floor to protect the pawnbrokers from any possibility of 
crime. Although the structure of the counter is related to the security, it seems that there 
is a different caste between the customer and pawnbroker which will lead to the 
humiliation of the customer. 
All of the above results from the perspective of the Islamic and conventional customers 
are likely to be the reasons as to why the degree of satisfaction with all processes (such as 
lending, redeeming, extending, auctioning, compensating, and complaining) undergone 
by customers in the Islamic pawnshops is higher than those who deal with conventional 
pawnshops. One of the examples of high satisfaction in the auctioning process undergone 
in Islamic pawnshops is the fact that if the borrower fails to redeem their belongings by 
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the maximum period allowed, a notice of reminder will be sent to the customer informing 
them that the item will be auctioned off. After being auctioned off, if the borrower cannot 
be traced, the Islamic pawnshop is responsible in handing out the surplus from the 
auction in the Baitulmal so that the customers or their heir can claim it in future which, as 
a practice, is not implemented by conventional pawnshops. 
Interestingly, results also reveal that conventional pawnshops are still patronised by some 
customers despite their malpractices and oppression to the customers due to (i) the 
acceptance of a wide spectrum of items as collateral such as gold, silver, grants, electrical 
appliances, and branded watches as compared to Islamic pawnshop which only permit 
limited items such as gold
72 
and recently diamond;
73
 (ii) their speed in loan approval 
which, according to the pawnbrokers‟ survey, normally takes less than 10 minutes, whilst 
Islamic pawnshop will take a little bit longer, i.e. 10 – 20 minutes than that which is 
consistent with Lanäs and Nowak‟s (2007) findings, due to the documentation procedure 
and assessment of the collateral; (iii) knowledgeable and competence of the staff which 
can be explained with the fact that they have existed longer within a range of 21 to more 
than 30 years, whilst Islamic pawnshops have only been established within less than 10 
years to 20 years. A similar reasoning was found by Maamor et al. (2005); (iv) location 
of the conventional pawnshop being near to home or office; this corresponds to Ismail 
and Ahmad‟s (1997) study, whilst the accessibility of Islamic pawnshop in rural areas 
was still limited; (v) loyalty to traditional pawnbroking, which, as a result, is parallel to 
the result from the interviews with MGIT representative; and (vi) conventional 
pawnshops are more careful with confidentiality than certain Islamic pawnshops whereby 
borrowers from conventional pawnshops need not disclose the purpose of their lending, 
whilst, according to the interviewee from MAIDAM, their staff in the front desk tend to 
                                                          
72
 Undoubtedly, gold is permitted because it maintained its values over a period of time and can be easily 
stored (See for example Meera, 2008; Chan and Owyong, 2007; Khan and Nigar, 2004; Soon and Choon, 
2001; Ismail and Ahmad, 1997; and Bouman and Houtman, 1998). 
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 Based on the Islamic pawnbroking normal practice, diamond attached with ring or other jewellery will be 
excluded from being valued during the pawning transaction. But in 2009, YaPEIM under its ar-rahn 
cooperatives took the first attempt of accepting diamond as collateral alongside with gold. According to Dr. 
Abd. Malek Awang Kechil, Chief Executive Officer of YaPEIM, the acceptance of diamond was to give 
more value to the loan that the customer will received. 
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ask informally about the purpose of lending for their record. However, these factors tend 
to be the least important criteria in selecting Islamic pawnshop as the lender for instant 
cash loan. It can therefore be considered that these factors are perceived to be the 
challenges for Islamic pawnshops in competing with conventional pawnshops that have 
been in existence since the 15
th
 century. 
The above results seem to be parallel with Islamic and conventional pawnbrokers‟ 
opinions respectively in relation to being influenced by the decisions of their respective 
customers, although they ranked those factors in different level of importance. 
Having mentioned the above result from the customers‟ perception of conventional 
pawnshops, the Islamic pawnbrokers are expected to operate effectively and efficiently 
side by side with conventional pawnshops and finally capture the whole market of 
pawnbroking by pursuing the following strategies: diversifying the type of collateral; 
requiring less documentation in loan process; providing adequate training to their staff in 
order to enhance knowledge and competence especially in measuring the collateral value 
or evaluating the authenticity of the item; dispersing the location of the Islamic 
pawnshops in order to draw more customers, especially in rural areas and over populated 
areas in order to eliminate any monopoly of pawnshops; and finally providing a very 
good rapport between staff and customers, effectiveness in handling the pawn lending 
transaction, and maintaining the confidentiality of the customers.   
It should be noted that similar issues were raised by Maamor et al. (2006) in his attempt 
to locate the sources of patronage and in particular making reference to building up 
customers‟ loyalty, reputation of the pawnshop, and hence attract new comers to deal 
with Islamic pawnshops rather than their rival.   
10.3.4 Pawnshop Awareness 
The customers‟ survey findings reveal that conventional customers get information about 
pawnshops mainly from seeing signboards, friends and relatives, and newspapers, while 
television and radio advertisement, and the internet were not effective for conventional 
respondents. Similar findings were established by Johnson and Johnson (1998).  
223 
 
In contrast, respondents from Islamic pawnshops have been aware of the existence of 
their preferred pawnshops through a range of channels such as friends and relatives, 
signboards, television and radio advertisements, newspapers, and via the internet. These 
results show that Islamic pawnbroking institutions as an alternative to the conventional 
pawnbroking imply a wide range of channels in order to outreach customers especially 
lower-income groups. It can be inferred that conventional pawnshops in Malaysia have 
been in operation since the 15
th
 century; therefore, the customers were well informed of 
their existence.   
Furthermore, from the interview with MAIDAM, it was revealed that some Muslim 
customers still cannot differentiate between the safekeeping fee and interest rate. 
Therefore, staff in the front desk should be well equipped with the knowledge and 
competency, via intensive training, to educate the customers regarding the 
misconceptions on the safekeeping fee and the interest rate, and the prohibition of dealing 
with conventional pawnshops which involve riba and gharar. As for non-Muslim 
customers, the demand for this scheme by the Indians is quite promising, whilst the 
Chinese prefer to get small cash loans from moneylenders rather than pawnshops due to 
keeping gold as collateral being not part of their culture.  
It should therefore be noted that not only the pawnbrokers should promote the ar-rahn 
scheme to the society, but the relevant authorities also play an important role in order to 
increase awareness of this scheme. 
10.3.5 The Usage of Pawnshop Loan 
Although pawnbrokers do not question the purpose of lending from their customers 
(unlike other financial institutions), results from the customers‟ survey and Islamic 
pawnbrokers‟ interview reveal that customers tend to obtain loans from pawnshop for 
consumption purposes rather than production purposes. This finding is in line with 
previous research conducted by Mohamed (1986) and Maamor et al. (2006).  
Although it can be argued that borrowing for consumption purposes rather than 
production purposes can undermine the asset base of the society, all the interviewees 
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seem to suggest that the maslahah should be taken into consideration. They also claimed 
that once the domestic needs have been fulfilled, customers can channel their usage of 
loans to productive purposes that can contribute to the total economy even on a micro 
level.  
10.3.6 The Role of Pawnshop to the Society 
From the customers‟ survey, it is clear that customers recognise the positive role of 
Islamic pawnshops as a credit provider to the community, especially to those „vulnerable‟ 
borrowers as compared to conventional pawnshops. They consider Islamic pawnshop as 
credit providers who help solve financial exclusion, reduce social problems such as 
crime, an alternative to mainstream financial institution, and avoid them from dealing 
with riba and gharar transaction. In addition, they also believe that if the loan from 
pawnshops is used for consumption and no redemption, it will sustain their financial 
difficulty.  
Similarly, the pawnbrokers‟ survey also reveals the same result as above: all the Islamic 
pawnbrokers acknowledge the positive role of pawnshops to the society in terms of 
solving financial exclusion, mitigating social problems such as crime, being an 
alternative to mainstream financial institutions, and eliminating elements of riba and 
gharar in pawn lending. However, they disagree with the statement, which states that „if 
the loan is used for consumption and no redemption, it helps their business to sustain‟. 
The Islamic pawnbrokers disagree with the statement presumably because their main 
objective is not only to provide loans which are free from interest and the element 
gharar, but they also aim to fulfil the social obligation towards the society rather than 
prioritizing profit. Although the Islamic pawnbrokers do not aim to maximise their profit, 
the pawnbrokers‟ survey reveals that a majority of them did attain a positive profit for the 
last twelve months because of an increase in loan transactions due to customers switching 
to pawn lending rather than banks which have stringent loan approval due to the 
economic downturn, competitive rates, the increased repayment rate, and wide 
promotion, while most conventional pawnbrokers fail to gain profit because of decreased 
collateral price, increased loan default, competition from other pawnbrokers, and a lack 
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of promotion. These results indicate that the Islamic pawnshop has been acknowledged 
by society as an alternative to the traditional pawn lending with so many advantages, 
although the scheme has only been established for less than 20 years and can be a 
competitor to conventional pawnshops. In addition, the Islamic pawnshop has to give 
priority to maintaining social obligations to the customer instead of profit maximisation 
in order to build up the image of a pawnbroking business which previously had been 
criticised for making huge returns on small initial investments. 
10.3.7 Performance of Pawnshops Business in Economic Downturn 
The findings from the pawnbrokers‟ survey shows that all pawnbrokers agree with the 
impact of the economic downturn on pawnbroking business which is consistent with the 
research by Yahong (2008), Soon and Choon (2001), Bienkowski and Davis (1997), and 
Caskey (1991) but Bienkowski and Davis (1997) claims that this will only be applicable 
in the short-run.  
The degree of agreement in terms of this impact, however, is higher for the Islamic 
pawnbrokers rather than the conventional. Results reveal that Islamic pawnbrokers very 
much agreed with the positive impacts of the pawnbroking business in the economic 
downturn due to the fact that their businesses experienced an increased number of loans, 
repayment rates, and profit. In order to mitigate the financial difficulty consequences 
from economic downturn, pawning will be the „last resort‟ for people who are financially 
excluded and those groups with high risk due to stringent loan approval by mainstream 
financial institutions. Thus, the short-term impact of pawning is rather positive; in terms 
of mitigating the financial difficulty of the household and also microbalancing the total 
economy in the economic downturn.  
10.3.8 The Challenges of Pawnbroking Business 
The survey results indicate that both pawnbrokers are regulated under the Pawnbrokers 
Act 1972 with an exception under Section 17(1) for Islamic pawnbroking which allows 
licenses pawnbrokers to take profit on pawn lending. There are three institutions that are 
exempted from the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. These are all banks operating in Malaysia, 
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AgroBank, and the cooperatives society. Cooperatives and franchise cooperatives will be 
governed by Cooperatives Societies Act 1993, and Franchise Act 1998 alongside with the 
Ar-rahn Manual Guideline which is developed differently by each institution. 
Under these different regulations, the survey results show that a majority of the 
corresponding Islamic pawnbrokers were not satisfied with the current regulative 
environment which shows the ambiguousness of the Act, no specific regulation for 
Islamic pawnbroking and very stringent license granting by the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government. The findings related to the licensing issues seem to be consistent with 
Jaafar (as cited in Skully, 2005: 5), noting that “the Islamic pawnbroking business had 
not been expanded outside Kelantan into other states, partly due to difficulties in 
obtaining pawnbroking licenses from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government”.  
In terms of auditing, the findings show that all Islamic pawnbrokers follow a formal 
auditing procedure, which is conducted mostly by their internal auditors and some of 
them by the state government. However, most of the conventional pawnbrokers do not 
have formal auditing in their business. This result is consistent with the research by Soon 
and Choon (2001: 257), which categorized the pawnbroking business as “closed or 
informal”. Normally, the operation of the conventional pawnshops will be handled by the 
owner himself and support from the few staff that can be categorized as loyal and 
reliable.   
In terms of business challenges, the most common problem faced by both pawnbrokers is 
competition with other financial providers. Specifically, conventional pawnbrokers feel 
that they are challenged by the other conventional pawnshops, followed by money 
lenders (or known as „ah-long‟ in Malaysia), the ar-rahn pawnshops, cooperatives, the 
middlemen (especially in Kelantan), banks, and microcredit institutions. On the other 
hand, Islamic pawnbrokers stated that they were more threatened by other ar-rahn 
pawnshops, conventional pawnshops, cooperatives, moneylenders, and middlemen. 
The findings also demonstrate that both types of pawnbrokers also face a problem with 
loan default, especially conventional pawnbrokers. Although the risk of loan default in 
pawnbroking can be reduced by keeping their goods as security, this loan default has 
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become a major problem to the pawnbrokers if they cannot sell the items or the value of 
the items is lower than the amount loan given (Bienkowski and Davis, 1997: 7).   
The third common problem faced by pawnbrokers, especially conventional pawnbrokers, 
according to the study, is the difficulty in ascertaining the market value of some items 
such as branded watches, electrical appliances, or other types of jewellery such as 
diamonds. In order to have an accurate measurement on the item pledged, both 
pawnbrokers send their staff for training and get their measuring instruments verified by 
the Inspector.  
Furthermore, they also face the probability of having customers pawning stolen goods at 
their pawnshops. According to Bienkowski and Davis (1997: 12), if the customer pawns 
a stolen item, the pawnbroker will face the risk of losing the item when the real owner 
reclaims their item. In order to avoid this from happening, the findings reveal that 
conventional pawnbrokers will stringent loan approval or even report to the police 
regarding this mislead. As for Islamic pawnbrokers, they will stringent the loan approval, 
blacklist the customer, and also report to the police.  
Finally, one of the Islamic pawnbrokers experienced a problem regarding robbery in their 
premises which led to lost of the customers‟ collateral. Those respective customers had 
been given compensation by the respective pawnbrokers with the total amount equal to 
value of the item minus the amount of the loan given and the accumulated safekeeping 
fees before the collateral was lost. 
10.4 PROSPECT OF ISLAMIC PAWNBROKING 
As the analysis and the findings indicate, the future prospect of Islamic pawnbroking in 
Malaysia looks bright. By allowing Islamic pawnbroking to operate side-by-side with the 
conventional pawnbroking, it is hoped that they would be able to fulfil their main 
objectives towards the customers, pawnbrokers and also the policy makers.  
In this section, hence, the prospect of Islamic pawnbroking is discussed by assessing the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, namely through a SWOT analysis, with 
possible strategies for assessing the prospects.  
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10.4.1 Strengths 
10.4.1.1 High support and demand from Malaysian Muslims 
The current population of Malaysia is about 28.9 million and Muslims are about 55.36% 
of total population in Malaysia.
74
 Given the statistics, it becomes imperative to introduce 
products that are in conformity with shari‟ah such as the Islamic pawnbroking in 
Malaysia, as there is a wide potential demand from the Muslim community towards the 
product. Considering that Islamic finance is penetrating into the larger segments of the 
society, it is expected that Islamic pawnshops will follow suit to expand not only their 
presence but also their operations. 
10.4.1.2 Government support for development of Islamic pawnbroking 
The Malaysian government has taken a massive effort in developing the Islamic 
financing system and infrastructure since the establishment of the Pilgrims Fund 
Corporation in 1963, the first Islamic savings and investment institution to facilitate 
savings for pilgrimage to Makkah. In order to ensure that Islamic financing will be able 
to meet the needs of all segments of society, the government launched the first phase of 
the ar-rahn scheme under Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia in 1993. Currently, there are 
329 Islamic pawnshops operating in Malaysia from a total of 588 pawnshops. The 
Government‟s adamant strategy in expanding Islamic banking and finance and its 
articulations in different areas of financial life, makes it also possible for Islamic 
pawnshops to expand. 
10.4.2 Weaknesses 
10.4.2.1 No specific regulation for Islamic pawnbroking and no standardization in 
the existing Islamic Pawnbrokers Manual Guideline 
To date, there is no solid act or guideline imposed upon Islamic pawnbrokers other than 
the Pawnbrokers Act 1972. Each of these institutions establishes their own ar-rahn 
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 Retrieved 14
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 August 2010 from: 
http://www.epu.gov.my/html/themes/epu/images/common/pdf/eco_stat/pdf/1.2.5.pdf.  
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manual guidelines as a reference to Islamic pawnbroking operations. Despite the different 
manual guideline imposed by each institution, the contract is more or less the same; they 
may differ in terms of the loan margin and safekeeping fee. 
10.4.2.2 Lack of diversification in terms of collateral  
According to the survey, the most important reasons for the customers patronising 
conventional pawnshops are the acceptance of various types of collateral from everyday 
life. This is one of the main challenges for the Islamic pawnbroking because at present, 
they only accept gold (jewelleries or bar) and diamond as collateral due to the ease at 
liquidating gold through an auction in case of loan default. In contrast, conventional 
pawnbrokers are more lenient in terms of pledged items such as branded watches, vehicle 
grants, electrical appliances, etc. 
10.4.2.3 Lack of awareness about the existence of Islamic pawnshop  
Based on the interviews, conventional pawnbroking is still preferable due to the lack of 
awareness and knowledge about the existence of alternative sources of pawning which 
are in line with shari‟ah principles. In addition, although the total amount of Islamic 
pawnshops available is gradually increasing as opposed to the conventional pawnshops, 
people still go to the conventional pawnshops. 
10.4.2.4 Lack of branches in rural areas 
On the demand side, it seems that people from rural areas still use conventional 
pawnshops to obtain loans due to not having Islamic pawnshops in the periphery.   
10.4.2.5 Lack of monitoring from the local authority  
Although the government established the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 to regulate the 
pawnbroking business, some of the customers still are not satisfied with the pawnbroker‟s 
services in terms of valuing their collateral and other malpractices that is being discussed 
in Chapter 8. The local authority is only interested in regulating the institution but not the 
activities.   
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10.4.3 Opportunities 
10.4.3.1 Being alternative credit provider to the low-income and high-risk group  
As for those being excluded from the mainstream financial institutions because of lack of 
creditworthiness, they can be taken care of by introducing this scheme. It is here where 
the actual market potential of Islamic pawnbroking lies. Moreover, the survey conducted 
by this study on the customers revealed that there were different patterns in terms of the 
customers that deal with pawnshop. Traditionally, pawnshop lending is patronised by the 
low-income groups rather than the middle-income groups. The survey reveals that the 
middle-income and upper income customers now obtain loans from pawnshops, 
especially during the economic downturn where mainstream financial institutions are 
very stringent and selective in giving loans to high-risk customers to mitigate risks.  
10.4.3.2 Expanding the opportunity spaces for demand from the non-Muslim  
It is expected that Islamic pawnbroking in Malaysia is able to provide pawning services, 
not only to the Muslims, but to the non-Muslim customers as well as this study has 
evidenced there is a better economic deal offered by Islamic pawnshops compared to 
conventional ones. 
10.4.3.3 Economic opportunity with the development of Islamic pawnbroking 
With the concept of Islamic pawnbroking focusing more on productive purposes rather 
than consumption purposes, it will generate not only the borrowers‟ income but also 
contribute positively towards Malaysian economic growth as well. For example in 
Kelantan, Islamic pawnbroking is the most popular credit provider to the society, 
especially among the Muslim women‟s traders. Most of them do not resort to banks to 
finance their businesses due to lack of creditworthiness. By obtaining financing from 
Islamic pawnbrokers, they can use it as an initial capital or to expand their business with 
innovative changes which finally will improve their own economic position and increase 
women empowerment.  
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The opening of Islamic pawnbroking by banks can definitely be one of the routes to 
expand this scheme. Currently, Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia creates opportunities to 
any cooperatives intending to open Islamic pawnshops. The bank fulfils their dreams by 
providing capital to the cooperatives under the principles of mudharabah or trust 
financing. 
Unlike the banking sector, the study also reveals that Islamic pawnbroking is sustainable 
and is growing in area, as it is experiencing an increase in the number of loans and gain 
profit regardless of the current global economic crisis. Basically, during the economic 
crisis, banks will squeeze out high-risk customers in order to mitigate risk. Hence, 
pawnbroking will be the next saviour for them to fulfil their money shortage.  
10.4.4 Threats 
10.4.4.1 Competition from other informal financing  
According to the findings, one of the biggest challenges to the Islamic pawnbroking 
business is competition by other small-credit providers including Islamic pawnbroking 
providers themselves, the conventional pawnbrokers, cooperatives (franchise), 
moneylenders and middlemen (person who buy gold). Customers still patronise 
conventional pawnshops due to the acceptance of various collateral, the speed in loan 
approval, knowledgeable and competent staff, location near to office/home, and the 
loyalty factor.  
Apart from conventional pawnbroking, illegal moneylenders or ah-long activity has 
become another challenge to Islamic pawnbroking. The moneylender activity is carried 
out as an illegal activity widely in Malaysia. This type of moneylenders provides ready 
cash advances to small income individuals and also for small scale businessmen with 
very high interest (as high as 20% per month) and other unfair charges like agreement 
fees and stamp duty charges. The only attraction of such activity is that the borrower need 
not pledge any collateral but to sign some documents. The challenge for Islamic 
pawnbroking specifically is that even people with gold jewelleries opt to borrow from 
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moneylenders although they have to pay an exorbitant interest with the possibility of 
getting harmful threats or even murder if they unable to pay the debt.  
10.4.4.2 Strict license granting due to political position  
As the analysis of the interviews indicated, due to political reasons, Islamic pawnbroking 
faces a problem in obtaining license from the local authority.  
10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis so far and the SWOT analysis in this chapter, the following 
recommendations can be offered: 
(i)  Based on the interviewers with the Islamic pawnbrokers, it seems that they are 
facing a problem of getting license from the local authority, which creates an 
obstacle in front of the expansion of the Islamic pawnbroking. Therefore the 
government should be able to cater all the demands from Malaysian Muslims. 
With the existence of Islamic-based pawnshops, government strategies can help 
will divert the customers away from using interest-based product.  
On the other hand, the local authorities can come out with a policy of opening 
the windows of Islamic pawnshops in existing conventional pawnshops in order 
to capture loyal conventional pawnshops‟ customers to deal with Islamic 
pawnbroking transaction.  
 Support from the government and state governments and Islamic institutions are 
also vital, especially at the growth stage of these pawnshops. They should come 
out with short-term and long-term plans for the Islamic pawnbroking scheme in 
order to improve the well-being of the Muslim community in Malaysia. 
(ii)  The government should initiate some amendments to the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
to make the regulations applicable to both types of pawnshops. In order to 
support the growth of the Islamic pawnbroking, the government should be more 
encouraging in terms of license granting to the institutions that are interested in 
offering the scheme. Although recent amendments in the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
233 
 
(See Pawnbrokers Act 1972, List of Section Amended, p. 54-56) relating to 
license granting to procedures in pawning and the pawnbroker‟s responsibility 
seem to enhance the protection for the consumers and the proper guideline to 
the pawnbrokers, it seems that there is no specific legislation for Islamic 
pawnshops. In addition, all the amendments will be ineffective if there is lack of 
enforcement by the relevant authorities and cooperation from the public. The 
relevant authorities should come out with a proposal for a standard regulation 
for Islamic pawnshops in order for them to provide better services and 
simultaneously provide better protection to the customers. The local authorities 
should also go on-site or establish formal auditing to ensure that all the 
pawnbrokers follow the rules stated in the act and to ensure the protection of the 
rights of both parties. 
As for Islamic pawnbroking institutions, they should take the initiative to 
expand their branches in rural areas and also over populated areas so that the 
community can have access to Islamic pawnbroking schemes which are interest-
free rather than conventional pawnshops which are definitely based on interest. 
Islamic pawnbrokers must take aggressive measures to create awareness among 
prospective customers and to change the negative stigma attached to 
pawnbroking in the society. With these potential customers, it means that there 
is a huge market which can be tapped by Islamic pawnbroking.  
(iii) Based on the findings from the customers‟ point of view, the factors that 
influenced them most in terms of pawnshop selection were the underlying 
principles of the product, which are an interest-free base and also the lower fee 
charge. This indicates that the customers opted for the Islamic pawnbroking 
genuinely due to the shari‟ah concerns (religious factor) and also the fee that 
they have to pay to obtain loan (economic incentive).  
Although the fee rate is quite high as compared to the profit rate charged by 
banks (See table 5.8 in Chapter 5), the  pawnshops can still be an alternative 
financing to those with low-income and high risk who will still benefit from the 
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pawnshops‟ lending, especially from Islamic pawnbroking. Therefore, Islamic 
pawnbrokers must ensure that they are genuinely in compliance with the Islamic 
law and charge a very reasonable fee in order to avoid any misconceptions of 
the product. 
 The Islamic pawnbrokers should consider waiving the fee charge or, in other 
words, al-qardhul hasan (that is currently being practice by only one Islamic 
pawnbroker such as MGIT) under certain income levels to attract more 
customers and at the same time help the needy, which is parallel to the Islamic 
teaching. The fee charge should be more competitive in order for them to be 
sustainable in this business and at the same time charge a reasonable rate in 
order to protect customers from feeling oppressed. By introducing Islamic 
pawnbroking, it is hoped that the borrowing trend from loan sharks can 
gradually be reduced or eliminated in the long-term along with the potential 
reductions in conventional pawnbroking. 
 The survey also shows that Islamic pawnbroking is making significant inroads 
within the non-Muslim part of the society. The providers of Islamic 
pawnbroking should increase their promotional activities towards the ar-rahn 
product, although it‟s quite impossible due to their loyalty to traditional 
pawnbroking. 
(iv) In order to compete and be able to replace conventional pawnbroking and other 
informal financing, Islamic pawnbroking needs to improve the services not only 
in terms of diversifying their collateral acceptance, such as accepting vehicle 
grants or trust funds; but also improving the speed in loan approval with less 
documentation such as scanning the customers‟ MyCard to get the customers‟ 
personal detail; sending their staffs for training in order to enhance their 
knowledge and competency in valuing collateral; opening more branches that 
are easy for the customers to access, especially in the rural area, and thus attract 
loyal conventional pawnbroking customers, especially the Muslims, to deal with 
Islamic pawnshops which are free from riba, gharar, and promote social justice 
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to the borrower. Apart from that, the Islamic pawnbrokers should give discounts 
to those customers who do early repayment in order to encourage the customers 
to deal with them. Up to now, there is no discount promotion given to customers 
from all Islamic pawnbroking providers. Governments, on the other hand, 
should design and enforce regulations that will allow Islamic pawnshops to 
remain profitable without exploiting the customers who depend on them.  
In terms of license granting, governments should intervene in granting license 
processes to ensure a transparent process is taken in dealing with it. 
10.6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As part of applied social science related research, similar to any other study, hence, this 
research has also suffered from some limitations in terms of resources and time frame of 
the study. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the literature on pawnshops, especially Islamic 
pawnbroking, is very limited, which has affected the study as was stressed by Caskey 
(1991) as “The Forgotten Market”. In addition, there is no formal statistical data on 
pawnshops available at the Central Bank or other institutions except for a list of 
pawnshops operating in Malaysia, including two Islamic pawnbrokers which are obliged 
by the Pawnbrokers Act 1972 which can be downloaded at the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government website.  
In terms of collecting data and responses from three main players such as the customers, 
pawnbrokers, and the Islamic pawnbrokers, the researcher faced a limitation of time and 
lack of cooperation from the respondents. Presumably, they did not want to give full 
cooperation to the researcher due to the potential reasons: (i) majority of the customers 
came from a lower and middle income people with a less-educated background and they 
felt embarrassed being seen pawning their belongings as if they were too desperate of 
money; (ii) most conventional pawnbrokers were Chinese, thus they felt that filling the 
questionnaire would only waste their time and may chase away their customers from 
dealing with them, plus some of the Chinese old folks were not articulate either in Malay 
or English; and (iii) the Islamic pawnbrokers from the branches were not willing to fill in 
the questionnaires because they claimed that the headquarters had already filled it.  
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Nevertheless, although these limitations had a significant effect on the research, the 
researcher remained adamant to ensure all the objectives of the study mentioned in 
Chapter 1 would be answered and the research can, hence, contribute to the body of 
knowledge.  
In addition, it is hoped that the findings would also be very useful to the pawnbrokers and 
also the policy makers in order to improve the image of pawnshops, the regulatory 
environment related to pawnshops, the potential of pawnshops as a credit provider to all 
strata of the society in Malaysia, and their potential in microbalancing the total economy. 
Below, the researcher listed six possible ways in which research could be extended in the 
future: 
(i) A comparative analysis between Islamic pawnbroking and other informal 
 finance as a credit provider for the low-income groups; 
(ii) A comparative analysis between lending from Islamic pawnbroking and  the 
 personal loans offered by banks; 
(iii) Expanding the sample base of customers and pawnbrokers from each state in 
Malaysia (Peninsular and East Malaysia) in order to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the pawnshops‟ roles and their contribution to the total 
economy; 
(iv) Conducting a comparative study on the operation and performance of Islamic 
pawnbroking between Malaysia and other Asian countries such as Indonesia, 
Brunei, and Thailand;  
(v) Exploring and analysing the potential of Islamic pawnbroking loans as capital 
 accumulation or investment to the borrower; and 
(vi) The research can also be expanded into the role of Islamic pawnbroking on 
 empowering women through measuring their involvement in Islamic 
 pawnbroking and also the impact this has had on their lives.  
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10.7 EPILOGUE 
It is important to recognise the invaluable contribution of the pawnshop industry to 
Malaysia socially, economically, and historically. Having existing over thousands of 
years, pawnbrokers are actually improving their image by demonstrating the benefits of 
offering credit access to low-income groups and presumably the middle and higher-
income groups with high risk given their current economic condition where mainstream 
financial institutions are stringent in their loan approval. With all the advantages and a 
new reform of the pawnbroking industry shown by the Islamic pawnbroking that is 
pioneered by Malaysia, it will help to build up the reputation and the image of this 
business which was previously associated in the public mind with poverty and crime.  
Finally, it is hoped that with this study can contribute to a better understanding of 
pawnbroking, which can duly be appreciated due to its positive roles as a complement to 
mainstream financial institutions.  
This study fulfilled the aim and objectives set in the first chapter, as evidenced through 
the literature survey and empirical analysis conducted in the relevant chapters. 
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A SURVEY OF 
 
MICROCREDIT THROUGH ISLAMIC PAWNSHOPS IN 
MALAYSIA AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
(CUSTOMER) 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
For Office Use Only: 
 
Date of interview  :  Respondent number :   
 
Time of interview :  Region    :     ……………… 
  
     
     
 
 
   
General Instructions and Information 
 
1. All individual responses to this questionnaire 
 will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
4. For most questions, tick the box(es) most 
applicable to you as for some, you would 
need to rank according to your preferences. 
 
5. Please tick (√) in an appropriate box. Your 
answers are very important to the accuracy. 
of the study. 
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
1. Gender:  
 
  Male     Female 
 
2. Age: 
 
 Below 20    41 – 50  
  20 – 30    Above 50 
  31 – 40  
  
3. Race: 
  
 Malay     Indian  
  Chinese    Others (Please specify):  
       ...................................... 
 
4. Religion: 
 
 Islam     Buddhism  
  Christianity    Others (Please specify):  
  Hinduism     ………………………. 
 
5. Please state your educational level: 
  
 No formal education   Certificate/ Diploma 
  Primary school   Bachelor/ Postgraduate  
  Secondary school   
 
6. Marital status: 
 
 Single   (Proceed to Question 9)    
  Married  (Proceed to Question 7) 
  Widow/Widower (Proceed to Question 7) 
 
7. Not counting yourself, what is your total number of dependents?  
 
 None  (Proceed to Question 9) 
  1 – 2   (Proceed to Question 8) 
 3 – 5  (Proceed to Question 8) 
  6 – 8   (Proceed to Question 8) 
  More than 8  (Proceed to Question 8) 
   
 
SECTION 1 : PERSONAL INFORMATION  
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8. Out of your dependents, how many is in full-time education?   
 
 None     4 
  1       5 
 2     More than 5   
 3 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
9. What statement describes your work status?  
 
 Government servant   Farmer or fisherman 
  Private sector employee  Student    
  Businessman    Housewife 
 Small business   Retired 
 Shopkeeper    Unemployed/ Searching for job 
 Petty trader/ hawker   Driver 
 Labour     Other (please specify): 
      ……………………… 
    
10. What statement describes your spouse‟s work status? (if applicable) 
 
 Government servant   Farmer or fisherman 
  Private sector employee  Student    
  Businessman    Housewife 
 Small business   Retired 
 Shopkeeper    Unemployed/ Searching for job 
 Petty trader/ hawker   Driver 
 Labour     Other (please specify): 
      ……………………… 
 
11. Do you have any other sources of income? Rank the following consideration as 
one (1) being the most important, and four (4) being the least important:  
 
 None 
  Rental (e.g. house rental/ land pawning) 
  Wage (e.g. part-time job)    
  Profit/ Interest (e.g. direct selling/ investment)   
 Beneficiary (e.g. zakat provision/ the Hard Core Poor Development  
  Programme/ the Department of Social Welfare Malaysia/ scholarship) 
 Pension 
 Monthly allowance 
 Other (please specify): 
  ………………………  
 
SECTION 2 : HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENSES 
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12. What is your approximate total monthly household income?   
 
 RM0 – RM500   RM1,001 – RM2,000 
  RM501 – RM1,000   Above than RM2,000 
 
13. What is your approximate total monthly household expenditure?   
 
 Below than RM100   RM301 – RM400 
  RM101 – RM200   RM401 – RM500 
  RM201 – RM300   Above than RM500 
 
14. Is your total monthly household income sufficient for your living expenses?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 16) 
 No (Proceed to Question 15) 
 
15. Why do you think your total monthly household income is insufficient?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  I have no job            
  Being dismissed from employment 
  Children begin their schooling/ starts academic term in college or   
  university 
 Family member is sick 
 Spouse has no job   
 Increase in family member  
 Cost of living is very high  
 Tied with big amount of debt  
 Newly wed 
 Business performance fall 
 Unstable income 
 Others (Please specify): 
..................................... 
 
 
 
16. Do you have any account in bank? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 18) 
 No (Proceed to Question 17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 : MOTIVATION 
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17. Reason as to why you do not have bank account: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Rejected by the bank   
 Does not have any saving  
 Does not believe with the bank services 
 Limited access to financial service in my area 
 Unstable income and employment pattern 
 The existence of informal financial institution which provide more 
convenient financial services  
 Others (Please specify): 
..................................... 
 
18. If you need instant cash for today, where would you consider going? Rank the 
following consideration as one (1) being the most preferable, and seven (7) being 
the least preferable:  
 
 Bank 
 Cooperative company 
 Pawnshop 
 Moneylender (e.g. „ah-long‟ or „chettiar‟) 
  Get a cash advance from a credit card  
 Relatives 
 Friends 
  Others (please specify): 
       ………………………. 
 
19. Why do you choose pawnshop to get instant cash? Rank the following reason as 
one (1) being the most important, and eight (8) being the least important: 
 
 The probability of getting the loan is high 
 No credit check 
  Short time to get cash 
  Cost of the loan is low 
 Little paper work 
 Convenient hours 
 Privacy during process 
 Possibility of redemption/getting back the item 
  Others (please specify): 
       ………………………. 
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
20. In the last 12 months, how many times have you got cash loans at pawnshops 
(including today)? 
Pawnshop 
 
None 
Once Twice 
Three 
times 
Four to 
six times 
More than 
six times 
Ar-rahn       
Conventional       
 
21. Which types of pawnshop that you prefer? 
 
 Ar-rahn    Conventional  
 
22. How did you learn about this pawnshop?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Signboard    
  Recommendation from friends or relatives   
 Newspaper advertisement 
 Television and radio advertisement 
 Internet 
  Others (please specify):  
.……………………… 
 
23. How much do the following factors influence your choice of pawnshop? Rank 
the following reason as one (1) being the most important, and thirteen (13) being 
the least important: 
 
 Underlying principle impose on the lending (e.g. granting interest- free  
  loan).  
 Speed in loan approval (e.g. little of paperwork and no credit check). 
  Lower interest rate/ fee rate. 
  Acceptance of various collateral. 
 Location being near home or workplace. 
 Confidentiality (e.g. pawner information and private room for dealing). 
 Convenient (e.g. available parking space, interior comfort) 
  Knowledgeable and competent staff. 
  Possibility of redemption/getting back the item. 
 The security of the collateral guaranteed. 
 The process is more transparency (e.g. valuing the collateral, 
 auctioning) 
 Image of the pawnshop. 
 Loyalty. 
 Others (please specify): 
       ………………………. 
SECTION 4 : AWARENESS AND PREFERENCES 
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24. Are you aware of the existence of other alternative pawnshop beside this one? 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
25. What is your purpose of going to this pawnshop today? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Pawning    
  Redeeming   
  To extend redemption period  
  Safekeeping 
 
26. Thinking of your pawn today, why did you need the money?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Medical expenses    Gift for other(s) 
  Utility bills    Buying property (e.g. house, etc) 
  Household expenses   Education expenses 
 Repayment for other loan  Start-up business 
  Car expenses (personal)  Extend business 
  Festival celebration expenses  Car expenses (business) 
 Refinancing household     Others (please specify):  
  appliances    ………………………. 
 Treat for yourself 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
27. What type of item that you used as collateral? 
 
 Jewellery (Gold)   
  Jewellery (Silver)    
 Grant (e.g. letter of undertaking)   
 Electrical appliances 
 Branded watch 
 Others (please specify): ……………………….  
 
28. Who is the real owner of the collateral? 
 
  Myself     Relatives 
  Spouse     Others (please specify): 
   Children    ………………………. 
SECTION 5 : PURPOSE OF PAWNING 
SECTION 6 : TYPE OF ITEM PLEDGE 
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
29. What are the documents that you have to provide during the pawning transaction? 
 
 Collateral    Receipt purchase of item 
 Identification card   Others (please specify): 
      ………………………. 
 
30. How long did the whole process take? 
 
 Less than 10 minutes   21 – 30 minutes 
  10 – 20 minutes   More than 30 minutes 
 
31. Was the staff who dealt with your pawning transaction knowledgeable and 
competent in measuring the value of your collateral? 
 
 Very knowledgeable and competent. 
  Lack of knowledge and competence. 
  I did not care about the staff‟s knowledge and competency. 
 
32. What is the amount of loan that you received from the pawnshop today? 
   
 Maximum loan that is approved by the pawnbroker. 
  Limited to the amount that is needed. 
 
33. Do you know the interest rate/ fee that you are paying? 
 
 No charge 
  Safekeeping fee based on the value of the collateral 
  Interest rate of 2% 
  Interest rate of more than 2% 
  I do not care 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
34. Period of redemption offered by the pawnbroker: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 1 – 6 months 
 7 – 12 months  
 More than 12 months 
 
 
SECTION 7 : PROCESS OF LENDING  
SECTION 8 : PROCESS OF REDEMPTION AND EXTENSION  
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35. Are you aware of the possible outcome if there is no repayment within the 6 
months period from the date of pawning, or of such longer period as may have 
been agreed between a pawnbroker and the pawner?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 The pawnbroker will endorse a notice to the pawner. 
 The pawnbroker will allow you to make an extension/ renew contract. 
 If the collateral value is below RM200, it will become the property of the 
pawnbroker. 
 If the collateral value is more than RM200, the pawnbroker can dispose of 
it by auction. 
 
36. How long is the extension period offered by the pawnbroker? 
 
 Less than 3 months   Others (please specify): 
 More than 3 months    ………………………..  
 
37. Have you ever failed to redeem your collateral in the last 12 months?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 38) 
 No (Proceed to Question 40)  
 
38. How many times did you lose (forfeit)? 
  
 Once     Three times 
  Two times    More than three 
 
39. What might be the reasons for this?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Not enough cash to redeem            
  Being dismissed from employment 
  Spouse being dismissed from employment  
  Children begin their schooling 
 Family member is sick  
 Increase in family member  
 Money used for festival celebration (e.g. Eid Fitri, Chinese New Year, 
Deepavali or Christmas) 
 Pay other debts 
 Business performance fall 
 Others (Please specify): 
..................................... 
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40. If you managed to redeem your collateral back, you managed through 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  using the money productively. 
  salary/ bonus. 
  receiving unexpected money. 
  borrowing from formal financial institutions (e.g. banks). 
  borrowing from informal financial institutions (e.g. moneylender). 
  borrowing from the family members/ friends. 
 monthly allowance. 
 saving. 
  Others (please specify): ………………………. 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
41. Have you ever received any notice from the pawnbroker about your unclaimed 
item that will be auctioned? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 42) 
 No (Proceed to Question 46) 
 
42. Did you redeem your collateral after receiving the notice? 
  
 Yes (Proceed to Question 46) 
 No (Proceed to Question 43) 
 
43. If your collateral being auction by the pawnbroker, did you receive any surplus of 
the sale of the item?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 44 and 46) 
 No (Proceed to Question 45) 
 
44. What is the value of the surplus? It is equal to ………………………………… 
 
  the present market value of the item minus the outstanding balance of 
 your loan and accumulated fee/ interest charge.  
  depends on the pawnbrokers judgement.  
  I do not know about the calculation.  
 
45. What is the reason that you did not receive any surplus from the auction? 
 
 The value of the collateral is below RM200. 
 I did not know that I can claim the surplus. 
 I do not care about the surplus.  
SECTION 9 : PROCESS OF AUCTION  
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
46. Have you ever experienced your collateral lost in the pawnshop?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 47) 
 No (Proceed to Question 49) 
 
47. Did you get any compensation from the pawnbroker?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 48) 
 No (Proceed to Question 49) 
 
48. What is the value of the compensation? It is equal to 
 
 25% more than the amount of loan. 
 the value of the item minus the amount of loan given and accumulated fee/ 
interest charge before the collateral lost. 
 depends on the pawnbroker‟s judgement.  
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
49. Have you experienced any problems when dealing with the pawnbroker?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 50) 
 No (Proceed to Question 55) 
 
50. What is the nature of the problem? 
 (Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Decreasing value of collateral after redeemed. 
 Low collateral value. 
 Higher interest/fee charge. 
 Pawnbroker charge for replacement of pawn ticket. 
 Inappropriate use of term on pawn ticket.  
  Pawnbroker auctioned the collateral worth more than RM200 without  
  informing the pawner. 
  Pawnbroker do not returned any surplus from the auction. 
  Pawner do not received any notice from the pawnbroker regarding  the  
  expiration period of the loan and the auctioning of the collateral. 
 Collateral lost/ stolen in the hand of the pawnbroker. 
  Others (please specify): 
  ………………………. 
  
SECTION 10 : PROCESS OF COMPENSATION 
SECTION 11 : PROCESS OF COMPLAINT 
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51. Did you make any complaint regarding the problem?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 52) 
 No (Proceed to Question 55) 
 
52. To whom did you refer your complaint? 
 
 The pawnbroker itself 
 Police officer 
 Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs  
 Ministry of Entrepreneur and Co-operative Development  
 Federation of Malaysian Consumers Associations (FOMCA) 
 Malaysia Co-operative Societies Commission 
 States Government 
 Others (please specify): 
 ………………………. 
 
53. Did they take any action regarding your complaint? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 54) 
 No (Proceed to Question 55) 
 
54. Was the outcome in favour of you? 
 
 Yes     No 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
55. As a conclusion, please state the level of satisfaction from the services you 
received from going to this pawnshop according to the following process.  
Process 
Absolutely 
not 
satisfied 
Not 
Satisfied 
Do not 
know 
Satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
 Lending      
 Redeeming      
 Extend 
redemption 
period/Renew 
contract 
     
 Auctioning      
 Compensating  
(if applicable)  
     
 Complaining  
(if applicable) 
     
 
SECTION 12 : PRODUCT SATISFACTION 
251 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
56. Did the initial money you borrowed from pawnshop fulfill its objective?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 58) 
 No (Proceed to Question 57) 
 
57. In what ways?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Medical expenses    Gift for other(s) 
  Utility bills    Buying property (e.g. house, etc) 
  Household expenses   Education expenses 
 Repayment for other loan  Start-up business 
  Car expenses (personal)  Extend business 
  Festival celebration expenses  Car expenses (business) 
 Refinancing household     Others (please specify):  
  appliances    ………………………. 
 Treat for yourself 
 
58. Do you think pawnbroking helped you in a positive manner?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 59)  
 No (Proceed to Question 60) 
 
59. In what ways?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Enabled to finance my economic activity (e.g. start-up or expand   
  business). 
 Helped to overcome my money shortage for consumption purpose. 
 Helped to finance the consumption purpose. 
 Helped to finance education expenses. 
 Improved my standard of living. 
 Improved my business performance. 
 Helped to survive during recession. 
 As a safekeeping. 
 Others (please specify): 
  ………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 13 : IMPACT AND OPINION 
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60. Would you please state your opinion on the following statements related to 
pawnshops? 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Do not 
know 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 Helps to solve 
financial exclusion. 
     
 Helps to solve 
social problem 
such as poverty or 
crime. 
     
 It is an alternative 
to the formal 
financial institution 
(e.g. banks). 
     
 Conforms to my 
faith of abstaining 
from riba.  
     
 When it is used for 
consumption and 
no redemption, it 
sustains financial 
difficulty. 
     
 
61. In overall, do you think you are financially better off pawning your 
 belongings? 
 
  Yes 
  No  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance in 
providing this information is very much appreciated. 
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A SURVEY OF 
 
MICROCREDIT THROUGH ISLAMIC PAWNSHOPS IN 
MALAYSIA AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
(PAWNBROKER) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    
 
For Office Use Only: 
 
Date of interview  :  Pawnbroker‟s branch code :   
 
Time of interview :  Respondent number           :  
     
    Region    :     ……………… 
  
 
 
   
    
General Instructions and Information 
 
1. All individual responses to this questionnaire 
 will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. 
 
2. For most questions, tick the box(es) most 
applicable to you as for some, you would 
need to rank according to your preferences. 
 
3. Please tick (√) in an appropriate box. Your 
answers are very important to the accuracy. 
of the study. 
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
1. Years of establishment:  
  
 Less than 10 years   21 – 30 years 
  11 – 20 years    More than 30 years   
  
2. Type of ownership: 
 
  Sole proprietorship   Cooperative  
  Partnership    Branch  
  Corporation    Others (please specify): 
       ………………………. 
 
3. Source of capital: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
  
 Own capital 
 Loan from banks 
 Borrowed from family/relatives and friends 
 Subsidized by the state government    
 Parent company  
 Cooperative members‟ share     
 Others (please specify): 
………………………. 
 
4. Number of staffs employed: 
 
  Less than 2    4 – 5   
  2 – 3      More than 5 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
5. Individual that can make loan: 
 
 Owner of the collateral. 
 Any person regardless the real owner of the collateral. 
 Others (please specify): 
 ………………………. 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2 : PROCESS OF LENDING 
SECTION 1 : BUSINESS INFORMATION  
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6. Acceptance of collateral: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Jewellery (Gold)   Grant (e.g. letter of undertaking) 
  Jewellery (Silver)   Branded watch  
 Diamond    Others (please specify): 
   Electrical appliances    ………………………. 
  
7. Fee/interest charge: 
 
  No charge   (Proceed to Question 9)    
  Safekeeping fee  (Proceed to Question 8)   
  Interest rate of 2%  (Proceed to Question 8) 
  Interest rate of more than 2% (Proceed to Question 8) 
 
8. If you charge fee/ interest for pawnbroking services, how do you determine the 
fee/interest?  
 
  Based on the amount of loan.  
  Based on the value of the collateral. 
  Others (please specify): 
  ………………………. 
 
9. Number of customers visiting pawnshop per day: 
 
 Less than 10    21 – 30  
  11 – 20    More than 30  
 
10. Loan offered from the percentage of the collateral: 
  
 Less than 50%    
  50% - 60%  
  61% - 70% 
  71% - 80%   
  Depends on the customers‟ demand (bargaining process)  
  Others (please specify): 
  ………………………. 
 
11. What are the documents that the customer has to provide during the pawning 
transaction? 
 
 Collateral    Purchasing receipt of collateral 
 Identification card    Others (please specify):  
      ………………………. 
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12. Who is in charge of measuring the value of the collateral? 
 
 The owner/manager  
 Qualified staff  
 External valuer 
 Others (please specify):  
 ………………………. 
 
13. What method do you use to record customer profile? 
 
 Database in the computer  Pawnbroker‟s sale book 
 Others (please specify):  
………………………. 
14. Details on the pawn ticket: 
 (Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Pawner‟s name   Total of loan 
 Pawner‟s address   Purpose of the loan  
 Type of collateral   Others (please specify): 
  Date of pawning   ………………………. 
 
15. The length of the loan approval process: 
 
 Less than 10 minutes   21 – 30 minutes 
  10 – 20 minutes   More than 30 minutes 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
16. The person who can redeemed: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  The owner of the collateral 
  Any person who have the pawn ticket 
 A person who has a letter of representative given by the real owner plus a 
photocopy of the real owner identification card 
    Others (please specify):  
………………………. 
 
17. Period of redemption: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 3 months or less 
 6 months and above    
 Others (Please specify): ..................................... 
 
SECTION 3 : PROCESS OF REDEMPTION 
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18. Extension period: 
 
 Less than 3 months   Others (please specify): 
 More than 3 months    ……………………….. 
 
19. Did you send any notice to the customers about the expiration period of lending? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
20. Percent of the customers‟ collateral not redeemed: 
 
  Less than 5%    16% – 20%  
  5% – 10%    21% – 25% 
 11% – 15%    More than 25% 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
21. What is the action taken towards the collateral that is not redeemed? 
 
  Auctioned the collateral to a registered auctioneer. 
  Sells the collateral at my pawnshop.  
  Melting the gold.  
  Others (please specify):  
  ………………………. 
 
22. Did you send any notice to the customers about the auctioning of the customers 
belonging? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
23. If there is a surplus after the unclaimed item being auction, did you return the 
surplus to the customer?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 30 and 31) 
 No (Proceed to Question 31) 
 
24. What will you do if no claim for the surplus is made within four months? 
 
  I will pay the surplus to the Accountant General within fourteen days  
  after the expiration of that period of four months. 
  The surplus will be transferred to Baitulmal.  
  The surplus will be transferred into the company‟s account.  
  Others (please specify): ………………………. 
SECTION 4 : PROCESS OF AUCTION  
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
25. Have you received any complaint from the customer?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 26) 
 No (Proceed to Question 27) 
 
26. What is the nature of the complaint? 
 (Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Decreasing value of collateral after redeemed. 
 Low collateral value. 
 Higher interest/fee charge. 
 Pawnbroker charge for replacement of pawn ticket. 
 Inappropriate use of term on pawn ticket.  
  Pawnbroker auctioned the collateral worth more than RM200 
 without informing the pawner. 
  Pawnbroker do not returned any surplus from the auction. 
  Pawner do not received any notice from the pawnbroker regarding the 
 expiration period of the loan and the auctioning of the collateral. 
 Collateral lost/ stolen in the hand of the pawnbroker. 
  Others (please specify): 
 ………………………. 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
27. Have you ever experienced the destroyed or damaged of collateral (because of 
fire, theft or robbery) held by you?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 28) 
 No (Proceed to Question 30) 
 
28. Did you give any compensation to the customer?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 29) 
 No (Proceed to Question 30) 
 
29. What is the value of the compensation? It is equal to 
 
  25% more than the amount of loan. 
  the value of the item minus the amount of loan given and accumulated  
  fee/interest charge before the collateral lost. 
  depends on the pawnbroker‟s judgement.  
SECTION 6 : PROCESS OF COMPENSATION 
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 (Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
30. The Act applicable for the business of pawnbroking: 
 (Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Pawnbrokers Act 1972 
  Co-operative Societies Act 1993   
  Development Finance Institutions Act 2002 
  Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994 
  Weight and Measurement Act 1972  
  Others (please specify):  
  …………………. 
 
31. Other regulation: 
 
 Ar-rahnu manual guidelines  
  Others (please specify): ………………………. 
 
32. Are you happy with the current regulative environment? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 34) 
 No (Proceed to Question 33) 
 
33. What is the reason? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Ambiguous regulation 
  No specific regulation for Islamic pawnbroking 
 Strict regulation  
 Strict in license granted 
  Others (please specify): ………………………. 
 
34. Do you follow a formal and independent auditing? 
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 35) 
 No (Proceed to Question 36) 
 
35. Which institutions? 
 
 Internal auditors 
 Independent auditors  
  Government auditor 
 State Government auditor 
  Others (please specify):  
………………………. 
SECTION 7 : REGULATION  
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(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
36. Common problems faced by the pawnbroker: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Loan default  
 Customer pawn stolen goods   
  Customer pawn non-authentic goods 
 Difficulty in establishing the value of the item 
 Collateral being destroyed or damaged (e.g. in consequence of fire, theft 
or robbery) 
 Competition from other pawnshops or other financial institutions 
  Others (please specify):  
………………………. 
 
37. The action to be taken out regarding customer misleading: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Report to the police 
 Stringent in loan approval 
  Blacklist the customer  
  Others (please specify):  
………………………. 
 
38. The action to be taken out regarding the accuracy of measurement: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Send staffs for formal training (e.g. measuring skills, identify the   
  authenticity of the collateral etc.) 
  Employ an external valuer 
  Use the measuring instrument verified by Inspector (according to the  
  Weight and Measurement Act 1972)    
  Others (please specify):  
  ………………………. 
 
39. Competition from other financial institutions: 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
 Ar-rahn pawnshops  
  Conventional pawnshops   
  Banks 
 Co-operatives 
 Microcredit institution (e.g. TEKUN and AIM)  
 Moneylender  
  Others (please specify): ………………………. 
SECTION 8 : PROBLEMS  
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40. In your opinion, how much do the following factors influence the customers‟ to 
deal with your pawnshop? Rank the following reason as one (1) being the most 
important, and fourteen (13) being the least important: 
  
  Underlying principle impose on the lending (e.g. granting interest-free  
  loan).  
  Speed in loan approval (e.g. little of paperwork and no credit check). 
  Lower interest rate/ fee rate. 
  Acceptance of various collateral. 
  Location being near home or workplace. 
  Confidentiality (e.g. pawner information and private room for dealing). 
  Convenient (e.g. available parking space, interior comfort). 
  Knowledgeable and competence staff. 
  Possibility of redemption/getting back the item. 
  The security of the collateral guaranteed. 
 The process is more transparency (e.g. valuing the collateral, 
 auctioning). 
  Image of the pawnshop. 
  Loyalty. 
  Others (please specify): 
        ………………………. 
 
 
 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
 
41. In the last 12 months, how frequent do the customers involve in the following 
process? 
Process Always 
Very 
often 
Sometimes Rarely Never 
 Lending      
 Redeeming      
 Extend 
redemption 
period 
     
 Auctioning      
 Compensation       
 Complaint      
 
42. Is there any impact on the pawnbroking business if there is an economic 
downturn?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 43)  
 No (Proceed to Question 44) 
 
 
SECTION 9 : IMPACT AND OPINION 
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43. In what ways?   
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Do not 
know 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 Increased number of 
loan. 
     
 Increased repayment 
rate. 
     
 Increased profit.      
 Alternative to bank.      
 Improved their image.      
 Microbalancing the 
total economy. 
     
 
44. In the last 12 months of operation, have you made any profit?  
 
 Yes (Proceed to Question 45)  
 No (Proceed to Question 46) 
 
45. How did you manage to make a profit?  
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Increased the number of loan. 
  Economic downturn caused the bank very selective of giving loans,  
  and consequently the customer will prefer to get loan from pawnshop. 
  Offered a very competitive pricing. 
  Increased in the price of the collateral (e.g. gold price). 
 Increased in the customers‟ repayment rate. 
 The acceptance of various types of collateral. 
 A wide promotion. 
  Others (please specify):  
  ………………………. 
 
46. What is the reason of not making profit? 
(Please tick as appropriate) 
 
  Increased in loan defaults. 
  Impact from the economic downturn.  
  Competition from other pawnbrokers. 
 Competition from other informal institutions.  
  Decreasing on the market price of the collateral (e.g. gold, other   
  valuable item). 
 The pawnshop objectives more towards the social impact rather than  
  profit making.  
 Limited types of collateral acceptance. 
 Lack of promotion. 
  Others (please specify):       
  ………………………. 
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47. Would you please state your opinion on the following statements as to the  nature 
 of pawnbrokers? 
Statement Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Do not 
know 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 Helps to solve 
financial exclusion. 
     
 Helps to solve 
social problem 
such as poverty or 
crime. 
     
 It is an alternative 
to the formal 
financial institution 
(e.g. banks). 
     
 Conforms to my 
faith of abstaining 
from riba.  
     
 When it is used for 
consumption and 
no redemption, it 
helps to sustain the 
business. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance in 
providing this information is very much appreciated. 
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To whom it may concern 
20
th
 February 2009 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
Re: Request for Interview on the Topic of “Microcredit through Islamic Pawnshops 
in Malaysia and its Socio-Economic Impact” 
I am a full time Ph.D student in Islamic Finance registered at the School of Government 
and International Affairs, Durham University, UK. Currently, I am conducting my 
fieldwork in Malaysia from 16
th
 February 2009 to 31
st
 May 2009.  
I will be conducting interviews with the institutions/individuals involved in Islamic and 
conventional pawnshops in Malaysia which is an essential part of my research. The 
purpose of the interview would be exclusively for the academic purposes in order to have 
a better understanding concerning the perceptions of pawnbrokers towards the role of 
pawnbroking in improving the socio-economic of the society. I will handle the 
information collected with confidentiality and sensitivity. I believe that your perspective 
will increase the knowledge that I have and will thus enable an expansive investigation 
into this area.  
Should you wish to answer the interview questions via email or phone, you can reply to 
my email or contact me with the details stated below. Herewith I attached the list of 
interview questions and a support letter from my supervisor, Dr. Asutay regarding this 
research.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require further information. Your assistance 
and cooperation are highly appreciated. 
I am looking forward to hearing from you.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Azila binti Abdul Razak 
Ph.D Researcher, Durham University, UK 
Email: azila1973@yahoo.co.uk 
Mobile phone: 019-7345291 
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APPENDIX 6D  
 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. When did this institution establish the ar-rahn product? 
 
2. What is the motivation of doing so? 
 
3. What are the salient shari‟ah features of Islamic pawnbroking? 
 
4. What particular shari‟ah problems are encountered in Islamic pawnbroking sector? 
 
5. In your opinion, can Islamic pawnbroking system be sustained by charging a 
minimal of safekeeping fees compared to the conventional? 
 
6. Is there any possibility to accept other types of collateral rather than gold in 
Islamic pawnbroking? 
 
7. Is there any intention to develop a standard regulation among the institution that 
provides Islamic pawnbroking? 
 
8. Do you think Islamic pawnbroking encourage consumption as opposed to used for 
production purpose? If this the case, do not you think that this runs against spirit of 
Islamic financing? Or do you think maslahah should be considered in 
understanding its use for consumption purpose? 
 
9. If Islamic pawnbroking is mainly used for consumption purpose, does not it 
undermine the asset base of the society? Should not this be avoided? 
 
10. Why do Muslims still use conventional pawnbroking while Islamic alternative is 
available? 
 
11. Is there any demand from the non-Muslim towards the Islamic pawnbroking 
product? 
 
12. Would you please comment on what can be done to increase product awareness? 
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APPENDIX 7A 
Crosstabulation of Age by Marital Status 
 
Marital status 
Total 
Single Married Widow 
Age < 20 5 0 0 5 
20 – 
30 
35 28 0 63 
31 – 
40 
8 79 2 89 
41 – 
50 
1 84 5 90 
> 50 0 45 19 64 
Total 49 236 26 311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
 
APPENDIX 7B 
The Means of Total Dependents of Household by Number of Dependents with Full-
time Education  
No. of Dependents with Full-time Education Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
None 2.41 61 .692 
1 2.78 32 .420 
2 3.31 49 .652 
3 3.22 50 .507 
4 3.58 36 .604 
5 4.00 26 .490 
> 5 4.50 6 .548 
Total 3.15 260 .794 
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APPENDIX 7C 
Crosstabulation of Occupation Background of the Respondents Spouse by Type of 
Pawnshop  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Ar-rahn Conventional 
Work (spouse) Government servant 24 17 41 
  Private 16 17 33 
  Businessman 12 10 22 
  Small business 20 13 33 
  Shopkeeper 3 0 3 
  Petty trader/hawker 1 0 1 
  Labor 9 2 11 
  Farmer/fisherman 10 5 15 
  Homemaker 45 24 69 
  Retired 4 0 4 
  Unemployed 2 0 2 
  Driver 0 2 2 
Total 146 90 236 
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APPENDIX 8A 
Crosstabulation of the Reasons of Not Receiving Surplus by Type of Pawnshop  
  
  
Pawnshop 
Total 
Ar-rahn Conventional 
Why did not 
receive any 
surplus? 
Collateral value below 
RM200 0 3 3 
  I did not know that I can 
claim the surplus 
3 5 8 
  I did not care 0 2 2 
Total 3 10 13 
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APPENDIX 8B 
Crosstabulation of Number of Customer by Region   
  
  
Zone 
Total 
Central Northern East Southern 
Customer < 10 0 0 2 2 
  11 – 20 2 1 2 5 
  21 – 30 8 3 0 11 
  > 30 1 9 2 12 
Total 11 13 6 30 
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APPENDIX 10A 
The Mean of Total Monthly Household Income by Type of Pawnshop    
  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Total household income 311 1 4 3.05 .922 
Valid N (listwise) 311     
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APPENDIX 8B 
Crosstabulation of Number of Customer by Region   
  
Zone 
Total 
Central 
Northern 
East Southern 
Customer < 10 0 0 2 2 
11 – 20 2 1 2 5 
21 – 30 8 3 0 11 
> 30 1 9 2 12 
Total 11 13 6 30 
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